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ABSTRACT 
In the years following World War II social activists learned to refine rhetorical techniques for 
gaining the attention of the new global mass media and developed anti-corporate campaigns to 
convince some of the world’s largest companies to concede to their demands. Despite these 
developments, rhetorical critics have tended to overlook anti-corporate campaigns as objects of 
study in their own right. One can account for the remarkable success of anti-corporate campaigns 
by understanding how activists have practiced prospective narrative disclosure, a calculated 
rhetorical wager that, through the public circulation of stories and texts disclosing problematic 
 practices and answerable decision makers, activists can influence the policies and practices of 
prominent corporations. In support of this thesis, I provide case studies of two anti-corporate 
campaigns: the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union vs. J. P. Stevens (1976 – 
1980) and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers vs. Taco Bell (2001—2005). Each campaign 
represents a typology of practice within prospective narrative disclosure: martial (instrumental 
emphasis) and confrontation/alliance (popular, constitutive emphasis) respectively. The former is 
more likely to spark defensive responses and public backlash, and the latter is more likely to 
sway entire market sectors and produce lasting changes in the de facto corporate social 
responsibility standards of global markets. 
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Chapter 1: Anti-Corporate Campaigns and Corporate Power 
“Corporations are the new public sphere.”  
Stanley Deetz
1
 
 
This dissertation began as an attempt to understand a conundrum. How is it that a group 
of marginalized farmworkers, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), was able to convince 
the world’s largest fast food corporation to heed their call to make substantial changes to its 
purchasing policies? In the interest of full disclosure, I should explain that my curiosity about the 
CIW’s accomplishments was driven by academic interests to be sure, but also by personal 
interests. I once taught high school English in Immokalee, the South Florida community that is 
home to the CIW. I later learned that a former student, whom I taught several years later in 
another school in the area, had been convicted of participating in a human-trafficking ring the 
CIW had worked to expose.
2
 When I first read about the CIW’s campaign against Taco Bell I 
dismissed it as a quixotic enterprise – farmworkers tilting at windmills. When one of my 
daughters later told me she would be supporting the CIW’s Taco Bell boycott, I shrugged off her 
actions as naïve optimism. It was not until Taco Bell and its parent company Yum! Brands 
signed an agreement with the CIW in 2005 that I became seriously interested in understanding 
the coalition’s accomplishments and those of other activists who determined to challenge the 
progress of corporate power. 
By way of explanation, the CIW’s victory came at a felicitous time; I had been taking 
graduate classes where I had been learning about critical theory and the subtle, pervasive 
                                                 
1 Stanley Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1992), 348. 
2 My former student’s name is Herman Covarrubias, and I first learned of his involvement through a story 
published in the Naples Daily News about a human-trafficking operation run by two brothers named Abel and 
Bacilio Cuello. According to the story, “The brothers and Covarrubias trapped workers with threats of calling 
immigration and physical violence if they left the [Cuellos’] camp. One worker said Covarrubias told him he’d shoot 
him and leave him in the groves when he complained about carrying heavy tomato pails.” Janine Zeitlin, “Slavery: 
Collier County’s Connection: Modern-Day Slavery Reaches from Immokalee Farm Fields to Prostitution in Golden 
Gate,” Naples Daily News, January 29, 2006.  
9 
intrusions of corporate discourse into daily life. In this context I began to think more carefully 
and seriously about what the CIW had accomplished and how improbable it all seemed. As 
someone who had worked for several years in Immokalee, Florida, I was familiar with the 
ramshackle, overcrowded housing where many of the farmworkers who make up the CIW live. 
In an age when the economic power of many corporations rivals that of the state, the 
accomplishments of these farmworkers struck me as almost unimaginable. Yet there was no 
denying what they had done. In just over three years, they had rallied thousands of supporters 
across the nation to call on Taco Bell to commit to eradicating slavery from the commercial 
tomato fields of South Florida. In the end, company management saw things the CIW’s way. On 
a warm spring day in Louisville, Kentucky in 2005, Jonathan Blum of YUM! Brands shook 
hands with Lucas Benitez of the CIW to signify an end to the campaign. Blum used the event to 
call on other companies in the fast food industry to follow his company’s lead by working with 
the CIW to improve wages and working conditions in commercial agriculture.
3
  
As it turned out, the Taco Bell agreement was but the most dramatic recent example in a 
broader trend. As I began to read more about anti-corporate activism, I encountered scores of 
other campaigns, beginning with the great Civil Rights Movements of the twentieth century and 
continuing to the present day, in which seemingly marginalized groups had overcome 
improbable odds in order to garner surprising concessions from prominent corporations.
4
 I 
eventually came to realize that the campaigns I had been reviewing constituted an important but 
largely understudied class of rhetorical practices. No previous studies had treated the rhetoric of 
anti-corporate campaigns as a subject sui generis, distinct from that of other types of social 
                                                 
3 In his speech that day, Blum told the crowd, “human rights are universal and we hope others [in the fast 
food industry] will follow our company’s lead.” Evelyn Nieves, “Accord with Tomato Pickers Ends Boycott of Taco 
Bell,” Washington Post, March 9, 2005. 
4 Examples include the “sit-ins” at Woolworth’s counters across the nation and the United Farm Workers 
grape boycotts of the 1970s. I discuss these events and others in more detail in chapter three.  
10 
movement campaigns related to ecology, globalization, and human rights. By treating anti-
corporate campaigns as a distinct rhetorical typology, I concluded, a dissertation length study 
could help to reinvigorate stalled debates over the nature of activist campaigns and contribute to 
newer discussions regarding the role of public decorum and kairos (strategic timing) in activist 
campaigns.
5
  
I eventually surveyed more than 170 anti-corporate campaigns over the last four 
decades.
6
 Some of these actions, like the Taco Bell campaign, appeared to be unqualified success 
stories in which activist groups overcame long odds in order to convince management to modify 
their corporate practices in some significant and unexpected way. In other instances, activists 
either failed in their attempts to extract concessions from management or, despite earning 
important concessions, sparked counter mobilization from opposing interests within the 
executive corps at other companies or in the broader public sphere.  
This initial survey, in turn, prompted me to formulate two guiding questions for my 
dissertation research. First, I was interested to know what accounted for the ability of activist 
organizations to convince prominent corporations to accede to their demands. Second, I wanted 
                                                 
5 Specifically, the recent history of anti-corporate campaigns radically problematizes longstanding 
assumptions in the rhetorical literature about the need for authoritative “top-down” leadership in social movement 
campaigns. Any such assumptions fail to account for the egalitarian decision-making practices and inter-
organizational resource sharing that characterize many recent campaigns, including those sponsored by the CIW and 
the “community campaigns” that have been sponsored by organizations with well-established organizational 
hierarchies such as the United Steel Workers and the Service Employees International Union. Nevertheless, the 
argument Herbert Simons and his co-authors present regarding the need for top-down leadership in movement 
campaigns has remained largely unchallenged for two decades. Peter K. Bsumek, “Kairos: Time to Get Down to it 
(Should Have Been Done Long Time Ago),” Environmental Communication 2, no. 1 (March 2008), 84; William J. 
Kinsella et al., “Narratives, Rhetorical Genres, and Environmental Conflict: Responses to Schwarze’s 
‘Environmental Melodrama.’” Environmental Communication 2, no. 1 (March 2008),79; Steven Schwarze, 
“Environmental Melodrama,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 3 (2006), 257; Steven Schwarze, “Environmental 
Melodrama: Explorations and Extensions,” Environmental Communication 2, no. 1 (March 2008), 106; Herbert W. 
Simons, James W. Chesebro, and C. Jack Orr, “A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Election,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 59, no. 2 (1973), 168; Herbert W. Simons, Elizabeth W. Mechling, and Howard N. 
Schreier, “The Functions of Human Communication in Mobilizing from the Ground Up: The Rhetoric of Social 
Movements,” in Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1984), 794. 
6 I provide a list of these campaigns in Appendix A.  
11 
to know which modes of rhetorical persuasion in anti-corporate campaigns were more likely to 
yield progressive changes in the de facto corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards of 
global markets. In an effort to seek answers to these questions, I conducted case studies of two of 
the best known anti-corporate campaigns of our time: the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU) campaign against the J. P. Stevens Company (1976 – 1980; hereafter 
the Stevens campaign) and the CIW’s campaign against Taco Bell and its parent company Yum! 
Brands (2001 – 2005; hereafter the Taco Bell campaign). 
The Stevens campaign is recognized as one of the earliest and most widely emulated anti-
corporate campaigns of the modern era.
7
 It was the final chapter in a protracted labor dispute 
between ACTWU and J. P. Stevens which, in defiance of the NLRB (National Labor Relations 
Board), had steadfastly refused to recognize union contracts at ten of its textile factories in the 
American South. The leader of the Stevens campaign and the person who is widely credited with 
developing its innovative and aggressive strategies was a young labor activist named Ray Rogers 
who has subsequently worked as a professional consultant on dozens of other campaigns to the 
present day. The Stevens campaign has often been described as an expensive, carefully 
researched, “power on power” event in which the union confronted the corporation on several 
fronts simultaneously.
8
 It featured the strategic shifting of union retirement funds to place 
economic pressure on management, damaging revelations in the public media about racist and 
                                                 
7 Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, “The Evolution of Strategic and Coordinated Bargaining 
Campaigns in the 1990s: The Steelworkers’ Experience,” in Rekindling the Movement, ed. Lowell Turner, Harry C. 
Katz, and Richard W. Hurd (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 218. 
James A. Hodges, “J. P. Stevens and the Union Struggle for the South,” Race, Class, and Community in 
Southern Labor History, ed. Gary Fink (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 53-66; Jarol 
Manheim, The Death of a Thousand Cuts: Corporate Campaigns and the Attack on the Corporation (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), 56; Timothy J. Minchin, “J. P. Stevens Campaign,” in Encyclopedia of U.S. Labor and 
Working-Class History, ed. Eric Arnesen (New York: Routledge, 2007), 709; Timothy J. Minchin, Don’t Sleep with 
Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign and the Struggle to Organize the South, 1963 - 1980 (Gainesville, FL: 
University of Florida Press, 2005), 179-184. 
8 Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 53-55; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 
122. See Appendix B for outtakes from promotional fliers produced by Corporate Campaigns, Inc. in which they 
provide graphic illustrations of power on power campaign strategies.  
12 
sexist employment policies at J. P. Stevens’ factories, and the resignation under public pressure 
of prominent members of the company’s board of directors. Four decades later the Stevens 
campaign remains controversial and influential. Many other activist groups, especially in the 
1980s and 90s, attempted to duplicate its confrontational strategies and tactics, often with mixed 
results.
9
 
Like the Stevens campaign, the Taco Bell campaign was based in the rural American 
South. In 1999 the CIW, a Southwest Florida farmworkers cooperative, set out to convince a 
multinational fast food company to pay one penny more per pound for tomatoes with the extra 
funds being paid directly to Florida farmworkers, a group of people whose average wages had 
remained frozen since the 1970s. Remarkably, the plan worked – in part because the coalition 
knew something management did not: some of the tomatoes being sold to Taco Bell had been 
picked by slave labor. During the campaign, the CIW and their allies employed a wide variety of 
protest tactics including a hunger strike, boycotts on college campuses, and speeches at 
shareholder meetings. The campaign began to turn in favor of the workers when news media 
began to publish stories about the coalition’s dramatic investigations into human trafficking in 
Florida agriculture.
10
 In a series of subsequent campaigns the CIW has convinced several other 
                                                 
9 Prominent examples of campaigns that emulated strategies of the Stevens campaign during this period 
include the Airline Pilots Association strike against Transamerica Airlines in 1984-85 (failed to produce a labor 
contract and company dissolved a year later); the United Food and Commercial Workers P-9 campaign against 
Hormel Foods from 1985-86 (ended with union being tossed out); The United Paperworkers’ International Union 
strike against International Paper (failed to overcome a company lock out of union workers); and Greenpeace’s 
“Brent Spar Campaign” in 1995 (convinced Shell Oil to dismantle an oil storage facility on shore instead of sinking 
it in the North Sea). For other examples see the list of martial campaigns in Appendix A.  
Grant Jordan, Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Peter Kellman, 
Divided We Fall: The Story of the Paperworkers’ Union and the Future of Labor (Lanham, Maryland: Apex Press, 
2004), 174; Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 315, 323, 342; Scott McCartney, “West German-Owned Chemical 
Plant in Louisiana Called ‘Bhopal on the Bayou,’” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1986. 
10 Evelyn Nieves, “Fla. Tomato Pickers Still Reap ‘Harvest of Shame’: Boycott Helps Raise Awareness of 
Plight,” Washington Post, February 28, 2005. 
13 
prominent companies (including McDonald’s, Burger King, Whole Foods supermarkets, and 
Subway) to sign onto their “Campaign for Fair Food.”11 
The two campaigns were similar in several important respects but differed significantly in 
their long-term impact on the attitudes and practices of corporate decision makers. The 
similarities are easy to recognize. Both were labor oriented campaigns focused on controversial 
business practices in small towns in the rural American South and targeted companies whose 
main offices were located in metropolitan centers (New York City and Los Angeles 
respectively).
12
 Both campaigns also generated considerable attention from national and 
international media, attracted large followings on college campuses, and garnered the 
endorsements of prominent celebrities as well as organizations representing other human rights 
causes.
13
 And both campaigns featured the public circulation of stories and texts featuring 
carnivalesque inversion and grotesque realism. In the Stevens campaign the stories and texts 
featured tangible evidence of workplace injuries, racism, and sexism – all of which served to 
problematize the company’s efforts to position itself in public memory as one of the nation’s 
premier purveyors of fine linens and textiles. In the CIW campaign, the farmworkers and their 
allies used public protests, internet postings, and undercover investigations of commercial 
farming operations to disclose harsh working conditions, poverty-level wages, and modern day 
slavery. 
At the same time, one can recognize striking differences between how the two campaigns 
planned and operated their campaigns, how they viewed campaign strategies, and how they were 
                                                 
11 Amy Bennett Williams, “Museum Highlights Modern-Day Slavery Problem in Florida,” Miami Herald, 
March 7, 2010. 
12 John Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor and the Dark Side of the New Global Economy 
(New York: Random House, 2007), 29; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens! The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 15. 
13 See Appendix G for a list of prominent individuals and organizations that endorsed the CIW’s Taco Bell 
campaign. Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 73; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens! The J. P. 
Stevens Campaign, 1-8, 92. 
14 
received by public audiences. First, in stark contrast to the decision-making practices of the 
Stevens campaign, where Rogers and a handful of other union leaders were responsible for all 
major strategy decisions, the CIW practiced a form of cooperative decision-making in which 
rank and file members were encouraged to participate at every juncture.
14
 Second, unlike the 
Stevens campaign, which was conceived as a one-time action against a single company, the Taco 
Bell campaign was conceived from the beginning as the first of a long series of protest actions 
aimed at changing attitudes and business practices in corporate agriculture. Third, public 
audiences – to say the least – responded with ambivalence to the Stevens campaign. On the one 
hand, the campaign generated considerable public sympathy at the time for female and minority 
textile workers.
15
 Several scholars have argued, in fact, that ACTWU’s aggressive tactics fueled 
public skepticism of labor unions and alienated management teams at other corporations who 
feared they could be the target of future actions.
16
 By contrast, the Taco Bell campaign did not 
produce a large scale public backlash and in the years following the campaign a whole series of 
companies the CIW has targeted have issued public statements endorsing its cause.
17
 In 
summary, the two campaigns were sufficiently similar to allow me to make detailed 
comparisons, but sufficiently different to allow me to draw reasonable conclusions about their 
rhetorical strategies.  
After extensive study of both campaigns (a process that included an in-person interview 
with Ray Rogers and an extended review of campaign-related news stories, internal campaign 
documents, pamphlets, web pages, and other texts), I concluded one could attribute the success 
                                                 
14 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 24-25.  
15 Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens! The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 90-110 passim. 
16 Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, “The Evolution,” 218; Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 57-58; Minchin, 
Don’t Sleep with Stevens! The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 182.  
17 John Lantigua, “McDonald’s Agrees to Increase Pay for Workers Who Harvest Its Tomatoes,” Palm 
Beach Post, April 10, 2007; Andrew Martin, “Burger King Grants Raise to Pickers,” New York Times, May 24, 
2008; Elaine Walker, “Subway to Pay More for Tomatoes,” Miami Herald, December 2, 2008. 
15 
of each campaign to their practice of what I am calling prospective narrative disclosure. In 
simplest terms, prospective narrative disclosure refers to a calculated rhetorical wager that, 
through the timely circulation of stories and texts disclosing problematic practices and 
answerable decision makers, activists can influence the policies and practices of prominent 
corporations.
18
 Moreover, I concluded that prospective narrative disclosure can produce a range 
of responses running from public sympathy to public backlash and that, with this in mind, one 
can think of the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns as representing overlapping typologies of 
practice. For its part, the Stevens campaign constitutes a paradigmatic instance of a “martial” 
campaign characterized by a distinct emphasis on labor strikes, boycotts, governmental lobbying 
and other instrumental actions. As the name suggests, activist groups that sponsor anti-corporate 
campaigns of this type often speak in militaristic terms, in the sense that they typically frame a 
targeted corporation in melodramatic fashion as a dangerous enemy that must be prevented from 
perpetuating some egregious harm. Consistent with this orientation, groups that sponsor martial 
campaigns focus on extracting specific concessions from management, while downplaying any 
attempts to change management attitudes over the long-term.  
By contrast, the Taco Bell campaign represents a two-part “confrontation/alliance” 
pattern characterized by an initial confrontation in which activists attempt to demonstrate 
management’s culpability in some egregious practice, followed by intensive efforts to convince 
them to renounce the offensive behavior and endorse the activists’ cause. Those who plan 
campaigns conforming to this latter pattern set long-term goals of changing the attitudes of 
management and the policies of companies across entire market sectors. My research suggests 
                                                 
18 In using the term “answerability” I am thinking of Bakhtin’s argument that “The individual must 
become answerable through and through: all of his constituent moments must not only fit next to each other in the 
temporal sequence of his life, but must also interpenetrate each other in the unity of guilt and answerability.” 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Vadim Liapunov 
and Kenneth Brostrom (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 2. 
16 
that, although either style of campaign can yield important concessions from corporate 
management, the latter is more likely to produce lasting changes in the daily business practices 
of targeted companies and in the de facto corporate social responsibility standards of global 
markets.  
Regardless of the typology of action they employ, activist groups that adopt prospective 
narrative disclosure strategies make several implicit assumptions about multinational 
corporations and the global markets in which they operate. First, by the closing decades of the 
twentieth century corporations had insinuated themselves into nearly every corner of private life 
and the public sphere.
19
 Anti-corporate activists understand that despite the ubiquity of their 
presence, corporations typically invest considerable time and money in practices that obscure 
lines of ethical accountability. More to the point, they operate on the tacit assumption that public 
relations strategies, limited liability laws, and sprawling global supply chains now serve to 
occlude decision-making practices and prevent public audiences from determining who within a 
corporate matrix ought to be held accountable for any given policy or action. Second, they 
understand that in many instances speaking the truth in the public sphere regarding the material 
conditions of production requires considerable bravery. The basest forms of coercion often thrive 
on privacy, and in the globalized public sphere indefensible practices flourish in the remote 
reaches of global supply networks, well beyond the view of many executives and most investors.  
Third, they understand that corporations are thoroughly dialogic organizations embedded 
in dialogic social contexts.
20
 That is, although management invariably expends considerable time 
                                                 
19 Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization, 13-14; Naomi Klein, No Logo: No Space, No 
Choice, No Jobs (New York: Picador, 2009), 37. 
20 I am thinking here of Mikhail Bakhtin’s definition of dialogism as “the characteristic epistemological 
mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia [radical, centrifugal plurivocality at all levels of human discourse]. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Vadim Liapunov and 
Kenneth Brostrom (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 426. 
17 
and money in order to maintain centripetal (monovocal and centralizing) control of 
organizational discourse, these efforts can never be entirely successful. They can never fully 
contain the countervailing, centrifugal (plurivocal and decentralizing) force of heteroglossia – the 
radical plurivocality that persists at all levels of human discourse.
21
 In the present context, the 
most important implication of this situation is that activists tend to view the plurivocal 
complexity of organizational discourse as working in their favor.  By setting credible stories and 
texts into public circulation, they can sometimes destabilize corporate discourse and challenge 
the fundamental integrity of centripetal corporate narratives. In the contemporary era the rapid 
diffusion of new communication technologies has accelerated this process by opening new 
channels for storytelling circulation around the globe. Fourth, anti-corporate activists understand 
that business executives go home. Activists have sometimes taken advantage of this obvious 
truth by critiquing the actions of corporations, not only according to the ethical standards of 
global markets, but also by those of the local communities where managers live with their 
families.  
Finally, this last point highlights the crucial importance of kairos and decorum in anti-
corporate protest campaigns. That is, anti-corporate activists of all stripes understand that if they 
are to check the advancement of corporate power, then they must time their actions carefully in 
order to take advantage of fleeting vulnerabilities. Social decorum represents the most 
predictable and consequential of these vulnerabilities. The first duty of corporate executives is 
often held out to be the delivery of substantial, predictable returns on investments to 
stockholders. However, the recent history of anti-corporate protest suggests that most executives 
recognize a closely related but less explicit obligation to defend the public reputations of their 
companies, communities, and families. In practice this means that many of these executives are 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 272. 
18 
highly vulnerable to charges of personal or professional hypocrisy. Whether or not any given 
campaign succeeds or fails in its attempts to change market practices turns on the ability of 
activists to level these sorts of accusations without, at the same time, alienating their corporate 
opponents and prompting a counterproductive backlash in the public sphere. 
Overview of Chapters 
The anti-corporate campaign strategies and tactics I describe in this dissertation 
participate in an iconoclastic rhetorical tradition that pre-dates Socrates. Nevertheless, they were 
developed by people intent on responding to a relatively recent political development: the 
emergence of business corporations as cosmopolitan institutions. Given the ubiquity of their 
presence, it is easy to forget that multinational corporations such as McDonalds, Wal-Mart, and 
ExxonMobil are, from a historical perspective, relative newcomers to the global market place. It 
was not until the middle decades of the nineteenth century that the United States, England, and 
other nations began to issue large numbers of charters for general business corporations. And yet, 
in the space of one and one-half centuries they have proliferated to the point that they have now 
become a predictable feature of daily life under globalization. In his work Frankenstein, 
Incorporated, I. Maurice Wormser proposed a vivid metaphor to describe these new institutions. 
In doing so he underscored the importance of limiting the influence of corporations while, at the 
same time, channeling their energies to serve the interests of civil society. Wormser wrote his 
book in 1931 (a time, not unlike today, when the world was still reeling from the effects of 
investment scandals), and he deserves to be quoted at length:  
We are all familiar with Mrs. Shelly’s thrilling tale of Frankenstein, the modern 
Prometheus, who artificially created and vitalized a monster which became the terror of 
“all living things” and threatened the security and well-being of mankind [sic]. The fable 
is not without its application to the corporate business organization of to-day. 
Corporations are not natural living persons, but artificial beings, corpa ficta. They are 
created by the nation or state, which endows them with distinct personality in the eye of 
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the law, special privileges and comprehensive powers. Frankenstein’s creature developed 
into a deadly menace to his creator. The nation and the state must curb certain grave and 
vicious abuses in their corporate offspring.
22
 
 
The argument of the passage is straightforward. Wormser was not advocating that corporations 
ought not to exist. Rather, he was asking his audience to recall that corporations are a product of 
human ingenuity, and as such their actions are amenable to human modification and control.
23
 
 An anti-corporate campaign represents just that: an attempt to use rhetorics of disclosure 
to make a corporation more democratically accountable for its actions. Anti-corporate activists 
employ these strategies to draw the attention of public audiences to little known policies and 
practices, thereby problematizing a company’s public relations narratives. I coined the phrase 
“prospective narrative disclosure” to describe these rhetorical practices. In chapter two I describe 
this concept in considerable detail and consider how it comports with ancient rhetorics of popular 
disclosure as well as contemporary discussions on subjects including corporate hegemony, the 
rhetoric of social movements, kairos, narrative theory, and globalization. As part of this 
discussion, I also review a compensatory rhetoric of concealment featuring the global 
distribution of highly-produced public relations and advertising narratives that often gloss over 
disturbing contradictions in corporate practice.  
In chapter three I trace a brief history of the birth and evolution of corporations and of 
anti-corporate campaigns. The chapter begins with a review of two famous episodes from the 
early decades of the Industrial Revolution: the Luddite Rebellion and the abolitionist 
                                                 
22 I. Maurice Wormser, Frankenstein, Incorporated (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931). v. 
23 In place of “human ingenuity,” I could just as easily have written “social imagination,” a phrase coined 
in the 1950s by the sociologist C. Wright Mills to describe the human capacity to reflect critically on individual 
behavior and social taxonomies. The philosopher Charles Taylor has expanded our understanding of social 
imagination by describing the “social imaginary” as “that common understanding that makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.” By the end of the twentieth century corporations had, in effect, 
assumed a prominent position in the cosmopolitan social imaginary. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5; Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 23. 
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movement’s successful campaign to end the slave trade in the British Empire. I argue that the 
two movements anticipate the martial and confrontation/alliance typologies as exemplified by 
the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns respectively. I then trace representative instances of these 
contrasting patterns across the better part of two centuries in which corporations emerged as 
institutions whose economic and political power rivaled that of many political states, and 
activists began to discover rhetorical techniques for disclosing egregious contradictions between 
what corporations said in public and how they actually conducted business on a daily basis in the 
global marketplace. 
With this theoretical and historic groundwork in place, in chapters four and five I conduct 
a more detailed review of the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns and defend them as 
representative instances of the martial and confrontation/alliance typologies. Each chapter begins 
with a brief history of the campaign and is followed by a detailed, critical interrogation of several 
key incidents. In chapter four I focus primarily on the union’s use of advanced research 
techniques to profile the corporation and its financial relationships, and on the public circulation 
of stories and texts featuring carnivalesque and grotesque themes. I follow a similar pattern in 
chapter five by reviewing the CIW’s use of encuentras (community discussions in which they 
discussed research and laid plans for the campaign), slavery investigations, and indigenous 
theatrical performances featuring political inversion and grotesque realism.  
In chapter six I conclude by revisiting the research questions and summarizing my 
findings and by reviewing how the two case studies exemplify prospective narrative disclosure 
and its two related typologies of practice. The implication of this research project, I argue, is that 
while there can be no doubt regarding the power and reach of corporations, by adapting ancient 
rhetorics of disclosure to the exigencies of global markets, activists have reminded the world that 
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they need not shy away from challenging multinational corporations. They are, after all, human 
creations.
22 
Chapter 2: Rhetorics of Disappearance and Disclosure 
“My soul is rent, to wretchedness ensnared  
By men, by gods, whom I will now disclose.”  
Euripides
1
 
 
“[B]usinesses have begun to fabricate their own simulacra of credibility.” 
Michel de Certeau
2
 
 
In an era when multinational corporations have learned to master rhetorics of 
disappearance, anti-corporate activists have become students of a compensatory rhetoric of 
disclosure. On the one hand, multinational corporations have been expanding their operations to 
geographically remote locations around the globe where they can gain access to low cost labor 
and are less likely to face governmental scrutiny. On the other hand, activists have been refining 
rhetorical strategies for disclosing disturbing discrepancies between the public discourse of 
prominent corporations and the actual conditions of industrial production in clandestine locations 
within company supply chains. By making these sorts of carefully timed disclosures activists 
have aimed to shame corporate decision makers in the public sphere, thereby convincing them to 
modify their daily market practices in significant ways. On scores of occasions in recent decades, 
activist groups have used these sorts of techniques to extract surprising concessions from some 
of the world’s best known companies, even when such actions had no discernible effect on 
corporate profitability.  
In this chapter I provide a more thorough accounting of prospective narrative disclosure 
and locate the practice in relation to contemporary literature on anti-corporate activism and a 
plebian tradition of rhetorical disclosure. The description of prospective narrative disclosure I 
advance diverges from previous work in rhetoric studies by treating anti-corporate campaigns as 
an object of study in their own right and by providing a more comprehensive account of how 
                                                 
1 Euripides, Ion, trans. Robert Potter (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 46. 
2 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 180. 
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anti-corporate activists have refined ancient rhetorical practices in order to challenge how some 
of the world’s most prominent corporations conduct business on a daily basis. To date, most 
rhetorical scholars with an interest in anti-corporate activism have taken either a broad view by 
studying anti-corporate globalization protests as an international movement or have taken a 
narrower view by focusing on particular protest themes such as environmentalism or women’s 
rights.
3
 My work takes a middle path by using contrasting case studies of two prominent 
campaigns in order to draw conclusions about global trends in anti-corporate activism and about 
how corporations and markets have responded to contrasting typologies of practice in anti-
corporate campaigns. 
This is not to say that my study charts an entirely new course. To the contrary, it responds 
to contemporary work in rhetoric studies and in other disciplines about the role of kairos, 
decorum, and storytelling in anti-corporate activism and about how contemporary anti-corporate 
activists have learned from those who have gone before. In the first instance one can point to the 
work of the authors who have written of kairos (here defined as the careful timing of actions) in 
the context of anti-corporate activism. In that regard one can think of Steven Schwarze, Peter 
Bsumek, and others who have called for scholarship on the role of kairos in environmental 
                                                 
3 Examples of the former include M. Lane Bruner’s essay on the anti-corporate globalization movement at 
the dawn of the new millennium; Phyllis Ryder’s study of an emergent public at World Bank protests; and Kevin 
Deluca and Jennifer Peeple’s article on the WTO protests in Seattle, in which they argue for the “public screen” as 
an extension of the public sphere. Examples of the latter include: Kathryn Olson and G. Thomas Goodnight’s study 
of oppositional argumentation in relation to protests against the fur industry; and Phaedra Pezzullo’s work on “toxic 
tourism” protests. M. Lane Bruner, “Global Governance and the Critical Public,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6, no. 4 
(2003), 687-708; Kevin Michael DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples, “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, 
Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 19, no. 2 (2002), 125-151; 
Kathryn M. Olson and G. Thomas Goodnight, “Entanglements of Consumption, Cruelty, Privacy, and Fashion: The 
Social Controversy over Fur,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80, no. 3 (1994), 249-276; Phaedra C. Pezzullo, 
“Touring ‘Cancer Alley,’ Louisiana: Performances of Community and Memory for Environmental Justice,” Text & 
Performance Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2003), 226-252; Phyllis Mentzell Ryder, “In(ter)ventions of Global Democracy: 
An Analysis of the Rhetorics of the A-16 World Bank/IMF Protests in Washington, DC,” Rhetoric Review 25, no. 4 
(2006), 408-426. 
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protests, including environmentally oriented anti-corporate campaigns.
4
 The notion of kairos as 
strategic timing is important as well in Dana Cloud’s recent work on dissident unionism at 
Boeing Corporation and in the sociologist Marshall Ganz’ study of the United Farm Workers 
under Cesar Chavez.
5
 Yet other authors have advocated a more expanded conception of kairotic 
action in anti-corporate campaigns. J. Blake Scott, for example, looks at the pharmaceutical 
industry’s difficulties in evaluating the “indeterminate risks” attendant to anti-corporate 
globalization protests.
6
 In a study of the primary works of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, 
Paul Turpin argues that public decorum (a traditional foil for rhetorical kairos) has come to serve 
a constitutive function in market economies.
7
 I extend on the work of all these authors by 
providing detailed case studies of anti-corporate activists who demonstrate an intuitive knack for 
recognizing the right moment to say “the wrong thing” in order to disclose self-serving erasures 
in the public narratives of corporations and answerable individuals in board rooms and in the 
broader public sphere.  
In doing so, my work also draws upon the work of authors in a variety of fields who have 
stressed the importance of public storytelling, risk taking, and carnivalesque inversion in market-
based activism. The sociologist Francesca Polletta, for instance, has documented the crucial role 
of public storytelling and metonymy (using the name of one item or concept in place of another, 
with which it is closely associated) in the ultimate success of the Student Nonviolent 
                                                 
4 Peter K. Bsumek, “Kairos,” 84; Kinsella et al., “Narratives, Rhetorical Genres, and Environmental 
Conflict,” 79; Steven Schwarze, “Environmental Melodrama,” Quarterly Journal of Speech , 257; Schwarze, 
“Environmental Melodrama: Explorations,” 106. 
5 Dana Cloud, “Corporate Social Responsibility as Oxymoron: Universalization and Exploitation at 
Boeing,” in The Debate over Corporate Social Responsibility, ed. Steve May, George Cheney, and Juliet Roper 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Marshal Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, 
and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9. 
6 J. Blake Scott, “Kairos as Indeterminate Risk Management: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Response to 
Bioterrorism,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 2 (May 2006), 115-143. 
7 Paul Bruce Turpin, “Liberal Political Economy and Justice: Character and Decorum in the Economic 
Arguments of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2005), 15-16. 
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Coordinating Committee’s “sit-in” protests against the Woolworth’s variety store chain in the 
1960s.
8
 Critical management scholar David Boje has produced several provocative works about 
storytelling circulation in organizational contexts.
9
 Boje is, perhaps, best known for coining the 
term “antenarrative” to refer to “the fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted and 
pre-narrative speculation, a bet.” 10 And M. Lane Bruner has documented how, in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle and in several other politically charged contexts 
protestors have been able to use carnivalesque inversion and humor to open spaces in which they 
could articulate incisive critiques of political order.
11
 Prospective narrative disclosure extends 
upon the work of these authors by locating the rhetoric of anti-corporate activism in relation to 
an ancient tradition of rhetorical disclosure, the core components of which are kairotic resistance, 
decisive timing, and centrifugal storytelling circulation. 
This rhetorical tradition can be traced to pre-Socratic times in Western culture and has 
analogues in the discursive traditions of indigenous cultures around the world. I coined the 
phrase “prospective narrative disclosure” to describe how anti-corporate globalization activists 
have adapted ancient techniques of rhetorical disclosure for use in contemporary anti-corporate 
campaigns. As my use of the word “adapted” implies, the single most important difference 
between the age old iconoclastic traditions I will describe momentarily and the rhetorical 
                                                 
8 Polletta’s account of SNCC’s efforts to forge a metonymic linkage between African American civil rights 
organizations and white dominated unions recalls Ernesto Laclau’s discussion of the role of “equivalential logic” in 
the formation of popular demands that I discuss later in this chapter. Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 9; 
Francesca Polletta It was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), 56. 
9 See for example: David Boje, Narrative Methods for Organizational and Communication Research 
(London: Sage, 2001); David Boje, Storytelling Organization (London: Sage, 2008); David Boje, editor. Storytelling 
and the Future of Organizations: An Antenarrative Handbook (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
10 I have argued elsewhere for the similarities between Boje’s account of antenarrative speculation and 
traditional conceptions of rhetorical kairos. Boje, Narrative Methods, 1; Richard Herder, “Well-Timed Stories: 
Rhetorical Kairos and Antenarrative Theory,” in Storytelling and the Future of Organizations: An Antenarrative 
Handbook, ed. David Boje (New York: Routledge, 2010), 347-365. 
11 M. Lane Bruner, “Carnivalesque Protest and the Humorless State,” Text & Performance Quarterly 25, 
no. 2 (2005), 147. 
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strategies and tactics of contemporary anti-corporate activists is that in the contemporary era 
anti-corporate globalization activists have gained access to a wide variety of new communication 
technologies. This development, I argue, has helped to make the world a more talkative and 
peripatetic place and, in the process, afforded activists with important new opportunities for 
setting credible stories in public circulation and challenging the policies and practices of 
multinational corporations.  
My defense of this thesis begins with an extended definition of prospective narrative 
disclosure in which I explain how anti-corporate globalization activists have adapted these 
ancient techniques to address contemporary exigencies. This section includes a point by point 
comparison of activist campaign strategies with the activism response strategies of corporations. 
Following that I consider how prospective narrative disclosure comports with contemporary 
debates regarding the transformative potential of social protest. This section, in turn, sets the 
stage for a review of the relationship of prospective narrative disclosure to the evolution of CSR 
standards in global markets. 
Defining Prospective Narrative Disclosure 
One can think of prospective narrative disclosure as a rhetorical wager involving the 
carefully timed, storytelling disclosure of egregious and systematic harms (harsh working 
conditions, environmental degradation, sexism, and the like) and answerable decision makers. In 
this context the word “prospective,” refers to kairotic (timely and strategic) actions aimed, in the 
short term, at convincing corporate decision makers to make specific, substantive changes in the 
way their organizations conduct business and, over the long-term, at shifting market perceptions 
of what counts as ethical behavior in daily commerce.
12
 I am using the term “narrative” in a 
dialogic sense to refer to the centripetal discourse of multinational corporations and to the 
                                                 
12 Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 2. 
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centrifugal storytelling practices of activists in contemporary anti-corporate campaigns. The 
phrase “narrative disclosure,” therefore, retains this double meaning in that it refers to the actions 
of corporate spokespersons who disseminate official organizational narratives as well as 
iconoclastic storytellers who disclose disturbing events that are often occluded by official 
corporate discourse. In practice, activist storytelling involves the staging of public protests and 
the distribution of texts featuring carnivalesque inversion and “grotesque realism.”13 By using 
these methods, activists have oftentimes managed to set stories about things like harsh working 
conditions or industrial pollution into public circulation where they can problematize corporate 
narratives and even cohere into a set of public demands for a corporation to cooperate with 
activists by modifying their practices. 
Ancient Rhetoric and Contemporary Markets 
Prospective narrative disclosure can be located squarely within an ancient and 
increasingly well-documented tradition of tactical resistance and satiric discourse that can be 
traced back as far as the pre-Socratic figure of Corax who, along with his student Tisias, is often 
held out as a founding figure of rhetoric. The name Corax means raven or crow, and early 
Greco/Roman myths contain numerous accounts of a garrulous and impious raven prone to 
questioning the pronouncements of Apollo, the god of truth and light.
14
 Like the bird from which 
he took his name, the rhetorician Corax was renowned for making iconoclastic arguments. In 
keeping with this, he also developed a reputation for teaching his students how to make weaker 
arguments seem like the better arguments.
15
  
                                                 
13 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington, IN: University of 
Indiana Press, 1984), 19. 
14 Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “The Myth of Rhetoric: Korax and the Art of Pollution,” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 37, no. 3 (2007), 261. 
15 George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994), 11. 
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Studies of these early traditions leave little doubt concerning their impious and 
democratic orientation. Janet Atwill, for example, gives a nuanced description of a pre-Socratic 
rhetoric characterized by an overriding concern with “power, cunning intelligence, and time” and 
featuring “the arts of resistance and transformation.”16 Deborah Hawhee reads this same tradition 
from the perspective of gymnasiums and athletic competitions by arguing for the importance of 
embodied performance and kairotic resistance in the work of Isocrates and his predecessors.
17
 
Stephen Gencarella stresses the skeptical orientation of early rhetorical traditions in a study of 
early religious myths featuring the impious Corax.
18
 Daniel Boyarin has recently argued for a 
connection between the rhetorical inversions of Corax and the later tradition of Menippean 
satire: the writing of book length, prose works featuring satiric commentaries on manners and 
ideas.
19
 One of the most important qualities of the Menippean satire is its plurivocality, the 
incorporation of a range of idiosyncratic dialects, voices, and perspectives.
20
 Menippean satire, in 
fact, anticipates the political inversions and grotesque themes that became the defining 
characteristics of the medieval carnivalesque. As Bakhtin argues, in both traditions, people feel 
free to “crudely degrade, to turn inside out the lofty aspects of the world.”21 
These iconoclastic rhetorical practices are certainly not limited to the Western tradition. 
One finds evidence of similar rhetorical traditions in ancient literatures from around the world. 
American Indians have long told tales of Kokopelli, a trickster character who, like Corax, is a 
                                                 
16 Janet Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998) 60, 52. 
17 Deborah Hawhee, Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2005), 6. 
18 Gencarella, “The Myth of Rhetoric,” 268. 
19 Daniel Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009), 26-27, 44-
45. 
20 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, 26. 
21 Ibid. 
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master of social inversion.
22
 Cognates of these trickster characters appear in African, Chinese, 
and Norse folklore where their impious (and often ribald) actions serve to disclose hypocrisies 
and produce dramatic social reversals.
23
  
As these few examples suggest, the techniques of Corax and other calculating storytellers 
of his kind have remained important in any context where people develop an interest in 
challenging “the exorbitant claim that a certain kind of production (real enough, but not the only 
kind) can set out to produce history by ‘informing’ the whole of a country.”24 For critical theorist 
Michele de Certeau, in fact, the rhetorical traditions I have been reviewing to this point contain 
the primary tools marginalized people have employed throughout history to challenge dominant 
powers and, at times, produce lasting changes in social attitudes and practices. For present 
purposes, the most relevant section of de Certeau’s analysis features memory, storytelling, kairos 
(timing and placement), and mētis (tactical cleverness).25  
Memory in this context serves as a discursive resource marginalized people can draw 
upon in their efforts to challenge the politics of the present.
26
 In the Stevens and Taco Bell 
campaigns, for example, workers told stories that drew upon their personal experiences with 
workplace injuries, sexism, and even slavery in order to mount potent challenges to corporate 
power. For de Certeau, this type of storytelling is not merely an orderly reflection of the past. 
Rather, it is a plurivocal process in which iconoclastic, idiosyncratic experiences are set into 
public circulation where they can disrupt dominant narratives and cohere into public demands.  
                                                 
22 Ekkehart Malotki, Kokopelli: The Making of an Icon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 10. 
23 Esther Clinton, “The Trickster, Various Motifs,” in Archetypes and Motifs in Folklore and Literature: A 
Handbook, ed. Jane Garry and Hasan M. El-Shamy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 472-473. 
24 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 167. 
25 Ibid, 82.  
26 As Janet Atwill has argued, “if memory can make a difference, the necessary character of fate is put into 
question.” Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, 118. 
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Kairos is a pivotal term in de Certeau’s account of popular resistance where he uses it to 
refer to an embodied sensibility shared by experienced storytellers who (like professional 
dancers or military combatants) have learned to execute daring moves in order to capitalize on 
fleeting opportunities.
27
 This mode of storytelling action rejects a chronological view of time as a 
regimented, mechanical march that cannot be interrupted in favor of a kairotic conception of 
time in which human actors can, through the use of carefully timed dramatic disclosures, disrupt 
the forward progression of linear time in order to open space for critical reflection.
28
 For this 
reason, the arts of “antidiscipline” emphasize kairos instead of its semantic cousin to prepon, 
social decorum.
29
 That is, they reject the notion that the very same discourse rules that have 
governed the past should serve as an unimpeachable guide for how discourse should occur in the 
present and future.  
Finally, these three themes converge in mētis, which in this instance counts as “a 
principle of economy: obtain the maximum number of effects from the minimum force.”30 Mētis, 
therefore, “counts on an accumulated time, which is in its favor, to overcome a hostile 
composition of place.”31 This patient rhetoric assumes an embodied familiarity with the 
prevailing sensibilities of social decorum among the privileged elite.
32
 No one knows more than 
the servants how forks, plates, and dinner guests must be arranged for any given occasion in the 
master’s house. When afforded this level of intimacy, those who have been effectively erased as 
subjects from dominant narratives are in a position to present testimonies about their experience 
                                                 
27 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 81. 
28 Organizational studies scholar Barbara Czarniawska makes a similar point when she writes, “Whereas 
Chronos measures time in mechanical intervals, Kairos jumps and slows down, omits long periods and dwells on 
others.” Barbara Czarniawska, “On Time, Space, and Action Nets,” Organization 11, no. 6 (2004), 775.  
29 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xv. 
30 Ibid, 82. 
31 Ibid. 
32 I am thinking here of Deborah Hawhee’s description of a set of “bodily arts” that can be difficult for a 
rhetor to describe but which are born of long and intimate association with context. Hawhee, Bodily Arts, 70. 
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of material discipline which, if recounted in a timely and compelling manner, stand a reasonable 
chance of tripping up the powerful when they least expect it.  
For the purposes of this study, two dimensions of this description of mētis are of special 
importance. First, it assumes a moment of sudden disclosure, a moment where concrete 
memories of oppression are revealed in public spaces. As de Certeau explains: 
This schema can be found in any number of stories. It is, as it were, their minimal unit. It 
can take a comic form in the memory that, at just the right moment, reverses a situation. 
In the exchange, “But … you must be my father!” “Good God, my daughter!,” we see a 
pirouette due to the return of a time that the …[dominant] characters did not know about. 
There is a whodunit form in which the past, by coming back overturns an established 
hierarchical order: “He must be the murder then!”33 
 
In this passage tactical disclosure emerges as an irreducible element in the ancient arts of plebian 
antidiscipline. But rhetorical disclosure cannot happen at just any time. “The occasion is taken 
advantage of, not created.”34 Marginalized rhetors, in other words, have traditionally been forced 
to persevere until “just the right” moment when action is possible and even then they must 
appropriate the language and aesthetic sensibilities of the hierarchical order.  
All four of these rhetorical practices (the strategic uses of memory, storytelling, kairos, 
and mētis) have emerged as crucial components of prospective narrative disclosure in anti-
corporate campaigns. With the advent of globalized news media and the rapid international 
diffusion of digital technologies, some marginalized people have been afforded unprecedented 
opportunities for smuggling their stories into the public sphere where they can be critically 
examined by public audiences. Horrific working conditions, to be sure, continue apace in many 
far flung corners of the world. Nevertheless, those who live and work in proximity to these 
environments may now have access to local news media, cell phones, and Internet portals. As a 
result their voices have, in effect, become more difficult to erase. 
                                                 
33 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 85. 
34 Ibid, 86. 
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This description of anti-corporate activists as practitioners of the ancient art of 
storytelling disclosure both confirms and complicates what is known about market-based 
activism from other sources. In the next section of the chapter I develop this claim in some detail 
by, first, tracing a basic three step pattern in the rhetorical practices of contemporary anti-
corporate campaigns, and then describing a corresponding set of rhetorical defense strategies on 
the part of corporations.  
Basic Rhetorical Patterns in Anti-Corporate Campaigns 
Current literature from a variety of fields on anti-corporate activism provides a consistent 
picture of anti-corporate campaigns as beginning with a localized rejection of little-known 
corporate practices – as when factory workers demand a labor contract or when someone 
discovers a company has been quietly profiting from practices harmful to the environment – and 
eventually cohering into an organized, strategic campaign.
35
 The campaign begins in earnest 
when activists begin a period of intensive research (or “power analysis”) of a corporate target to 
identify erasures and contradictions in corporate discourse.
 36
 Put another way, they conduct a 
thoroughgoing analysis of a company, looking for inconsistencies between words and deeds that 
could be exploited in a public campaign. Following this they develop strategies and tactics for 
gaining and leveraging the attention of public media. They then implement these strategies, all 
                                                 
35 Ray Rogers confirmed to me that this pattern is consistent with the campaigns he has worked on over 
the last thirty years. Raymond Rogers, interview by author, digital recording, New York, New York, January 24, 
2009. 
36 Manheim uses the phrase “power analysis,” but the process has become better known as “power 
mapping.” Business scholar Charles Perry confirms the importance of this type of research in the early stages of 
anti-corporate campaigns. The DFA Manual distributed by the activist organization Democracy for America is but 
one of many possible examples of texts where activists describe how to use these sorts of research techniques to 
develop detailed profiles of corporations and identify gaps and inconsistencies that could be used as the basis for a 
sustained campaign. For more information see Appendix C where I provide a list of activist training materials and 
professional campaign consultants. Matthew Blizek, DFA Training Manual (Burlington, VT: Democracy for 
America, 2008), 150; Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 9; Charles R. Perry, Union Corporate Campaigns 
(Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 9. 
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the while adapting to new exigencies as they arise.
37
 As I explain in more detail shortly, one can 
trace a related three stage process in the response strategies of corporations. 
Anti-Corporate Campaign Strategies 
By comparing the descriptions of activist campaigns I found in contemporary literature 
with the scores of campaigns listed in Appendix A, I was able to craft a generalized model of an 
anti-corporate campaign as a three stage event, beginning with the mapping of corporate 
vulnerabilities, moving on to strategy development, and culminating in a moment of public 
rhetorical disclosure accompanied by the presentation of an explicit or de facto demand [see 
chart below].
38
 The last stage of the process is also the moment when disturbing stories and the 
demands of the campaign are set in public circulation. One can trace a parallel three stage pattern 
in the campaign-related discourse of multinational corporations beginning with the mapping of 
vulnerabilities to anti-corporate activism and continuing on to include the development of 
strategic inoculation techniques and strategies of rhetorical closure. In reviewing these 
contrasting processes, it may be useful to keep in mind that they constitute recent iterations of 
ancient rhetorical practices aimed at political resistance and social control.  
Activist Corporate 
1. Mapping of corporate 
vulnerabilities 
1. Mapping of vulnerabilities to 
activist campaigns 
2. Strategy development 2. Strategic inoculation 
3. Rhetorical disclosure (prompts 
storytelling circulation) 
3. Rhetorical closure  
 
                                                 
37 This pattern is consistent with descriptions of campaigns against corporations in the works of political 
scientist Jarol Manheim, sociologist James Jasper, and labor scholars, Charles Perry, Kate Bronfenbrenner, and Tom 
Juravich. Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, “The Evolution,” 218; James M. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, 
Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1997), 115; Manheim, 
Death of a Thousand, 63; Perry, Union Corporate Campaigns, 5. 
38 Minchin. Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 75-89 passim; Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, “The Evolution,” 218; Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 191-211 passim. 
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“Mapping of corporate vulnerabilities” refers here to the research phase of an anti-
corporate campaign. It is characterized by a distinct interest in discovery of what Aristotle 
termed inartistic or atechnical proofs – “pre-existing” things not subject to modification by the 
rhetor, including, “witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts and suchlike.”39 
In the context of anti-corporate campaigns the discovery of atechnical proofs is directly related 
to the discovery and mapping of gaps and contradictions in company discourse and in the tracing 
of lines of responsibility for perceived transgressions of ethical standards. In this stage of an anti-
corporate campaign, activist groups typically expend considerable time and energy locating 
material evidence and first person testimonies to warrant their claims.
40
 The research process 
sometimes begins as a quest for an appropriate corporate target; sometimes the group already has 
a corporation in mind.
41
 Either way, the goal is to map several types of discourse in a corporation 
in order to uncover one or more performative contradictions that could be used to sustain a full-
scale anti-corporate campaign. In union sponsored campaigns, more often than not, this has 
meant hiring private researchers and investigators at considerable expense to construct detailed 
financial and demographic profiles of a company and its management team.
42
  
Campaign research can involve a wide range of activities including evaluating financial 
statements, studying advertising themes, documenting supply chain practices, and so on. 
Sometimes this work is done by professional accountants, academic researchers, or private 
                                                 
39 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George Kennedy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 37.
 
40 Manheim argues this sort of “power structure research” is one of the defining traits of contemporary 
anti-corporate activism. Manheim, Death of a Thousand, xv, 6. 
41 The CIW, for instance, settled on Taco Bell Corporation as a target for their first national campaign only 
after considerable research and discussion. Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 24-25. 
42 Labor unions, for example, ultimately spent more than thirty-million dollars in their attempt to unionize 
textile factories in the American South, the majority of it on the research intensive Stevens campaign. 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, “The Evolution,” 218; Jarol B. Manheim, Biz-War and the Out-of-Power Elite: The 
Progressive Left Attack on the Corporation (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), 16-17; Manheim, Death of a 
Thousand, 6-7; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 111-126 passim. 
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investigators.
43
 Often as not activist groups supplement these formal research techniques with 
more informal research practices, primarily by gathering and verifying stories from those who 
have direct experience with the controversial behaviors.
44
 With the advent of Internet 
technologies, research has become easier and less expensive. In fact, one of the reasons there 
have been so many new campaigns in the last decade or so is that it has become easier for 
activist groups to do their own research or share the task – in pro bono fashion – with other 
organizations working on related causes.
45
 Professional researchers and consultants have not 
gone away, but those who plan campaigns tend to consult them only for the more difficult and 
time consuming tasks.
46
  
In the “strategy development” phase of an anti-corporate campaign one moves from an 
atechnical emphasis on the discovery of physical and documentary proofs to an entechnical 
emphasis on discovering appropriate rhetorical strategies and tactics.
 47
 It is at this juncture 
where the “prospective” dimension of prospective narrative disclosure comes most clearly into 
view. Regardless of their preferred manner of public protest, activist groups that sponsor anti-
corporate campaigns have demonstrated a consistent knack for catching management off guard 
by disclosing disconcerting information at inconvenient times, thus forcing them to speak about 
matters they had not expected at times not of their own choosing. Put another way, strategy 
                                                 
43 The National Labor Committee regularly uses confidential informants and even digs through garbage 
dumps to gather information on international sweatshops. Andrew Ross, No Sweat (London: Verso, 1997), 51; 
Manheim, Death of a Thousand, 7-10.
 
44 Elly Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell,” Monthly Review 57, no. 5 (2005).  
45 Prominent examples of organizations that collaborate with activists to provide training services include 
the Midwest Academy (publishes the highly influential training manual Organizing for Social Change and hosts 
activism training seminars), Training for Change (provides consulting and training for nonviolent activism), and Ray 
Rogers Corporate Campaigns, Inc. (provides fee for service and pro bono research and consulting services). For 
information on other organizations offering similar services see Appendix C. Kim Bobo, Jackie Kendall, and Steve 
Max, Organizing for Social Change (Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press, 2010); Rogers, interview by author; 
Training for Change, “About Us,” www.trainingforchange.org/about_us (accessed December 1, 2011).  
46 Manheim provides a comprehensive discussion of how anti-corporate activists have learned to use the 
Internet to share resources and expertise for the planning of campaigns. Manheim, Biz-War, 161.  
47 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 37. 
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development in anti-corporate campaigns is tantamount to the crafting of “rhetorical situations” 
to which corporations will feel obligated to respond.
48
 To plan an anti-corporate campaign is to 
develop strategies for hailing a corporation and those associated with it as certain types of people 
(e.g., as people willing to profit from racism, slavery, or pollution).
49
 The goal is to make sure 
the charges stick, i.e., to insure that those targeted will find it difficult to avoid being interpolated 
as transgressors.  
Strategies and tactics, then, can be thought of as varieties of kairotic (or prospective) 
action. Consistent with this observation, every anti-corporate campaign has a strategy in the 
traditional sense, by which I mean they determine a goal and subdivide it into tactics. On a day-
to-day basis one finds a distinct emphasis on tactics and especially on improvised responses to 
sudden exigencies. This is consistent with the ancient association of kairos and mētis with 
plebian resistance, embodied knowledge, and intuitive action.
50
 In practice this tactical 
orientation often works to the advantage of anti-corporate campaigns, enabling them to make up 
for a lack of economic and professional resources. This is especially true when they can speak 
with clarity and authority on a moment’s notice regarding issues with which they are intimately 
familiar. While corporate PR staffs take their time to research a situation and craft measured 
responses, nimble activists can often beat them to the microphones and gain a tactical 
advantage.
51
  
                                                 
48 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1, no. 1 (1968), 1.  
49 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 173.  
50 I develop this claim in greater detail in a chapter in David Boje’s edited collection Storytelling and the 
Future of Organizations. Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed , 57-60; Hawhee, Bodily Arts, 70; Herder, “Well-Timed 
Stories”; Phillip Sipiora, “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” in Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, 
Theory, and Practice, ed. Phillip Sipiora and James Baumlin (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2002), 6.
 
51 Kenneth Gergen and Diana Whitney contend that global markets have become more “polyphonic” due 
to the international proliferation of new communication technologies. One result of this development is that 
multinational corporations have been experiencing increasing difficulties in monitoring and controlling internal and 
37 
The final thing to emphasize in relation to strategy is discursive appropriation. One of the 
ways in which activists are able to respond quickly to exigencies and compensate for a mismatch 
in financial resources is by operating as bricoleurs who adapt materials from varied sources 
within the ideational and material economies and turn them to their own purposes. Examples of 
this include the staging of public relations style news conferences and the use of carnivalesque 
parodies of corporate discourse and practices. Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor 
Committee provided a memorable example of the former practice when he called a professional 
looking press conference on the steps of St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City to announce 
his organization had just purchased crucifixes manufactured in horrific sweatshops in China from 
the church bookstore.
52
  
I found numerous instances of carnivalesque practices in the Stevens and Taco Bell 
campaigns, where activists often served up satiric caricatures of corporate executives and 
grotesque images of injured workers. For example, as I will explain in more detail later, union 
pamphlets from the Stevens campaigns often featured images and language borrowed from 
corporate publications, quite often paired with graphic images of injured workers.
53
 
Appropriation of themes and images borrowed from corporate discourse was even more obvious 
                                                                                                                                                             
external communication processes. J. Blake Scott extends this argument to the context of anti-corporate protest by 
documenting a “boomerang effect” in which corporations are finding it difficult to defend egregious inconsistencies 
in how they conduct business in various geographic locations around the world. Kenneth J. Gergen and Diana 
Whitney, “Technologies of Representation in the Global Corporation: Power and Polyphony,” in Postmodern 
Management and Organization Theory, ed. David M. Boje, Robert P. Gephart, and Tojo Joseph Thatchenkery 
(London: Sage, 1996), 331; Scott, “Kairos as Indeterminate Risk Management,” 129. 
52 John Sullivan, “Labor Group Says St. Patrick’s Sells Sweatshop Goods,” New York Times, November 
21, 2007. 
53 The most obvious example is a series of ACTWU campaign pamphlets, one of which I reproduce in 
Appendix D, entitled “What’s Under the Covers?” The cover of each featured a close-up photograph of a bed that 
bore an unmistakable resemblance to a well-known image from a J. P. Stevens promotional campaign. The interior 
pages of the pamphlets featured disturbing images and stories about work related injuries and discrimination. 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “What’s Under the Covers? Danger on the Job at J. P. Stevens,” 
undated campaign pamphlet, J. P. Stevens folder, box 31, pamphlets collection, Southern Labor Archives, Special 
Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta; J. P. Stevens and Company; “J. P. Stevens Today,” 
undated company pamphlet, J. P. Stevens folder, box 31, pamphlets collection, Southern Labor Archives, Special 
Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta, 7. 
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in the Taco Bell campaign where protestors often carried signs featuring slogans such as “Taco 
Hell” and “¡No Quiero Taco Bell!” – a play on the company’s well known advertising theme 
“¡Yo Quiero Taco Bell!” (I want Taco Bell!).54 In recent years activists have sometimes built 
entire campaigns around these sorts of satiric parodies of corporate advertising themes. Recent 
examples include slogans such as “Victoria’s Dirty Secret,” “Murder King,” “Kentucky Fried 
Cruelty,” “McLibel,” and “Frankenbucks.”55 Each of these phrases conforms to the same pattern 
of prying loose words and phrases from corporate advertising campaigns and pairing them with 
jarring words and phrases designed to highlight what an activist group sees as ugly 
contradictions in corporate practices.  
As the last few examples suggest, the third stage of prospective narrative disclosure 
(“rhetorical disclosure”) is actually a culminating moment of disclosure within an anti-corporate 
protest event when activists place atechnical evidence of egregious corporate practices in 
dialectical tension with contradictory elements of the company’s public discourse. The practice 
is consistent with Kenneth Burke’s description of “planned incongruity.”56 That is, by placing 
the official public narratives of corporations in dialectical tension with living stories, activist 
groups are practicing a variety of Burkean “perspective by incongruity.”57 Thus, by coining the 
phrase “Kentucky Fried Cruelty,” PETA places the name of a popular fast food chicken 
restaurant in dialectical tension with the concept of animal cruelty.  
                                                 
54 Dave Wielenga, “Taco Hell,” OC Weekly, September 27, 2001; Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Let 
Freedom Ring… Boycott the Bell!” www.ciw-online.org/ CIW%20hunger _strike_site/hunger_strike_ 
daily_report.html (accessed July 1, 2011). 
55 ForestEthics “What is Victoria’s Secret?” www.victoriasdirtysecret.net (accessed July 1, 2011); Organic 
Consumers Association, “OCA Declares Victory in its “Frankenbucks” Campaign,” www.organicconsumers.org 
/starbucks/index.cfm (accessed November 2, 2010); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, “PETA’s 
Campaign against KFC,” www.kentuckyfriedcruelty.com (accessed November 2, 2010); People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, “Victory: PETA Wins ‘Murder King’ Campaign!” www.peta.org /about/learn-about-
peta/murderking.aspx (accessed July 1, 2011); Bill Talen, “Reverend Billy’s Starbucks Invasion: The Church of 
Stop Shopping Takes a Stand,” Utne Reader, October 9, 2007, www.utne.com/archives 
/ReverendBillysStarbucksInvasion.aspx (accessed July 1, 2011).
 
56 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 308, 313.  
57 Ibid, 308.
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Nor is this rhetorical pattern limited to the appropriation of corporate advertising themes. 
When anti-corporate campaigns are well researched and carefully planned, they culminate in 
moments of planned incongruity in which activists present audiences with radically divergent 
accounts of corporate behavior. These are moments when pre-existing narrative taxonomies fade 
into the background and an activist and a corporate executive can interact temporarily as 
rhetorical peers. In these culminating moments in anti-corporate campaigns fundamental shifts in 
attitudes, memory, and meaning become possible. This is true in part because the moment of 
public, narrative disclosure also marks the beginning of storytelling circulation. It also helps to 
explain why activists are wont to repeat the same claims in multiple venues. They are attempting 
to “jump start” a process of centrifugal, discursive circulation capable of destabilizing corporate 
narratives and cohering into popular demands for substantive changes in corporate practice. It is 
a long-term rhetorical strategy that requires considerable persistence, and patience. In a testament 
to its potential, many of the world’s best known corporations now invest considerable time and 
resources into figuring out how to turn back activist campaigns.  
Corporate Defense Strategies 
On the few occasions when business executives have spoken on record about their 
experiences with anti-corporate campaigns, they have tended to emphasize their frustrations in 
dealing with a prolonged conflict over which they have little control as well as their fears about 
how an activist campaign might affect their company’s public standing.58 As David Vogel 
explains, despite the “lack of evidence indicating that ‘bad’ behavior reduces profitability or 
                                                 
58 For an example, see the testimony of Jonathan Blum, former CEO of Taco Bell Corporation before the 
Senate HELP Committee and David Vogel’s brief account of how executives at Dow Chemical worried aloud about 
how protests against their sale of Napalm might do long-term damage to their company’s public reputation. Blum, 
“Testimony of Jonathan Blum;” David Vogel, “Tracing the American Roots of the Political Consumerism 
Movement,” in Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present, ed. Michele 
Micheletti, Andreas Follesdal, and Dietlind Stolle (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2004), 91. 
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harms other measures of corporate performance, many companies remain concerned about the 
potential for long-term harm to their reputations.”59 This interest in public integrity helps to 
explain the remarkable growth over the last few decades in the number of companies with 
publicly available CSR policies – a trend that parallels the growth in the number of headline 
grabbing anti-corporate campaigns.
60
 Anti-corporate activists have learned to create rhetorical 
exigencies to which corporations have been forced to respond. It is important to note, however, 
that because anti-corporate activism typically represents a nominal threat to short term 
profitability, management teams (whatever their concerns regarding reputational integrity) are 
prone to underestimating their chances of becoming the target of a high profile anti-corporate 
campaign.
61
 In other words, though nearly all multinational corporations now have strategies in 
place for responding to activist campaigns, most companies remain highly vulnerable to activist 
initiatives, primarily because, on a daily basis, managers are obligated to attend to more pressing 
matters.
62
 Executive bonuses, after all, are predicated on economic performance, not on the 
ability to anticipate anti-corporate campaigns.  
I am using the phrase “mapping of vulnerabilities” to refer to the research phase of a 
corporate response strategy. Most corporations, like the organizations that sponsor campaigns 
against them, prepare for anti-corporate campaigns by surveying the social field in a prospective 
                                                 
59 David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 46. 
60 For a thoroughgoing discussion of the relationship between activism and corporate social responsibility 
see David Vogel’s The Market for Virtue. Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and 
Power (New York: Free Press, 2005) 28; Vogel, The Market for Virtue, 2. 
61 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (London: Sage, 1995), 2. 
62 As an example of the global interest in activism response strategies among multinational corporations, 
the prominent public relations firm Weber Shandwick recently won an award for its new “social crisis simulator,” 
Firebell. The simulator stages mock crises in which a company’s reputation comes under attack from activists on 
social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. “Weber Shandwick Wins Best Use of Social Media and PR 
Innovation of the Year at 2011 PRWeek Awards,” PR Week, March 11, 2011. 
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manner with an eye toward developing strategies for future action.
63
 Many corporations farm this 
work out to specialty legal or public relations firms that provide issue-specific research and 
strategy consultation services.
64
 As one might expect, the hiring of these sorts of consultants is 
more common in union-sponsored campaigns where management can anticipate with reasonable 
accuracy when they might have to respond to a campaign.
65
 Still, risk assessments related to anti-
corporate activism are common in all global markets regardless of the issue and are viewed as an 
important first step in developing proactive response strategies. In the jargon of public relations 
specialists, activism response strategies are a subset of “crisis communication.”66 
The phrases “strategic inoculation” and “rhetorical closure” refer to efforts to render a 
company less vulnerable to activist campaigns and to restore the integrity of corporate narratives 
in the aftermath of any such campaign. As with medical and computer inoculations, activism-
related inoculation and rhetorical closure strategies serve to disrupt a process in its earliest stages 
before it can pose a serious risk to the integrity of a company’s organizational narratives.67 These 
strategies can be grouped into two categories: geographic and proactive. The first class of actions 
includes things like moving manufacturing operations to a “right to work” state (as J. P. Stevens 
                                                 
63 The Public Relations consultant Denise Deegan gives detailed recommendations for corporations 
interested in researching and monitoring activist groups. Denise Deegan, Managing Activism: A Guide to Dealing 
with Activists and Pressure Groups (New York: Kogan Page, 2001). 
64 Some public relations firms have long experience in helping corporations develop activism response 
strategies. One of the most prominent examples is Burson-Marsteller, which assisted Dow Chemical in developing a 
response to protestors during the Viet Nam War. Other high profile firms that provide activism response services for 
multinational corporations include: Davies Public Affairs, Bonner and Associates Restructuring Associates, and the 
Lukaszewski Group. Joshua Karliner, The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997) 183-184. 
65 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategy in Information and Influence Campaigns: How Policy Advocates , Social 
Movements, Insurgent Groups, Corporations, Governments and Others Get What They Want (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 153. 
66 As public relations scholar Robert Heath explains, “Major theories have developed to understand, 
manage, and mitigate the impact of risk [to businesses and non-profit organizations]. It is a rationale for activism, 
government intervention, and corporate social responsibility.” Robert L. Heath, “Introduction: Defining the Beast 
and De-Marginalizing Key Publics,” in The Handbook of Crisis Communication, ed. W. Timothy Coombs and 
Sherry J. Holladay (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010), 10.  
67 For a discussion of corporate inoculation strategies see: Manheim, Strategy in Information and Influence 
Campaigns, 163. 
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began doing in the middle decades of the twentieth century) or contracting with vendors in 
geographically remote locations with lax labor standards.
68
 The defensive logic of these sorts of 
geographic moves is not difficult to discern. It is more difficult to hold companies accountable 
for things that happen in isolated locations within sprawling supply networks.
69
  
Second, by proactive strategies I mean a wide variety of actions designed to coopt activist 
campaigns before they can gain traction in the public arena. Some of these strategies are 
clandestine and controversial and, for that reason, can be difficult to track. Some are more 
mundane and fall within the category of what public relations professionals call “reputation 
management.” The former, more clandestine, strategies include things like “astroturf” 
campaigns, undercover investigations, and Internet monitoring/sleuthing activities. The astroturf 
campaign (also known as a “stealth” or “undercover” marketing campaign) is the most common 
of these practices. It is a strategy for mimicking grass roots activism by disguising a business 
initiative as a popular movement.
70
  
Since this is where corporate and activist campaigns most resemble one another, one brief 
example may help to illustrate how in some market sectors companies have attempted to co-opt 
activist strategies. The Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF) is the largest and best known 
sponsor of market-oriented astroturf campaigns.
 71
 CCF manages dozens of websites with names 
such as activistcash.com (provides hard-bitten profiles of anti-corporate organizations), 
                                                 
68 Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 15. 
69 As David Vogel explains, “It is not uncommon for some of the most hazardous jobs to be shifted further 
down the supply chain or into the informal sector to avoid international scrutiny.” Vogel, The Market for Virtue, 90. 
70 Legal scholar Joel Bakan provides a caustic review of “undercover marketing” campaigns in his popular 
book, The Corporation. Bakan, The Corporation, 111. 
71 A large percentage of astroturf campaigns target governmental actors. The conservative political action 
group Freedom Works, for example, is said to have planned several of the “spontaneous” Tea Party protests in 
opposition to the Obama administration’s proposed health care reforms in the fall of 2009. Dennis W. Johnson, 
Campaigning in the Twenty-First Century: A Whole New Ballgame? (New York: Routledge, 2011), 64; Earl 
Wysong and Robert Perrucci, New Class Society: Goodbye American Dream? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2008), 235. 
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sweetscam.com (defends high fructose corn syrup) and Petakills.com (accuses People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals, PETA, of hypocrisy).
72
 The titles capture the edgy/critical tone of 
many anti-corporate campaigns, but there are obvious differences.  
In the usual order of things, a social movement spawns an activist campaign which then 
puts up a website and produces campaign literature. The CCF reverses this process by creating 
websites and TV ads in search of popular audiences. Even more telling, legitimate grassroots 
activism depends on generating news coverage through the staging of protest events. Anti-
corporate activists nearly always lack the resources to pay for TV and radio promotions. This, of 
course, explains why they have traditionally placed so much emphasis on carnivalesque parodies. 
Flamboyant and melodramatic performances are more likely to attract news cameras and, as a 
result, generate free publicity. In an age of corporate sponsored public spectacles, anti-corporate 
activists have had to learn to stage public spectacles of their own.  
Undoubtedly the most controversial of the proactive inoculation strategies involve the 
hiring of private investigators to track activist behaviors (online and otherwise) and even 
infiltrate activist organizations. Reliable data is difficult to come by, but there are said to be 
“hundreds of multinational security organizations, which operate with less regulation than the 
spooks [i.e., government spies] themselves.”73 Nor is this a new development. Pinkerton spies 
were hired to infiltrate unions as early as the 1850s and corporate espionage of all sorts has been 
widely practiced since WWII.
74
 In one of the most egregious instances of this type of spying, 
                                                 
72 The title of the petakills.com website mimics the “planned incongruity” of several PETA websites such 
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FBI informants reportedly infiltrated ACTWU during the years of the Stevens campaign.
75
 More 
recently, corporations have been caught spying on PETA, the CIW, Wal-Mart Watch, and The 
New York Times.
76
 The use of corporate espionage tactics against anti-corporate activists and 
journalists marks a disturbing trend, but it is not altogether surprising given the increased number 
of anti-corporate campaigns in recent years.  
As far as I can determine, most corporations do not employ corporate espionage, if for no 
other reason, because of the risk to their reputations if they get caught. In that regard, the 
experience of Burger King Corporation is instructive. In 2007 the CIW learned that Burger King 
executives had, among other things, hired a local detective agency to conduct an undercover 
investigation of their organization.
77
 The CIW responded by contacting local media outlets, and 
when the story gained national attention Burger King issued a swift apology and conceded the 
campaign in short order. If corporate management is sometimes reluctant to be viewed as an easy 
mark for activists, they are even more reluctant to be viewed as crooks.
78
  
By far the most commonly used inoculation strategies involve the hiring of reputation 
management specialists who provide advice on everything from the crafting of CSR policies to 
the sponsoring of charitable activities. Reputation management strategies tend to be 
comprehensive and complex, but they operate according to the crisp utilitarian logic of social 
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78 In the jargon of those who provide advice to corporations on how to respond to activist campaigns, 
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want to be seen doing.” Deegan, Managing Activism, 31. 
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exchange theory.
79
 More to the point, reputation management assumes corporations with 
longstanding reputations as good corporate citizens are, on balance, less likely to find themselves 
the targets of anti-corporate campaigns and more likely to rebound from any events that might be 
corrosive to their public reputations. In other words, companies that adopt reputation 
management strategies aim to achieve a high degree of rhetorical closure.  
In practice this typically means companies use charitable donations to shore up what they 
see as vulnerabilities in their public reputations. McDonald’s, for example (which has had an 
inconsistent but highly profitable relationship with the African American community), sponsors 
the website 365Black.com featuring the slogan “Deeply rooted in the Community.” And 
ExxonMobil, which was responsible for the disastrous Exxon Valdez oil spill, regularly sponsors 
environmental initiatives.
80
 These two examples are of crucial importance to an understanding of 
prospective narrative disclosure. Memory is the indispensable well-spring of storytelling 
disclosure, and when a corporation is able to exercise precise and comprehensive control over 
how a community recalls its own history, anti-corporate campaigns become impossible. 
Finally, although corporations are often seen as bulwarks of stability and predictability, it 
can be very difficult to predict precisely how any one company will respond once it becomes the 
target of a high profile anti-corporate campaign. Some companies have attempted simply to 
ignore campaigns.
81
 Others have fought back by filing civil suits or leveling aggressive 
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countercharges.
82
 Yet others have issued blanket denials in an attempt to minimize or deflect 
criticism.
83
 A very few cooperate with little fanfare.
84
 The companies that fare best (i.e., by 
minimizing damage to their reputations and finances) are not necessarily the ones where 
management makes the fewest mistakes. They are the companies which, once the dust has 
settled, can make a credible claim to having acted in the public interest. Wal-Mart, for example, 
which spends millions every year on philanthropy, has a highly developed strategic CSR policy 
and yet they remain a favorite target for activist campaigns – not because they are the world’s 
largest retailer (although that doesn’t help), but because they have a well-established reputation 
for driving hard bargains with vendors and for lax monitoring of labor standards in their 
international supply chains.
85
 By contrast, in the Taco Bell campaign corporate managers made 
several regrettable statements about the CIW, but they were able to minimize damage to the 
company’s reputation (and, arguably spin the event to their advantage) by earning the trust of the 
coalition and working actively to advance its cause.
86
 To use a cliché, Taco Bell and YUM! 
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Brands have earned a degree of “street credibility” among some activists. Wal-Mart, despite 
spending millions more, has not.  
Unpacking Prospective Narrative Disclosure 
To this point I have been concerned with defining prospective narrative disclosure, 
locating it within historical contexts, and providing examples drawn from applied contexts. In 
the balance of this chapter I give a more fully-developed and theoretical account of its core 
concepts, beginning with a discussion of the ways in which corporations often hide unethical 
practices and how activists have learned to reveal those same “disappearance strategies.” Toward 
that end, this section begins with a discussion of the “aesthetics of disappearance,” which in this 
context refers to systematic techniques for obscuring the ugliest aspects of industrial 
production.
87
 I then provide a more thorough review of how contemporary activists have 
demonstrated parrhesia (rhetorical bravery) by adapting traditional storytelling practices (e.g., 
carnivalesque performances paired with grotesque realism) to the exigencies of the global 
marketplace in order to lay open corporate practices for public, critical interrogation.
88
 
Naomi Klein’s book No Logo, published shortly after the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, 
has come to be seen as something like a manifesto for the anti-corporate globalization 
movement.
89
 In the book Klein executes a “double gesture” in keeping with de Certeau’s 
“recipe” for critical analysis: “[F]irst, cut out; then turn over. First an ‘ethnological’ isolation; 
then a logical inversion.”90 Her first move is to explain how multinational corporations have 
spent billions developing branding strategies to insinuate their products into virtually every 
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aspect of daily life. Some of the more compelling examples she provides of this sort of behavior 
concern public elementary classrooms where “today’s lesson was building a Nike sneaker” and 
where homework included designing new ads for Snapple, Pepsi, or Burger King products.
91
 
Once she has isolated these and other branding strategies, Klein then proceeds to turn them over 
to reveal an ugly history of corporate misdeeds. This section of the book includes harrowing 
accounts of some of the most notorious events in the recent history of global markets, including 
the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire; the suppression of anti-corporate protests in the oil fields of 
Nigeria through military force; virtual slavery in Nike factories in Indonesia; and the poisoning 
of water, air, and soil in minority and low income neighborhoods.
92
 Klein’s graphic accounts of 
these events suggest that not a few of the world’s best known corporations have something to 
hide and have invested considerable time and energy into finding ways to convince public 
audiences to look the other way. 
Klein’s critique of the advancement of corporate power is more pragmatic than 
theoretical. Nonetheless, there are important similarities between the arguments she levels in No 
Logo and the work of academic critics such as Stanley Deetz and Paul Virilio who have written 
of the subtle intrusion of the corporate presence into daily life. For his part, Deetz has provided 
the most widely cited formulation of the so-called “corporate colonization” thesis.93 Borrowing 
from Jürgen Habermas’ conception of the colonization of the “life world” by a functional 
“system world,” he describes a cosmopolitan order in which corporate managerial discourse has 
come to exert significant influence over the daily discourse practices of media, family, education, 
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and the state.
94
 Deetz’s argument leans heavily upon Michel Foucault’s account of “discursive 
formations” – that is dispersed and systematically connected discourse rules that govern how 
ideas emerge, who has presumption to speak, what sorts of concepts can develop, and what sorts 
of strategies can be used for social transformation.
95
 That corporate colonization progresses 
according to subtle and often unspoken discourse rules helps to explain the ephemeral nature of 
corporate power when compared to the overt authority of political states. That is, unlike 
authorities in the governmental sector who are expected to justify their actions in terms of their 
effects on individual liberties, corporations participate in a more diffuse network of disciplinary 
power. And although corporations nearly always present a kinder, more beckoning face than 
state bureaucracies, they can be no less controlling.
96
 
The subtlety and near invisibility of corporate power also emerges as an important theme 
in Virilio’s work on the “aesthetics of disappearance.” Two aspects of Virilio’s critique are 
germane to a study of the rhetoric of anti-corporate activism: the dissemination of hypervisual 
fictions and the systematic programing of “accidents.”97 Regarding the former, Virilio argues 
that by divorcing imagery from geography, advertising and public relations professionals have 
produced a tantalizing world of images only loosely tethered to material locations. Entities such 
as Ronald McDonald or the enormous “rock” featured in Prudential Insurance advertisements are 
ubiquitous and local at the same time. The global dissemination of these appealing simulacra 
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lends an aura of substance to the advertising and public relations campaigns to which they are 
attached. What is more, the rapid proliferation of these fictive images militates against 
recognition of any gaps and contradictions in the hyper-visual matrix of global advertising.
98
 
Virilio discusses this theme in relation to the human struggle with “picnolepsy” – the tendency to 
overlook ubiquitous gaps in daily phenomenal experience.
99
 The frantic proliferation of 
tantalizing images in global mass media, in other words, obscures what might otherwise be 
recognized as disturbing inconsistencies and elisions in market discourse.  
The second mode of disappearance involves the systematic programming of “accidents,” 
that is, industrial “catastrophes” and “disasters.”100 As Virilio explains, the rapid and exponential 
expansion of knowledge has had a remarkable effect on conceptions of human subjectivity, 
necessitating new techniques for hiding the true costs of industrial progress.
101
 To understand 
why this is, it is important to understand that those who design modern day machinery (whether 
mechanical or otherwise) do so with an eye toward diffusing violence across networks – in other 
words, for insuring the “delocalization of all accidents.”102 The implication is that some 
significant level of risk is planned into all modern day social and ideological systems including 
highways, departments of war, and public markets. If that fact seems unremarkable, that is 
precisely the point. When public audiences learn about remote, dispersed violence they may 
express some level of benign sympathy for those who have been harmed, but they are unlikely to 
prompt consumers to take to the streets in protest. As theologian William Cavanaugh has argued, 
“We hear rumors that our shoes are made by Chinese children and other exploited laborers, but 
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we have no idea how we could begin to resist.”103 In other words, when public audiences have no 
idea how to respond to dispersed violence they are likely to toss up their hands and dismiss the 
entire problem as irresolvable. 
To be clear, neither Cavanaugh nor Virilio is claiming that the systematic dispersal of 
violence can be avoided entirely. Rather, they are highlighting the danger of allowing the logic 
of the systematic dispersal of accidents to develop unchallenged to the point where “a general 
impression of powerlessness and incoherence predominates in our minds.”104 Put another way, 
they are wrestling with the problem of how to galvanize public audiences to challenge diffused 
violence and faceless decision makers in a world where people continue to purchase their 
sneakers at big box retailers because any violence attached to such products seems either entirely 
natural (like tornadoes – regrettable but unavoidable acts of God) or as impossibly abstract and 
diffused.  
Of course, the perception that consumers and investors are incapable of seeing past 
corporate strategies and engaging in critical rhetorical action is just that: a perception. Virilio 
explains why this is so in a passage where he cites Aristotle’s argument that ‘the accident reveals 
the substance.”105 If Aristotle is correct, he posits, it means that “‘substance’ is equally [an] 
invention of the ‘accident.’” In the context of anti-corporate activism the implication is that to 
discover a sweatshop factory, a chemical dump, or an instance of human slavery is to uncover an 
opportunity for disturbing regnant assumptions about global markets and for jump starting 
critical conversations about the true price of the cheap goods on retail store shelves. 
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Deetz and Virilio’s arguments about the subtle intrusions of corporate power raise at least 
two questions of critical importance to anti-corporate globalization activists. That is, who should 
be held answerable for corporate behaviors? And, how do those people who labor in the remote 
reaches of corporate supply networks speak out against local despots who are able to silence 
dissent through the use of blunt violence? The first question recalls Deirdre McCloskey’s wry 
observation: “Do I believe in good capitalists? My answer is like the old joke, ‘Do I believe in 
infant baptism?’ Goodness, I’ve seen it!”106 The lesson here is simply that corporate executives 
make easy scapegoats, and one must take care to avoid jumping to conclusions regarding any 
given manager’s culpability in perpetuating harms. In many instances, to be sure, ethical 
culpability seems a foregone conclusion. There can be little doubt, for example, that Robert T. 
Stevens and the executive management team at J. P. Stevens knew about racism, sexism, and 
industrial accidents in their company’s southern textile factories, and that they simply chose to 
look the other way.
107
 Even more disturbing, when management teams at other companies across 
the nation saw how much money J. P. Stevens had saved by defying the NLRB and cracking 
down on union activism, many of them began to follow their example by taking belligerent 
stands in violation of federal law.
108
 That much acknowledged, two decades later, one encounters 
a very different situation in the CIW’s campaign against Taco Bell where the executive 
management team appeared genuinely surprised when presented with evidence of human 
trafficking in their company’s food supply chain.109 This should not be taken to mean that Taco 
Bell executives were not ethically responsible for their role in perpetuating human-trafficking. 
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Still, it is difficult to argue that someone like Jonathan Blum, the former CEO of Taco Bell who 
eventually advocated endorsing the CIW’s cause, was just as responsible for perpetuating social 
harms as was someone like Robert T. Stevens. The truth of the matter is that the Taco Bell 
campaign actually raises a set of difficult questions regarding the assigning of ethical 
responsibility when bad things happen in global markets. This is because corporate supply 
networks have become so extraordinarily complex (systematically, legally, and financially) that 
even those charged with managing them often cannot speak with precision regarding labor and 
environmental practices several tiers down.
110
 No doubt, in many instances this is by design. 
That is, one tangible advantage of supply chain complexity is that it affords management a 
significant measure of plausible deniability.  
Of course, from the perspectives of those who work in the remote reaches of these 
networks, it hardly matters whether top-level management is hard-hearted or clueless. The results 
are the same, and, even in the twenty-first century, the people who jumpstart anti-corporate 
campaigns often do so at risk to their public reputations, and even their own lives. Because of 
this, in many instances the single greatest challenge activists face is in figuring out how to side-
step belligerent local authorities in order to smuggle their arguments into the public sphere. This 
was certainly the case with ACTWU and the CIW in their campaigns against J. P. Stevens and 
Taco Bell. The history of both campaigns confirms the relevance of Michel Foucault’s work on 
brave speech (parrhesia) to the study of anti-corporate campaigns.
111
 That is, many anti-corporate 
activists understand that by speaking the truth about the material conditions of industrial 
production, they run a substantial risk of being fired, blacklisted, or worse. For this reason, those 
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who would speak truth to power within the darkest regions of the global economy must not only 
be brave, they must be inventive. Any discussion of rhetorical invention, however, moves the 
conversation from the realm of discipline to the realm of antidiscipline – and to a more in depth 
consideration of matters pertaining to strategic resistance. 
Activists who would challenge the dominant strategies of corporate powers find 
themselves on the horns of two dilemmas when engaging in rhetorical disclosure in anti-
corporate campaigns. The first involves a dialectical tension between fearless speech and 
figurative speech in the context of civic debates in the public sphere. The second involves a 
dynamic tension Paul Ricoeur has described that exists between a hermeneutic of suspicion and 
the sincere proclamation of kerygma (defensible truth claims). In the first instance the concern is 
with striking a balance between making credible, compelling arguments on the one hand and 
staging dramatic protest events that will attract the attention of public audiences and public 
media on the other. In the second it is with calibrating campaign strategies so as to encourage 
people to read the discourse of any given corporation with suspicion while at the same time 
limiting the chances that opposing parties might begin to read activist discourse with the same 
critical eye. 
Regarding the former dilemma, as Foucault explains, “in parrhesia, the speaker makes 
[things] manifestly clear... showing [his or her audience] as directly as possible what he [sic] 
actually believes.”112 The “parrhesiastes” (brave speaker), in other words shuns the use of any 
rhetorical figures that might obscure the plain meaning of her/his words. Rhetorical bravery is 
important in this context since, as I explain in more detail in chapters four and five, people who 
speak out against corporate misdeeds sometimes do so at risk to their own lives and/or 
livelihoods. Clarity is important in these situations, for the obvious reason that the people who 
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are speaking expect to be believed and are aiming to change the material conditions of daily 
practice in global markets. In situations where activists are speaking out against situated harms, 
imprecise language can be counterproductive. It risks damaging the credibility of the campaign 
and crushing any chance at reform. Furthermore, the emphasis on sober, unadorned arguments in 
anti-corporate campaigns complies with Habermas’ “norms of action” for debates in the public 
sphere.
113
 For example, one finds evidence of activists attempting to engage in this sort of 
serious argumentation in the dozens of meticulously documented studies published by groups 
such as the National Labor Committee and the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility 
where they detail sweatshop labor conditions in far-flung corners of the global marketplace.
114
 
The dilemma these and other groups face when attempting to disclose evidence of 
corporate misbehavior is with gaining an initial hearing in the public sphere. Carnivalesque 
storytelling and strategic action campaigns (two of the defining gestures of anti-corporate 
activism) clearly fall short of the standards for reasoned and dispassionate discourse in a 
Habermasian view of the public sphere. But they attract crowds and cameras, thereby affording 
activists with an unconventional route into serious public debates about the ethical standard of 
the global marketplace. 
Activists must tread a similar tightrope in relation to the latter dilemma relating to 
suspicion and belief. Those who sponsor anti-corporate campaigns aim, at a minimum, to 
convince public audiences to read the discourse of targeted corporations with a skeptical eye. Or, 
from a Nietzschean perspective, one could say they are asking them to critically interrogate the 
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corporation’s history in order to expose disturbing inconsistencies.115 At the same time, these 
same activists are expecting audiences to embrace anti-corporate campaign discourse as 
legitimate on face: as unadorned kerygma (truth). The success or failure of any given anti-
corporate campaign turns on the ability of activists to achieve both of these ends at the same 
time. It is at this juncture, where the martial and confrontation/alliance typologies become 
important. By adopting the more aggressive strategies such as labor strikes or occupations of 
facilities, activists may improve their odds of gaining short term concessions from management, 
but they also increase their chances of alienating some audiences and providing them with 
incentives for reading activist claims in a highly skeptical manner.
116
  
At the same time, if they rely more heavily on storytelling disclosure and carnivalesque 
inversion (as happens in confrontation/alliance campaigns), they run another sort of risk. I am 
referring here to the apathy and paralysis that can set in when people encounter overwhelming 
information about diffused violence. Stephen Browne provides a concise description of the 
situation in an article in which he analyzes the abolitionist Theodore Weld’s graphic descriptions 
of the violence of slavery (lynching, rape, floggings, and the like): “Sentimentalism extends no 
further than its own response.”117 Extreme pathos, in other words, can produce paradoxical 
results. When people are presented with graphic accounts of violence they may express shock or 
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sympathy, but because they have no idea how to rectify what seems like an overwhelming 
situation, they may simply shrug their shoulders and walk away. In confrontation/alliance 
campaigns activists often attempt to work around this paradox by pairing melodrama and 
pragmatism. That is, they not only confront audiences with egregious accounts of systematic 
violence, they provide consumers and/or management with palatable and pragmatic alternatives, 
such as signing a petition, making a small donation, or, in the case of the CIW, paying one penny 
more per pound for tomatoes. In the campaigns I reviewed for this study, when activist groups 
were able to strike this sort of delicate kairotic balance between storytelling confrontation and 
pragmatic alternatives, they were much more likely to convince multiple corporations to concede 
to their demands.118 
What can be said about both of the rhetorical dilemmas I have been discussing 
(parrhesia/figurative speech and suspicion/kerygma) is that if activists are to achieve their stated 
goals of altering corporate practices and changing the ethical standard of global markets they 
must become adept at balancing competing interests and exigencies. In other words, they must be 
able to tell credible stories in the public sphere in order to attract the attention of news media, 
thus enabling them to mobilize public audiences to support their cause; and, if that were not 
enough, at every step they must calibrate their strategies so as to mitigate opportunities for 
conservative counter-readings and counter-mobilization.  
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None of this is entirely new. As I explained earlier, marginalized rhetors have a well-
established history of mediating these sorts of tensions in order to gain hearings in the public 
square. One could speak of “calibrated strategies” or kairos and metis. The difference is 
primarily a matter of word choice. Similarly, one could speak of carnivalesque protests featuring 
grotesque realism or studied violations of social decorum. Practically speaking, the former is a 
more specific instance of the latter. With these distinctions in mind, in the balance of this section 
I provide a more fully-developed account of how anti-corporate globalization activists have used 
traditional storytelling techniques to mount potent challenges to corporate power.  
As Hayden White has argued, narrative constitutes a uniquely pervasive and powerful 
mode of rhetorical persuasion in human discourse.
119
 We are homo narrans, creatures for whom 
“oral narrative, or what we call storytelling in everyday speech, is as much around us as the air 
we breathe.”120 In other words, by pairing an intuitive mode of human rhetorical persuasion 
(storytelling) with theatrical protest performances, anti-corporate activists can speak with 
boldness and clarity while at the same time increasing their odds of attracting and mobilizing 
public support. My task in the next few pages is to review these claims in greater detail in order 
to demonstrate how activists can overcome the kairotic dilemmas I just described and position 
themselves to influence the trajectory of CSR practices in the global marketplace. To that end, I 
begin by placing storytelling resistance in theoretical context and proceed from there to relate 
storytelling to carnivalesque inversion and to describe a contest between monovocal narrative 
control and plurivocal storytelling resistance in the contemporary global marketplace.  
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To begin, one can find numerous accounts of the contest between narrative control and 
storytelling resistance in contemporary academic literature, including works by Jacques Derrida, 
Jean-François Lyotard, Paulo Freire, and Michel de Certeau. Of these authors, Derrida provides 
the most radical account by describing story as “recit,” that is, a storytelling “space that will 
never be closed,” and narration as an authoritarian demand – a terrorizing attempt to “force a 
narrative out of a narrator.”121 Lyotard echoes this sentiment when he writes of the gradual 
eclipse of “metanarratives” in the postmodern era, and when he claims “the little narrative [“petit 
recit”] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention.”122 Freire recognized a similar 
set of patterns in contemporary public education, which he came to view as “suffering from 
narration sickness” and as dominated by a “necrophilic” interest in narrative control.123 Of this 
group, de Certeau provides the most fully-developed discussion of these issues by describing a 
perpetual contest between dominant “strategies” on the one hand and popular “tactics” on the 
other.
124
 For de Certeau, “Storytime” (the patient art of allowing communal memories to 
accumulate and gain force until the ideal moment of action) is a central tactic in the rhetorics of 
popular resistance in daily life.
125
 
David Boje is the best known of several contemporary authors who have focused on the 
tension between story and narrative in the discourse of organizational management and global 
markets.
126
 Multinational corporations, he argues, have a demonstrated interest in exerting 
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narrative control over popular storytelling and “spend billions on story technology, hiring spin 
talent, increasingly appropriating our living stories… then selling them back to us to shape… 
‘reality.’”127 Boje’s work is important at this juncture, not only because of his focus on 
corporations and markets, but because in his work on storytelling resistance he demonstrates the 
relevance of a range of Bakhtinian concepts including heteroglossia (radical plurivocality); the 
dialogic interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces in discourse; and grotesque realism for the 
study of anti-corporate activism.
128
 At this juncture I want to follow Boje’s lead by focusing 
briefly on two of Bakhtin’s primary themes (dialogism and the carnivalesque) in order to 
demonstrate how activists have learned how to combine fearless speech, public storytelling, and 
carnivalesque protest performances without eroding their public credibility or rhetorical impact. 
Regarding the former concept (dialogism), according to Bakhtin one encounters a 
perpetual contest between monovocal, homogenizing authority (i.e., centripetal forces) and 
plurivocal, decentralizing, resistance (i.e., centrifugal forces) in all language systems (and by 
extension, all cultures).
129
 For present purposes, the important point is that corporations have a 
vested interest in maintaining narrative control of their organizations and in closing down any 
gaps or contradictions in their public discourse. Anti-corporate activists maintain an opposing 
interest in using public storytelling to disclose egregious gaps and contradictions in the discourse 
practices and daily business procedures of the corporations they target.  
To get a sense of how this dynamic can play out in applied contexts, I want to consider a 
brief example: the publication of official corporate “histories” on company web pages. In recent 
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years “our history” links have appeared on the web pages of companies as diverse as 
McDonald’s, Dow Chemical, AT&T, and Whole Foods.130 The narratives on these web pages 
tend to follow a progression that echoes the most familiar narratives of economic liberalism. 
Through hard work and determination, middle class entrepreneurs overcome daunting barriers to 
establish global enterprises. These are seamless narratives in which corporate actors progress 
steadily forward from one victory to another.  
The defining gesture of these texts is erasure; that is, the authors consistently eliminate 
discomfiting aspects of company histories. Concrete examples of this strategy are not difficult to 
find in the official histories that many prominent corporations now feature on their company 
websites. McDonald’s, as I explained earlier, says nothing about its troubled history with the 
African American community; Wal-Mart does not mention its troubles with labor unions or 
Chinese sweatshops; Dow Chemical is similarly quiet in relation to Napalm and the Vietnam 
War; and New York Life fails to mention how it profited from slavery in the nineteenth century 
and from racial discrimination in the twentieth.
131
  
These histories operate according to a highly predictable, metonymic logic. On this point 
I am thinking specifically about Kenneth Burke’s definition of metonymy as an attempt “to 
convey some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible,” as when a flag 
stands in for patriotism or a military tank stands in for war. In the sanitized histories one finds on 
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corporate websites, ambitious young entrepreneurs (nearly always white males), copies of 
antiquated print advertisements, and steady profit streams stand in for the “intangible” principles 
of economic liberalism. When reading this type of corporate history one enters a highly 
predictable space in which the logic of rational self-interest and economic autonomy are taken as 
self-evident. 
The utter predictability of these histories and the metonymic homogeneity of the 
landscapes signal that the companies in question are attempting to exert precise, monovocal 
control over their organizational narratives. As Hayden White has observed, the dominance of 
metonymy in any discursive economy is symptomatic of a conservative political order, a place 
where normative rules operate implicitly rather than explicitly and where social change tends to 
happen very slowly according to a natural rhythm.
132
 In a metonymic landscape, the past and the 
future can blend seamlessly together into a perpetual (and simulacral) present tense.
133
 
One of the primary goals of any anti-corporate campaign is to disrupt this narrative 
terrain by disclosing the sorts of information that does not appear in the public relations versions 
of corporate histories. From a grammatical perspective such disruptive actions operate in the 
subjunctive mood, which is to say they are concerned with “contingent, hypothetical, or 
prospective event[s].”134 Put another way, the goal of an anti-corporate campaign is to 
disseminate “critical” histories that transcend the limits of the present and introduce unforeseen 
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possibilities.
135
 If they are to accomplish this goal, activists must be able to think strategically in 
order to select the precise mode of discourse and the precise moment in time when accumulated 
memories stand the greatest chance of breaking through the sedimented present 
136
 In more 
classical terms, in making strategic decisions they must demonstrate an intuitive mastery of 
kairos and mētis (timing and cleverness) born of intimate familiarity with context. As Deborah 
Hawhee has observed, at the intersection of kairos with mētis, “chronos measures duration while 
kairos marks force.”137 As this implies, kairotic storytime tactics operate on the assumption that 
if one waits long enough, dominant strategies will always reveal a weakness – some gap in the 
armor that can afford the disempowered a fleeting but significant opportunity. When 
marginalized rhetors exploit these sorts of opportunities proficiently, sudden inversions of 
attitudes and expectations become possible. “The structure of the miracle has a similar form.”138 
Anti-corporate activists accomplish these things through storytelling action, that is, they 
draw upon the resources of memory in order to place disturbing stories and texts into public 
circulation at opportune times in carefully selected locations. In this way activists have 
sometimes been able to force prominent companies to speak more honestly about their own 
histories and to commit to making substantive reforms to their quotidian practices. One of the 
reasons this has happened is because plurivocal storytelling practices take advantage of the 
centrifugal, decentralizing potential inherent to all discursive economies. Storytelling, in other 
words, is a felicitous tool for anti-corporate activism because stories are centrifugal by nature. 
They are good travelers.
139
 Once released into the public sphere, stories that catch the attention 
of public audiences or shock public sensibilities get repeated, and in the process become linked 
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up to other content. Along the way these stories create counterpublics – discursive communities 
that come together in relation to the circulation of texts.
140
 In this instance the “texts” are stories 
that disclose secretive, disturbing dimensions of quotidian corporate practices.  
If they are to set these sorts of storytelling forces in motion, anti-corporate activists must 
be able to gain access to the public sphere and attract the attention of public media. In some 
campaigns gaining access to the public sphere becomes a problem of the first order. In the 
Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns, for example, activists had to discover ways of slipping 
evidence of their experiences past local tyrants (factory managers and small town authorities in 
the former campaign and brutal slave holders in the latter) so they could recount their stories to 
more sympathetic audiences in other places. As I explain next, in both campaigns carnivalesque 
modes of discourse provided them with an effective set of rhetorical tools for addressing these 
difficulties. 
I am using the word carnivalesque in this context to refer to a set of aesthetic sensibilities 
in keeping with the satiric social reversals and grotesque images that have characterized the 
European, pre-Lenten carnival tradition and certain non-Western performance traditions such as 
Mexican carpa theatre performances.
141
 In regard to the former, Bakhtin notes describes the 
European carnival as “a consecration of inequality [in which] a special form of free and familiar 
contact reigned among people who were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property, and 
profession, and age.”142 On most occasions, peasants and royalty alike respected the rigid 
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parameters of the medieval social order; but, for a precious few days of the year (most 
prominently during the lead-up to the Lenten season), a commoner could parade around dressed 
as a bawdy king, princess, or Pope.143 As this implies, the human body was of special importance 
during these performances, in the sense that a community wide fascination with grotesque 
imagery (explicit descriptions of body parts, bodily functions as well wounded and dismembered 
bodies) served to lower all that was noble, immaterial, and abstract in the normal order of things 
to a common level.
144
 For Bakhtin these popular modes of grotesque realism served to debase 
and regenerate the social system by introducing the possibility of a “more just social and 
economic order, a new truth.”145 
The spirit or carnivalesque inversion and grotesque realism lives on in the garish 
costumes and extreme caricatures one encounters in the literature and protest actions of many 
anti-corporate campaigns. Like their predecessors in medieval carnivals, many of the people who 
inspire anti-corporate campaigns must negotiate a rigid social order on a daily basis. By 
appropriating carnivalesque techniques, they are able to subvert these social taxonomies 
temporarily in order to disclose secretive practices and contest arbitrary privileges. 
None of this matters, to be sure, if local authorities manage to silence carnivalesque 
rhetors through direct coercion. I use the word “local” in this context because, as I explained 
earlier, in the global economy of the new millennium, corporations have developed sophisticated 
legal and organizational techniques for occluding controversial practices and deflecting torts. 
Toxic waste dumps, sweat shops, and slavery? These things have not disappeared from the 
human scene, but they have become less visible. More to the point, in many instances they have 
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been relegated to remote terrains on the fringe of corporate supply chains where local contractors 
are under intense pressure to contain costs and deliver consumer goods for the world economy 
according to tight schedules.
146
  
In discussing these bleak terrains, I want to reflect on M. Lane Bruner’s observation that 
“[d]espite the long and generally humorless history of statecraft, it is nevertheless the case that 
institutional forms of oppression have sometimes been defeated, transformed, or at least 
temporarily checked by carnivalesque protests, at least when conditions are favorable. 
Unfortunately, conditions are rarely favorable.”147 The crucial point of this passage is that 
carnivalesque protests have transformative potential, if for no other reason because it is more 
difficult to arrest protestors dressed as clowns or elves (or, as happened in the WTO protests, 
turtles) than those who are not.
148
 That is, in societies with a healthy tolerance for irony, 
carnivalesque humor affords a modicum of protection against institutional oppression – enough 
at least to make it easier for protestors to articulate their critiques and/or pronounce their 
demands. The important caveat in this argument is that some political orders are so utterly 
intolerant of dissent they can be counted as “humorless states” – places where “the singing and 
dancing elf can simply be taken away at night and dropped into the ocean with weights on his or 
her feet.”149 And yet, even under these sorts of oppressive conditions, determined activists 
sometimes discover avenues for expressing their concerns through carnivalesque dissent.  
This description of humorless states can be extended as well to include “humorless 
terrains” of industrial production – geographic zones (including, as we shall see, certain 
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commercial farm fields in South Florida and some U. S. textile factories in the 1970s) where 
disclosing the truth about daily working conditions could get a person fired or even killed. 
Fortunately, not all industrial terrains are equally humorless and, as I will explain in considerable 
detail in later chapters, even in bleak, isolated factories and farm fields, people can sometimes 
slow the progress of institutional discipline through carnivalesque parody and disclosure of 
grotesque aspects of industrial production.  
One of the ways they have achieved this is by articulating carnivalesque critiques from 
alternative terrains. The key distinction here is that, as scholars such as Arjun Appadurai and 
Homi Bhabha have recently made clear, under globalization the relationship between social 
order and physical geography has become increasingly tenuous.
150
 This hardly means geographic 
location has become irrelevant, but it does mean the global dissemination of communication 
technologies and the rapid expansion of public transportation systems have rendered political 
boundaries increasingly permeable and arbitrary. As globalization has progressed, dissidents 
have learned to lob satiric critiques into humorless gulags from the safety of more tolerant 
terrains where these same activists are more likely to find receptive audiences for their critiques 
of corporate policy. A company might get by with intimidating workers, firing minorities, or 
dumping toxic chemicals into rivers when such actions are restricted to remote corners of the 
global marketplace. But these sorts of practices can be difficult to defend when costumed 
protestors disclose them in the streets of Manhattan, Los Angeles, or London. By shifting the 
terrain of the conflict, activists have learned they can engage in humorous dissent while at the 
same time decreasing the threat of direct reprisal and increasing their chances of being noticed 
by global media. In an era when the public screen has become an extension of the public sphere, 
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employing carnivalesque humor makes strategic sense because cameras are attracted to 
spectacles.
151
 And once the cameras are present, activists have an opportunity to speak frankly 
about secretive practices in isolated locations. That is, by playing the role of the carnival clown, 
they can create opportunities for assuming the role of the “parrhesiastes” (fearless speaker) in the 
globalized public sphere.
152
  
This view, one might add, is in keeping with the recent work of scholars such as Michael 
Gardiner, Ken Hirschkop, and John Michael Roberts, who have advocated for Bakhtinian 
dialogism and carnivalesque modes of discourse as a supplement to Habermas’ conception of the 
public sphere.
153
 These authors recognize value in a Habermasian conception of public discourse 
but seek to open it up to include spaces where those who have been silenced are encouraged to 
speak, and where rational and performative modes of discourse can co-exist in agonistic tension. 
If these practices are to yield changes in the ethical standards of global markets, they must 
generate storytelling circulation without prompting counter-mobilization. It is to these topics I 
turn next. 
When activists lay out plans for anti-corporate campaigns, they must learn to calibrate 
their strategies and tactics in order to articulate defensible arguments and avoid the extremes of 
conservative backlash and public apathy. If they are to achieve their ultimate goal of influencing 
markets over the long-term, they must also be able to mobilize a diverse range of audiences to 
align with their cause so as to give management the sense that their current practices may be 
fundamentally out of step with public, ethical sensibilities.  
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This view of social change assumes that although corporations are powerful institutions 
with enormous resources, they are run by human beings who, under the right circumstances, are 
susceptible to humanitarian appeals, public sentiment, and the “language of praise and blame.”154 
Put another way, if – as Deirdre McCloskey insists – the global economy is rhetorically 
constructed, then financial resources might turn out to be less important than one might 
expect.
155
 The claim has history on its side. As Richard Rorty has observed, “The emergence of 
the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everything to 
hearing sad and sentimental stories.”156 If Rorty is right (and I believe he is) this means the 
dissemination of timely stories about shocking contradictions in corporate narratives may 
represent our best hope for shifting the de facto CSR standards of global markets over the long-
term.  
In his work On Populist Reason Ernesto Laclau provides a way of thinking about how the 
public circulation of stories and texts can yield the sorts of popular demands Rorty assumes and 
how those demands can sometimes fracture and spin out of control.
157
 In regard to the former 
possibility, I am thinking of Laclau’s description of the role of “equivalential chains” in the 
formation of popular demands.
158
 In this process, a single, resolute demand can come to stand for 
several others that become linked together via a process of equivalential reasoning. Thus, in 
English and American abolitionism the signifier “slavery” came to serve as the organizing term 
for a whole set of demands pertaining to temperance, women’s suffrage, and the early labor 
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movement.
159
 As abolitionist stories and texts circulated in centrifugal fashion among widely 
dispersed communities they helped to establish metonymic links between related demands and 
contributed to the destabilization of abstract, transcendental signifiers connected to things like 
patrimony, colonialism, and industrialization.
160
 
For those in positions of authority within hegemonic orders (e.g., corporate executives 
and financiers) the dialogic proliferation of these sorts of demands can often seem disorienting 
and alien. This is because equivalential chains challenge the limits of the social imaginary by 
disclosing the arbitrary nature of current political orders. Or, as Laclau writes, “the wild logic of 
emptying the signifiers of universality through the expansion of the equivalential chains means 
that no fixing and particular limitation on the sliding of the signified under the signifier is going 
to be permanently assured.”161 As with Burke’s description of planned incongruity, in other 
words, once signifiers have become radically disturbed they can never be realigned in precisely 
the same way, and the future can never again look exactly like the past.
 162
  
None of this should lead one to adopt a naïve view of popular change, primarily because 
this same process of the formation of equivalential chains and the emergence of popular demands 
can occur (counter-intuitively) on the conservative end of the political spectrum and against the 
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interests of anti-corporate activism.
163
 Even more worrisome, when this happens the competing 
demand can sometimes disrupt the original (activist) process and subsume some of the secondary 
demands that had been part of its equivalential chain. On this point Laclau gives the example of 
how, “the defence of the ‘small man’ against power ceases to be associated to a left discourse, as 
in the American New Deal, and becomes linked to the ‘moral majority.’”164 In an anti-corporate 
campaign, then, success or failure turns on the ability of an activist group to set highly credible 
stories of egregious practices in public circulation in ways that galvanize a diverse, durable 
coalition of audiences, all of whom embrace the key demand of the campaign as resonant with 
their own interests. 
Prospective Narrative Disclosure in Global Context 
By way of summary, I have argued that anti-corporate activists have learned to adapt 
ancient rhetorical techniques of storytelling disclosure to influence the behaviors of multinational 
corporations and the trajectory of CSR standards in global markets. I coined the phrase 
prospective narrative disclosure to describe this process, and defined it as referring to the 
practice of using intensive research and kairotic storytelling strategies to disclose egregious 
contradictions between corporate discourse and situated practice and, in so doing, disrupt the 
narrative coherence of corporate discourses. Corporations have responded to these strategies by 
developing sophisticated techniques of their own for fending off activist critiques and defending 
the long-term integrity of their public reputations. 
From a Bakhtinian perspective, the contest between corporate strategists and their activist 
opponents can be described as representing the dialogic interplay of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. One can recognize the centripetal dimension of corporate discourse in Paul Virilio’s 
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argument that global supply networks and the proliferation of advertising fictions are 
representative instances of a contemporary aesthetics of disappearance. Both authors provide 
useful analytic tools for understanding the narrative control strategies of multinational 
corporations and why it is that they would be willing to invest millions in order to exercise 
precise control over their organizational discourse and turn back activist campaigns. 
Despite obvious disparities in economic resources, anti-corporate activists have found 
ways of disrupting the centripetal cohesion of corporate discourse in order to disclose 
contradictions and challenge market practices. Their prospective narrative disclosure strategies 
are centrifugal in the sense that they involve setting plurivocal, iconoclastic stories about 
corporate misbehavior in public circulation. For such strategies to be effective activists must 
demonstrate considerable kairotic savvy. They must learn how to sidestep local tyrants in order 
smuggle stories into the public sphere. Then they must learn how to deliver unimpeachable 
assessments of corporate practices while at the same time attracting news cameras and sparking 
public discussions. This latter situation helps to explain the prevalence of carnivalesque and 
grotesque themes in anti-corporate discourse. Photographs of injured bodies and garish 
caricatures of CEO’s may not conform to Habermasian discourse standards, but they can enable 
activists to gain a hearing in the public sphere.  
Any such actions, however, must be carefully calibrated so that they do not invite undue 
public suspicion of activist claims. This distinction is of crucial importance in relation to the 
martial and confrontation/alliance typologies within prospective narrative disclosure. By 
adopting strategies that can fairly be described as coercive (occupying facilities, freezing 
financial assets, or staging labor strikes, for example), activists can invite counter-suspicion and 
counter-mobilization among opposing factions in the public sphere. Nonetheless, my research 
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suggests that when activists are able to negotiate these obstacles they can exert considerable 
influence on the attitudes and practices of corporate decision makers. A primary reason this 
happens is because true stories, when set in public circulation at certain times and in certain 
places, can cohere into public demands that corporations and markets find difficult to ignore.  
In the next chapter I build upon these themes by arguing that prospective narrative 
disclosure and the martial and confrontation/alliance typologies represent refinements to 
longstanding rhetorical practices in the discourse of anti-corporate activism. Just as the strategies 
of twenty-first century activists resemble those of iconoclastic rhetors from across human 
history, they also bear a striking resemblance to strategies activists have employed to challenge 
market practices since the dawn of the industrial era.  
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Chapter 3: Indicting Phantoms: Anti-Corporate Activism in Historic Context 
“Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be 
damned, and no body to be kicked?” 
Edward Thurlow
1
 
At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution one finds two prominent social movements in 
England that continue to drive debates about rhetorical agency and the limits of corporate 
activism in the global marketplace: the Luddite rebellion and the Abolitionist movement. The 
former was a labor rebellion that began in 1811, when new laws banning trade with Napoleonic 
France and its allies resulted in widespread unemployment and even famine in the English textile 
region.
2
 Thousands of people in the region responded by destroying industrial machinery and 
publically harassing many factory owners and managers.
3
 The uprising lasted nearly three years, 
ending only after a military intervention of unprecedented scale and the public trial and 
execution of dozens of leaders.
4
 The latter was a series of popular campaigns against the slave 
trade and featured large rallies throughout England at which abolitionist speakers denounced 
slavery as a violent and inhumane practice that was utterly inconsistent with Christian values. In 
the end the abolitionists achieved their goal of ending the slave trade and outlawing slavery in 
the British Empire.  
The Luddite and abolitionist movements mark touchstone moments in the history of 
corporations and of anti-corporate activism. More to the point, the two campaigns represent 
overlapping trends in market-based activism that have persisted across the last two centuries – a 
time during which the world has seen the emergence and proliferation of business corporations, 
                                                 
1 As cited in John C. Coffee, “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:’ An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment” Michigan Law Review 79, no. 3 (1981): 386. 
2 Frank Peel, The Risings of the Luddites, Chartists and Plugdrawers (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger 
Publishing, 2009), 160.
 
3 Ibid, 11-15. 
4 Kevin Binfield, “Introduction,” in Writings of the Luddites, ed. Kevin Binfield, 1-68 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 2-3.
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labor unions, international communication networks, and anti-corporate campaigns. Specifically, 
the Luddite rebellion can be viewed as anticipating the martial typology in prospective narrative 
disclosure with its characteristic emphasis on the use of bluntly instrumental strategies for the 
purpose of changing short term behaviors (e.g., wage scales, working conditions, and 
environmental policies). The abolitionist movement, by contrast, anticipates the 
confrontation/alliance pattern, characterized by artful disclosures of systematic harms for the 
purpose of bruising consciences, galvanizing popular sentiment, and gradually shifting the 
attitudes and practices of entire markets. This should not be taken to mean the two campaigns 
were entirely dissimilar. Both the Luddites and the abolitionists used pamphleteering, mass 
meetings, political parody, and grotesque imagery to disclose systematic human rights abuses 
and rally public audiences. Both groups also developed detailed campaign strategies and tactics 
for coordinating the actions of large numbers of people over extended periods of time.  
In this chapter I use the Luddite and abolitionist campaigns as a starting point for 
reviewing important themes in the history of corporations and of anti-corporate protest 
movements. I begin by recounting a brief history of the business corporation, starting with 
ancient cooperative business ventures, moving on to a more extended discussion of the 
emergence and growth of the general business corporation, a type of cooperative business 
venture which investors have found highly attractive, in no small part because they afford 
unprecedented protection against legal torts and obscure lines of ethical accountability. 
Following that, I provide a history of anti-corporate activism, starting with an analysis of 
important events and themes in the Luddite and abolitionist campaigns. From there I continue on 
to examine salient moments of consumer and labor activism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and the emergence of more strategically sophisticated, media-savvy campaigns in the 
76 
twentieth century. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how, in recent decades, anti-
corporate activists have learned to combine ancient rhetorical disclosure practices and public 
media strategies in order to influence the daily business practices of multinational corporations.  
The Birth of the Corporation 
Corporation, n.  
An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility  
– Ambrose Bierce5 
 
The word “corporation” can be defined in at least two ways. In its most general sense it 
refers to a business enterprise owned by several people. In this chapter I will be using the word 
in a narrower, strictly legal sense to refer to a general business corporation, defined as “a legal 
person separate and distinct from the people who own it…[an arrangement that limits] an 
owner’s loss… to the amount of capital that he [sic] has invested.”6 The implication is that when 
a plaintiff sues a corporation she or he is suing the company, not the investors.7 This also means 
that a corporation is, quite literally, a legal fiction and a product of social imagination.
8
 More to 
the point, corporations are legal constructs people have created ex nihlio over time to conduct 
business in an increasingly complex and interconnected global marketplace. 
This much acknowledged, corporations of the sort I just described are a relatively recent 
phenomenon in human history. Prior to the eighteenth century, business corporations were 
virtually unknown in the U. S. and Europe. What is more, it was not until governments began to 
issue charters for large scale transportation projects in the early nineteenth century that 
corporations caught on with investors. Despite this tentative beginning, corporations soon began 
                                                 
5 Ambrose Bierce, The Unabridged Devil’s Dictionary, ed. David E. Schultz and S. T. Joshi (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2000), 43. 
6 Graham Bannock, et. al., Dictionary of Business (Princeton, NJ: Bloomberg Press, 2003), 161, 200.  
7 For a more detailed definition of the corporation and other types of business organizations, including the 
limited liability company and the limited liability partnership see: Thomas R. Hurst and William A. Gregory, Cases 
and Materials on Corporations (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company, 1999), 1. 
8 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23. 
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to proliferate and crowd out other types of cooperative business ventures. Two hundred years 
later corporations have become a ubiquitous presence in modern economies and in daily life. To 
understand why, after their unparalleled record of financial growth, corporations remain 
controversial, requires a more detailed understanding of their history.  
To begin with, cooperative business ventures are hardly a new idea. Three millennia ago 
merchants trading along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers entered into joint ownership agreements 
supervised by temple authorities.
9
 A millennia later, Assyrian business people developed even 
more complex arrangements that in many respects resembled modern day venture-capital funds. 
By the fourth century BCE joint business ventures were relatively commonplace, especially in 
sea-faring cultures like those of Athens and Rome, where they provided important protections 
against the extreme financial risks inherent to sea travel and international commerce. It was the 
Romans who first treated cooperatively owned businesses as autonomous entities, legally distinct 
from any one of their owners or investors.
10
 These Roman societates (business societies) also 
count as the first businesses with legally distinct subsidiaries – in the form of various collegia or 
corpora (craft guilds) for manufacturing specific goods. 
The craft guild proved to be a robust model for collective business enterprises and 
persisted largely unchallenged until the Middle Ages, when business people and states began to 
look for new ways of financing large scale enterprises and global exploration.
11
 Collective 
business enterprises more closely resembling the modern day business corporation first appeared 
in the sixteenth century, when European states (eager to funnel riches from international trade 
                                                 
9 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea (New 
York: Modern Library, 2005), 4-5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Edison, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991), 14; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, 45; Ted Nace, Gangs of America: 
The Rise of Corporate America and the Disabling of Democracy (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2005), 22. 
78 
into governmental coffers) began to grant charters for international trading companies such as 
the Merchant Adventurers.
12
 As European governments expanded their international empires 
over the next few centuries, they granted charters for similar enterprises with increasing 
frequency.
13
 
The earliest of the chartered companies functioned as umbrella organizations for 
independent businesses, each of which was responsible for its own finances and accounting.
14
 
These arrangements proved cumbersome and inefficient for what were, more often than not, 
international enterprises. It often made little sense, for example, for individual merchants to 
maintain separate docks or to commission separate ships when operating out of the same ports. 
Cooperation on those sorts of pragmatic issues led to cooperation on financial matters and, 
eventually, to the selling of joint stock to finance risky adventures abroad.
15
 
Despite promises of extraordinary returns, the early overseas business ventures were 
dicey affairs that only rarely delivered profits to investors. Early Dutch and English 
entrepreneurs to the “spice islands” in Indonesia, for example, sometimes executed indigenous 
people they deemed uncooperative and, on several occasions, even poisoned their own crews. 
Not surprisingly, such traders often failed to complete their official missions, which, in most 
                                                 
12 The Merchant Adventurers (also known as the Guild or Fraternity of St. Thomas a Beckett) was 
organized by the Mercers’ (textile) Guild in 1505 to coordinate trade with Germany and Holland. Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge, The Company, 8; Nace, Gangs of America, 22, 46-47. 
13 The English government was prolific in this regard. Prominent examples include: the Russia (Muscovy) 
Company (1553), the East India Company (1600), the Hudson’s Bay Company (1670), and the Royal African 
Company (1672), and the South Seas Company (1711); Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship 
and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 52; Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge, The Company, 17. 
14 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, xvi.  
15 In one of the earliest examples of this arrangement the Muscovy Company made several attempts to sail 
to the remote port of Archangel on the northern coast of Russia. When, against considerable odds, one of the 
company’s ships finally sailed from London to Archangel and back, the company was granted a temporary 
monopoly on trade with Moscow. The owners then proceeded to raise money for subsequent journeys by selling 
public shares in their enterprise. There is some question as to whether the Muscovy Company should count as the 
first “joint stock company” or whether that honor should go to some other enterprise such as the Turkey Company or 
the British East India Company. Regardless, the practice of issuing public shares in chartered companies quickly 
caught on. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, 18; Nace, Gangs of America, 22. 
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instances, was to deliver novel commodities to European consumers.
16
 Early disasters aside, 
European merchants and monarchs sensed there was money to be made, and so they continued to 
fund trading ventures to sundry parts of the “New World.” By the middle of the seventeenth 
century the Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company were providing 
upper class consumers with a steady supply of tea, spices, silk, and other exotic goods.
17
 The 
Dutch East India Company quickly became the larger and more profitable enterprise, largely due 
to its practice of funding its sailing ventures on a multi-decade rather than a per-journey basis. 
The new practice enabled investors to spread out their risks in hope of gaining steady, 
dependable returns on investment.
18
 
The emergence of relatively stable and prosperous companies also created a need for 
public markets where investors and entrepreneurs could meet one another and conduct business. 
The Dutch opened the first such stock market in 1611. And by 1636 they saw the first stock 
market collapse after tulip bulb futures rose temporarily above the price of gold.
19
 The so-called 
Tulip Mania was the first and, to this day, the best known of several market scandals during this 
era, including the South Sea Bubble of 1720 (in which thousands of investors lost their fortunes 
in an elaborate scheme to profit from the South American slave trade) and the Mississippi 
Company scandal later that same year (in which thousands of investors in France and the 
continent were taken in by an elaborate marketing scheme exaggerating the wealth of 
Louisiana).
20
  
Two aspects of the wild fluctuations of these early markets are of special importance in 
relation to prospective narrative disclosure, as they mark behaviors that persist, to varying 
                                                 
16 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company,19. 
17 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, 13; Nace, Gangs of America, 33. 
18 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, 20. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 28-31. 
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degrees, even in the sophisticated global trading environments of the twenty-first century. The 
first concerns radical disparities between the claims speculators made when luring investors and 
what actually happened once they received money. The second has to do with strategic 
maneuvers among investors and managers intent on limiting their liability for a company’s 
missteps while maximizing their potential for reaping large financial returns.  
Regarding the former, one of the most striking examples involves a text entitled 
“Discourse on Western Planting” in which the writer Richard Hakluyt attempted to convince 
Queen Elizabeth to support Sir Walter Raleigh’s schemes for establishing colonies in North 
America. Such an enterprise, he claimed, would advance the Christian Gospel (through 
conversions of indigenous people) and “yelde unto us all the commodities of Europe, Affrica, 
and Asia, as far as wee were wonte to travel.”21 The grim truth was that the Jamestown colony 
quickly became a sort of death camp for poor people (including not a few children) who had 
been rounded up from the streets and prisons of London. Of the 3,570 people transported to the 
new colony over three years, only 900 survived.
22
 Three hundred or so died in skirmishes with 
Indians. The balance died of disease, starvation, or (more often than not) brutal punishments 
inflicted by Virginia Company managers upon anyone who complained or stepped out of line in 
any other way.
23
 Even as Hakluyt and others fed investors in the Virginia Company fervent 
fictions about idyllic life in the New World, word about brutal living conditions in Jamestown 
spread quickly among the poor of London. When the Virginia Company submitted a request for 
                                                 
21 Richard Hakluyt, A Discourse Concerning Western Planting (Cambridge, MA: John Wilson and Son, 
1877), 19. 
22 Nace, Gangs of America, 36. 
23 As Ted Nace explains, “Even petty crimes were harshly punished. Stealing an ear of corn or a bunch of 
grapes while weeding a garden was punishable by death. For stealing two or three pints of oatmeal, one worker had 
a needle thrust through his tongue and was chained to a tree until he died of starvation.” Nace, Gangs of America, 
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children from the Bridewell reformatory to be transported to the new colony, it sparked a revolt 
among the children.
24
 
In the end, the English underclass was helpless to do anything about the disturbing 
dissonance many recognized between the words and deeds of those associated with the Virginia 
Company. As for the children, 150 of them arrived on schedule in Jamestown colony where they 
were soon joined by a group of captives from the Congo region of Western Africa (the first 
instance of African slavery in what would become the United States).
25
 These developments 
aside, the “subculture of resistance” against elite business interests that became visible in the 
Bridewell revolt continued to percolate beneath the surface during the era of British colonial 
expansion; and in cities like Boston and New York it would eventually provide fuel for political 
rebellion.
26
  
The second thing to notice at this juncture about eighteenth century markets is that (wild 
fluctuations aside) they represented a significant improvement over even riskier investment 
strategies in which small groups of owners shared enormous risks in hope of reaping enormous 
profits. The new joint stock companies, by their very nature, afforded investors greater protection 
against financial risk than traditional business partnerships.
27
 The difference was a matter of 
scale. Because the Virginia Company and other joint stock companies sold shares to hundreds or 
even thousands of investors, and because the returns they paid were based on long-term 
productivity rather than the success of individual ventures, they were able to provide investors 
with a significant hedge against catastrophic losses. Returns may have been erratic and 
                                                 
24 Ibid, 36. 
25 James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America (New York, Basic Books, 
2005), 243-244.  
26 As a final note on the Jamestown debacle, when political observers and financial investors began to 
complain about mismanagement of the colony, King James finally revoked the company’s charter in 1624 and the 
settlement came under control of the crown. Nace, Gangs of America, 36.  
27 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Company, 19 
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unpredictable, but for patient investors the new joint stock companies sometimes paid out 
handsome long-term dividends.  
And yet, by distributing financial risk across large numbers of people, the joint stock 
companies also made it more difficult for anyone to trace lines of ethical responsibility. When, 
for example, the captains of some Dutch ships executed local citizens in remote ports, poisoned 
their own crews, or did anything else that impeded their ability to deliver promised goods on 
time to European markets, investors in the Dutch East India Company did not necessarily lose 
their fortunes.
28
 This was true, if for no other reason, because it was also difficult to determine 
with any precision just who (besides a gaggle of incorrigible underlings) should be called to 
account, legally or otherwise, for such actions. 
Scottish economist Adam Smith (a person often held out as one of the great apologists for 
economic liberalism) spoke to this ethical dilemma in Wealth of Nations when he held up the 
East India Company’s operations in Bengal as illustrating the dangers of mismanagement in 
chartered monopolies:  
Nothing can be more foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house at 
ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost quite out of sight, should, upon a 
simple order from their masters, give up at once doing any sort of business on their own 
account abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in 
their hands. 
29
  
 
In other words, whether one is speaking of eighteenth century British accountants in Bengal or 
the managers of sweatshops in modern day Bangladesh, people are less likely to bypass 
succulent but corrupt opportunities when they have every reason to believe their actions will not 
be subjected to widespread public critique. Worse, even when criminal operatives can be 
identified and called out, investors receive powerful incentives (in the form of dividend checks) 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Books IV-V (New York: 
Penguin, 1999), 224. 
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to look the other way. These sorts of difficulties with accountability in the early joint stock 
companies marked the beginning of an incipient rhetoric of disappearance – a discursive trend 
that would come to maturity in the twentieth century under the aegis of armadas of highly paid 
business executives, corporate lawyers, and public relations specialists. Charged with protecting 
returns on investment to stockholders, they would dedicate their full energies to formulating 
apologias for corporate actions and, in the process, making it difficult to determine who, if 
anyone, could be held answerable for egregious practices. 
In the rough and tumble markets of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, joint stock 
companies could hide many misdeeds from customers and investors, but this did not prevent 
them from earning a reputation as enormously risky business ventures. Large enterprises such as 
the Dutch East India Company aside, the vast majority of large businesses during this period 
were sole proprietorships or privately held corporations.
30
 As evidence of the pervasive distrust 
of corporations during this era, when the U.S. Constitution was drafted the new United States of 
America counted only six small-scale chartered corporations other than banks.
31
 In the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 the question of whether the national government or the states 
should grant charters to corporations was hotly debated. In the end, the new Constitution 
included no mention of corporations. This is primarily because advocates of federal charters 
could not overcome the objections of those who feared the expansion of corporate power and 
wanted to prevent the new nation from chartering anything like the East India Company – a 
business entity with economic clout that rivaled that of well-established political states.
32
  
It was not until the nineteenth century when governments and investors began to look for 
ways to finance large scale railroad projects that business corporations began to proliferate and 
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soon became a fixed feature of the global landscape.
33
 The “true creators” of the modern day 
corporation, in other words, were the great railroads of the United States and Great Britain. In 
England, between 1825 and 1849, shareholder investments in railroads increased 1,000 fold from 
£200,000 to more than £230, 000,000.
34
 In the years following the Civil War in the United 
States, the nation built more than 100,000 miles of track and the number of corporations in all 
sectors of the economy began to grow exponentially. Investors, it seems, had fallen in love with 
the idea of limited liability.  
As corporations proliferated, many investors came to learn that owning stock in a 
company was not the same thing as having a say in its management. As California Governor 
Newton Booth (an ardent anti-monopolist) observed in 1873, “every tie in the [new 
Transcontinental Railroad] is the grave of a small stockholder.”35 In other words, although cash 
flowed in from tens of thousands of people, a small cadre of monopolists retained control over 
the purse strings and were able to expand their own interests exponentially even while returning 
precious little money to small investors. 
In the coming decades new labor unions such as the Knights of Labor, the American 
Federation of Labor, and the American Railway Union would make a similar discovery, but with 
more tangible and disturbing results.
36
 In a series of clashes with labor activists during the fin de 
siècle, management demonstrated a willingness to use overt violence to quell dissent among 
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company employees. To cite but a handful of the most notorious incidents, management called 
on private security firms and government troops to quell labor uprisings in the Colorado Labor 
Wars from1902 to 1904, the Railroad Shopmen’s Strike of 1922, and the huge Textile Workers’ 
Strike of the 1930s (also known as the “Uprising of ‘34”).37 In each case, the strategy was 
unambiguously coercive. Strike participants were silenced with bludgeons and bullets. 
That corporate interests were able to suppress labor uprisings with the help of state and 
federal militias was an indication of their increasing financial and political clout. By the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century, large companies had succeeded in lobbying politicians in 
many venues to remove what they saw as burdensome limits on incorporation. In the early 
decades of the nineteenth century corporations were generally extended charters to conduct 
business for a limited number of years in a specific market sector.
38
 Moreover, if management 
violated the terms of a charter, then revocation was a tangible possibility. By the 1860s the 
charter system began to give way to new methods of general incorporation in which virtually 
anyone willing to fill out the necessary paperwork could be approved to form a business 
corporation. Under the new system corporations were typically extended an unlimited life span 
and freed up to conduct business in any market sector. One result of these developments was that 
some corporations quickly grew to an enormous size, thus prompting the U. S. and other 
industrialized nations to pass legislation such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 aimed at 
limiting the scope and influence of corporate monopolies.
39
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Concerns about corporations gaining excessive power were hardly new. As early as 1816, 
Thomas Jefferson had written that he hoped the nation would “crush in its birth the aristocracy of 
our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength 
and bid defiance to the laws of our country.”40 Half a century later Abraham Lincoln echoed 
these sentiments by warning that “corporations have been enthroned and an air of corruption in 
high places will follow.” By 1886, the year the Supreme Court issued the Santa Clara decision 
(later interpreted as granting personhood to corporations), the ascendance of corporations had 
become a hotly contested topic in lyceum debates and editorial pages on both sides of the 
Atlantic.41 
Titans of business like Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie 
shrugged off these concerns and doubled-down on expanding their empires. By the early decades 
of the twentieth century, critics within the academy were issuing warnings about the anti-
democratic nature of these industrialists and the enterprises they had founded. In 1931 Isaac 
Wormser argued that modern day corporations more closely resembled independent monsters 
than human beings.
42
 One year later, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means appealed to Jeffersonian 
notions of political liberty to warn that the separation of ownership and control in corporations 
was leading to an accumulation of power, not so much in the hands of a cadre of conspicuous 
“robber barons,” but in the hands of a new class of highly paid and largely anonymous corporate 
managers.
43
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Jürgen Habermas would later extend these arguments by attributing the decline of the 
bourgeois public sphere to the “invasion of advertising publications [and]… public relations” in 
the early twentieth century.
44
 Habermas’ critique is quite specific, going so far as to name the 
corporate public relations pioneers Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays. And though he does not name 
him, Habermas could just as easily have included the journalist and communication scholar 
Walter Lippmann, whose arguments about “stereotypes” and the lack of “universal competence” 
in the general public were entirely congruent with the views of early public relations 
professionals.
45
 In truth, what people like Lippmann and Bernays shared was a Platonic interest 
in controlling an unruly demos through the subtle manipulation of public opinion.
46
 Bernays, for 
instance, was the nephew of Sigmund Freud and spoke proudly of adapting his uncle’s theories 
for use in the “engineering of consent.”47 Those seeking evidence of the growth in managerial 
power Berle and Means predicted need look no further than the unblushing defense of the 
scientific management of public opinion one finds in the works of Lippman and Bernays.
48
  
In more recent decades corporations have expanded internationally and become even 
wealthier and more influential. By 2005 the annual revenues of each the world’s ten largest 
corporations exceeded the gross domestic products of 168 nations.
49
 The most politically 
consequential result of this situation is that multinational corporations have become increasingly 
peripatetic and independent of the control of individual nation states. The various iterations of 
the post-World War II Bretton Woods institutions (most significantly the International Monetary 
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Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization) have lowered or eliminated many 
barriers to global trade, thus enabling many corporations to sidestep local laws regulating labor, 
environmental, and investment practices by simply contracting with suppliers in other countries. 
At the same time, critics in the academy have continued to issue warnings about the 
colonizing potential of corporations.
50
 To cite but a few of the most prominent examples, 
Theodor Adorno traced the progress of a “culture industry” capable of commodifying even the 
most mundane aspects of daily life.
51
 Economist Joseph Stiglitz has warned of a fundamental 
lack of democratic accountability when management “hides behind the corporate veil.”52 Stanley 
Deetz has written a detailed analysis of “corporate colonization,” or the steady intrusion of the 
corporate presence into the daily activities of media, family, education, and the state.
53
 And in 
No Logo, Naomi Klein has provided a chilling description of the mind-numbing results of 
corporate branding strategies.
54
 
Corporations have responded to these sorts of criticisms by developing CSR initiatives: 
sophisticated strategies for serving the public good (and, in the process, enhancing profitability 
and public relations).
55
 As early as the 1950s, some business executives began to argue that all 
corporations should contribute to finding solutions to “many of the complex social questions of 
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our time.”56 By the 1980s the notion of CSR had gained momentum and, despite the objections 
of critics such as Milton Friedman, by the end of the millennium, nearly all of the world’s best 
known companies had developed CSR initiatives.
57
 
While it is easy to dismiss these efforts as a mere Potemkin village, a series of sham 
exercises designed to deflect serious criticism and protect profits, I want to argue that (absent 
clear evidence to the contrary) we should avoid jumping to those sorts of conclusions. I say this 
for the simple reason that, although the history of corporations includes many examples of 
companies going out of their way to side-step democratic accountability, this is not the entire 
story. As I will explain more thoroughly in later chapters, at various times and in various places 
activists have succeeded in turning back corporate intrusions, sometimes because supposedly 
“heartless” executives have stepped forward and embraced an activist cause.  
At a minimum this means that, despite their enormous economic and political resources, 
corporations are not invulnerable institutions. They are human enterprises populated by people 
representing a diverse range of interests, beliefs, and temperaments. In recent centuries 
determined social activists have been refining strategies and tactics for identifying and exploiting 
vulnerabilities that arise as a result of this situation. As I explain next, what most of these 
activists shared was a penchant for speaking uncomfortable truths in a timely fashion in order to 
extract significant concessions from intransigent business interests and influence the ethical 
standards of global markets. 
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The Marketplace as a New Field of Political Action 
The corporation has become the new site of protest... rather than protesting on the 
doorsteps of government on Sunday afternoon when no one is there, they are protesting 
outside of the Niketown on Fifth Avenue.  
– Naomi Klein58 
 
Anti-corporate activism and the general business corporation arrived on the world scene 
in the late eighteenth century, the same period of time which (as Jürgen Habermas has famously 
argued) gave birth to a vibrant public sphere.
59
 The basic elements of prospective narrative 
disclosure (including public disclosure, kairotic strategy development, and the public circulation 
of iconoclastic stories) were already present in those early market-based protest campaigns and 
have persisted, sometimes in attenuated forms, to the present day. Over two centuries that saw 
the rise of the labor movement, the muckrakers, the civil rights movements, and the anti-
corporate globalization movement, activist protestors have developed and refined strategies for 
using popular media to disclose hidden violence, circulate stories, and rally public audiences.  
Early market activists faced challenges that seem almost unimaginable from a twenty-
first century perspective. If they were to stand a chance of influencing business and markets, 
activists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had to learn how to use newspapers, 
pamphlets, and the public mail to coordinate the actions of large numbers of people scattered 
across nations and continents. None of this was possible prior to the emergence in the eighteenth 
century of a bourgeois public sphere that occupied a space between the private and governmental 
spheres. This development was due in large part to a revolution in global communication. As 
long distance trade lines opened channels of communication, an emergent middle class began to 
meet in coffee houses and salons on the continent and in the larger cities of the American 
colonies to discuss international business dealings and debate political issues. Habermas’ account 
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of this period has been widely criticized as contradictory in that it fails to account for the 
exclusion of women, minorities, and the poor.
60
 Whatever the merits of these claims, they do not 
change the fact that the emergence of international trade, print journalism and pamphleteering 
during this period provided activist movements with potent tools for challenging and even 
dismantling regnant power structures.
61
  
From a Bakhtinian perspective one could say that the emergence of international trade, 
journalism, and discussion forums created pathways for the centrifugal (and destabilizing) 
circulation of stories and texts. One of the most important results of these developments was the 
emergence of dispersed communities “based less on physical proximity than on commercial and 
media pathways.”62 Groups of people who in earlier times had been separated by vast stretches 
of geography gained access to new tools that enabled them to communicate with one another in 
regular and dependable ways.
63
 As Charles Tilly has argued, these factors help to explain why 
social movements were born during this time period.
64
 When geography became less of an 
impediment to moral action, people representing a range of heterodox political interests could 
begin to coordinate their efforts and work on common causes.
65
  
Examples of coordinated social actions targeting business interests from this time period 
include consumer protests in the American colonies, the Luddite rebellion, and English 
abolitionism. In all three actions one finds evidence of a rhetoric of disclosure (including 
carnivalesque inversion and intensive research practices) that foreshadows the use of prospective 
                                                 
60 Nancy Fraser is one of several critics who claim that because of these elisions, “the bourgeois public 
was never the public.” Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig 
Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 116.  
61 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 15. 
62 Lawrence B. Glickman, Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 60. 
63 T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7. 
64 Charles Tilly, Social Movements: 1768-2004 (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2004), 16. 
65 Glickman, Buying Power, 60; Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 16.  
92 
narrative disclosure in the fully-realized anti-corporate campaigns of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.  
Turning first to consumer protests in the American colonies, two factors are especially 
important to an understanding of the emergence and growth of anti-corporate campaigns. First, 
the availability of local printing presses and the establishment of regularized trade between 
America and Europe in the eighteenth century enabled American colonists to coordinate protest 
activities across great distances. Second, the resultant protests against British authorities and 
their commercial allies often featured carnivalesque and grotesque themes. On the first point, 
when colonists from Maine to South Carolina began to shun English textiles and tea in favor of 
homespun clothes and homegrown herbal teas, they were able to convince Parliament of the 
seriousness of their objections to taxation without representation.
66
 By focusing on imported 
goods the colonists demonstrated kairotic savvy.
67
 This is because, as Edmund Burke pointed out 
at the time, by the middle of the eighteenth century trade with the American colonies made up a 
substantial portion of England’s gross national product.68 The nation could ill afford to take 
income from the colonies for granted. His warning proved prescient. By the 1760s colonial 
shoppers had distinguished themselves as having a considerable appetite for high quality 
fashions, ceramics, books and other goods from London; and when thousands of people in every 
American colony decided, en masse, to stop purchasing English commercial goods, they nearly 
crippled the empire.
69
  
In addition to shunning English goods, many colonists also participated in localized, 
carnivalesque protest events targeting government agents and small businesses. In the annual 
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Pope’s Day festivities, for example, colonists donned face paint and wild costumes and (in 
addition to their traditional target, the radical Catholic Guy Fawkes) torched effigies of British 
officials charged with enforcing the hated Stamp Act.
 70
 Local business people caught selling 
British goods during this time often became the victims of “rough music” ceremonies in which 
masked members of a local community would hoist a merchant in the air and parade him through 
town to the sound of banging pots and clamoring bells.
71
 The offending party was often coated 
with tar and feathers and carried past the gallows.  
Even with this background, the Boston Tea Party stood out as “the most carnivalesque 
event of the era… [and] a wild reversal of the traditional order.”72 The most obvious inversion 
had to do with the seemingly mundane act of making a cup of tea, and involved the destruction 
of nearly £10,000 worth of property belonging to the East India Tea Company. The physician 
Thomas Young (a close associate of Samuel Adams) helped to kick off the raucous tea party by 
delivering a satirical speech on the ill effects of tea on human health.
73
 The rebels (many of them 
dressed in Mohawk Indian disguises) then enacted a crude parody of the tea rituals of the upper 
classes by using block and tackle hoists to dump huge chests of tea into Boston Harbor.
74
 As one 
participant, a journeyman blacksmith recalled, “We were merry in an undertone at the very idea 
of making so large a cup of tea for the fishes.”75 In other words, by making a gigantic, 
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undrinkable cup of tea the rebels snubbed their noses at the wealthy elite and signaled their 
willingness to use the marketplace as a field of political action.  
Nor were the large scale coordinated actions and carnivalesque protests in the American 
colonies isolated events. One finds clear evidence of both practices in the English Luddite and 
abolitionist movements. In the first instance, that the Luddites engaged in tactical planning may 
seem counterintuitive since their campaign has often been dismissed as an outburst of irrational 
technophobia. In truth, the Luddite rebellion represented a large scale social movement among 
craft weavers who rallied by the thousands to meetings (public and private) in the textile region 
of Central England. The rallies soon gave way to violence as angry crowds attacked factories, 
smashed mechanized stocking frames, and terrorized former employers. As the citizens of Paris 
had done at the Bastille prison twenty years earlier, the mobs struck out at the machinery of 
power that had worked profound changes in their daily lives. The stocking looms, in other words, 
became a metonym for industrialization to a people struggling to make sense of dehumanizing 
working conditions, grinding poverty, and the demise of their craft-based culture.  
And yet, as Sir George Beaumont observed at the time, the Luddites were not irrational 
zealots. Rather, they were a group of “empty-bellied men-ragged men-or worn-out, emaciated, 
half-starved, dying men.”76 The implication of Beaumont’s observation is that, journalistic 
accounts from the time period notwithstanding, the Luddite rebellion ought not to be dismissed 
as a senseless paroxysm of violence. To the contrary, the strategic elements of their coordinated 
protest actions anticipate the sophisticated instrumental strategies that labor leaders such as 
Samuel Gompers (founder of the American Federation of Labor) and Ray Rogers (chief 
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strategist of the Stevens campaign) would use to win labor contracts in later years.
77
 Historians, 
in fact, now understand that the Luddites selected their targets carefully, smashing machines at 
only those workplaces where they believed workers had been treated most harshly and only 
rarely singling out managers for physical harassment.
78
 As labor historian Eric Hobsbawm has 
observed, the rebellion was a carefully planned exercise in “collective bargaining by riot.”79 This 
helps to explain why the insurrection lasted for nearly three years and had to be suppressed 
through military intervention. The Luddite Rebellion, in other words, may have been a violent, 
calamitous failure, but it was not entirely unplanned. The extensive body of literature the 
participants left behind provides clear evidence that they, like the American rebels, used the 
communicative technologies of their day (especially pamphlets and newspapers) to coordinate 
the public protest activities of large numbers of people over long distances and over an extended 
period of time.
80
 
The Luddites also shared the American rebels’ enthusiasm for carnivalesque inversion, 
albeit with a more cynical edge that reflected the darker sensibilities of a people who had become 
intimately familiar with deprivation and disease. One can detect this tone in popular depictions 
of Ned (“King”) Ludd, the mythical leader of the movement. He is typically depicted as a 
gigantic man dressed in women’s clothing, carrying a king’s scepter leading a phalanx of armed 
rebels.
81
 At a minimum the image reflects attempts to reduce governing authorities to a plebian 
level and to assert the strength of the rebellion. Beyond that, the status of Ned Ludd’s “dress” is 
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decidedly more ambiguous. When viewed in historical context it appears to reflect the active 
participation of women in the rebellion, anger over the hiring of women to replace men in textile 
factories, or both.
82
  
In other contexts, Luddite rhetors adopted an even more confrontational and menacing 
tone. One of the clearest examples comes from a passage in the popular ballad “General Ludd’s 
Triumph,” where the Luddites conduct a mock-trial of the weaving machines and sentence them 
to die: 
These Engines of mischief were sentenced to die 
By unanimous vote of the Trade 
And Ludd who can all opposition defy 
Was the grand Executioner made
83
 
 
By referencing death and execution, the anonymous author of these lines channels themes that 
are rendered explicit in numerous other Luddite texts that detail “famine,” “poverty,” and 
“outrages” in the workplace.84 In passages such as these, where they provide graphic accounts of 
deprivation and use parody and satire to critique business practices, Luddite rhetors can sound 
remarkably contemporary. In all likelihood many of their texts could be adapted, with only minor 
revisions, for use in the sort of carnivalesque performances that have become commonplace 
events in modern day anti-corporate campaigns. 
 The rhetorical strategies of the Luddites resemble those of more contemporary activists in 
at least two other respects as well. First, as will become clearer in chapter four, their carefully 
planned instrumental strategies prefigure the “power on power” logic of ACTWU’s campaign 
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against J. P. Stevens. Second, by committing to a strategy that prioritized instrumental action 
over storytelling disclosure, the Luddites failed to appreciate the risk of debilitating blowback 
from their political adversaries. Indeed their inability to prevent industrialists from crushing a 
centuries old tradition of craft weaving had little to do with the merits of their claims. It is 
difficult, after all, to argue that they should not have complained about being starved out of their 
homes. It had everything to do with their decision to abandon public protest and attack the 
machinery of industrial production.  
The English abolitionists, it should be recalled, employed many of the same rhetorical 
strategies and tactics as their Luddite contemporaries, but achieved radically different results.  
From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the discrepancy between the outcomes of the 
two campaigns might seem easy to explain. The dissolution of the slave trade in the British 
Empire might seem like a predictable development – a natural end to a marginal and 
dehumanizing business enterprise in an era redolent with talk about “unalienable rights.” Such 
arguments, however, fall wide of the mark by underestimating the vitality and profitability of the 
international slave trade. When Thomas Clarkson, William Wilberforce, and other abolitionists 
began to travel the English countryside speaking in churches, town halls, and parlor rooms about 
the horrors of chattel slavery, the incomes of slave-related enterprises like the Company of 
Merchants Trading to Africa were said to have amounted to three quarters of the nation’s 
international earnings.
85
 This number may have been inflated to bolster the claims of anti-
abolitionist Members of Parliament who argued the abolishment of slavery, whatever its moral 
justification, would bankrupt the nation. Still, there can be little doubt that, absent the 
intervention of the abolitionist movement, the trafficking of African slaves could have persisted 
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well into the nineteenth century. There was simply too much money being made. As Neta 
Crawford explains, “the slave trade did not end because it was no longer profitable.” 86  
Crawford’s argument is important in the present context in that it makes it difficult to 
argue the abolitionists fared better than the Luddites because they faced an easier task.  More to 
the point, if one is to account for radical differences in the outcomes of the two campaigns 
requires a more careful consideration of the abolitionists’ rhetorical strategies. At risk of 
oversimplification, what can be said in that regard is that the abolitionists responded to a 
seemingly impossible situation by staging sugar boycotts and petition campaigns and by using 
books, pamphlets, broadsheets, trinkets, letters to newspapers, and public oratory to rally public 
audiences to their cause.
87
 At nearly every juncture they also used grotesque images and the first 
person testimonies of former slaves to disturb the consciences of the English public. Their goal 
in all this was to convince the English public that chattel slavery was fundamentally 
incompatible with the core values of Christian civilization, putting pressure on Parliament and on 
business merchants to end the slave trade.
88
  
In the present context the most striking and important quality of the abolitionists’ 
strategies and tactics is their resemblance to the confrontation/alliance pattern in contemporary 
anti-corporate activism in which activists conceive of campaigns as long-term efforts to 
transform the ethical standards of markets. The similarities between the two are not difficult to 
recognize in even a cursory review of the history of abolitionism. Merchants and politicians 
often took pains to distance themselves from the worst excesses of the slave trade, and when they 
did this they often left written records of their thoughts in the form of company memos, 
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editorials, statements to Parliament, and the like.
89
 When these same politicians and business 
leaders later failed to live up to the letter of their own words (as often happened), abolitionists 
would then have a clear point of leverage for confronting the offending party and demanding that 
they account for the discrepancy between what they had said and the actual lived experiences of 
slaves. Abolitionists would then use the response as a fulcrum point for future critiques. Through 
this practice of extracting minor concessions, they eventually shifted market attitudes toward 
human slavery and finally brought an end to the slave trade in the British Empire.  
To make this gradualist strategy work, the abolitionists had to remain one step ahead of 
their opponents by engaging in careful research. In that regard, international travel was crucial. 
The abolitionist William Wilberforce, for example, wrote his widely distributed Letter on the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade after an extended tour of Caribbean sugar plantations where he was 
able to witness first-hand the violence of chattel slavery. The text reflects his outrage at what he 
saw: 
When from the West Indies themselves I have heard the same assertion, that the negro 
slaves are happier than our labouring poor, let me be forgiven for declaring, that such an 
opinion, formed not by transient visitors but by those to whom a Negro sale, working 
under the whip, public and severe floggings of decent females, private punishments, and 
all other sad particulars of negro humiliation are thoroughly known, has, I own, created in 
my mind a reflection of a different character [sic].
90
 
 
After touring Barbados, in other words, Wilberforce could speak with authority in public debates 
and puncture popular fictions about the happy status of the slaves on sugar plantations.  
First person investigations were important as well to the work of Wilberforce’s best 
known ally, Thomas Clarkson, who visited the docks at Liverpool on a daily basis over several 
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years to gather implements of the slave trade and the narratives of sailors.
 91
 Despite several 
harrowing attempts on his life, Clarkson eventually assembled what amounted to a traveling 
museum of the Middle Passage including shackles, chains and the brutal speculum orbis, used to 
pry open the jaws of those who refused nourishment.
92
 He placed these items on display at 
hundreds of abolitionist meetings, large and small, throughout England. At many of these same 
meetings he was joined on the stage by former slaves who provided harrowing first person 
accounts of violence and deprivation. It was a confrontational strategy designed explicitly to 
create dissonance in English consciences by exposing predominantly Christian audiences to 
accounts of grotesque violence.
93
  
Contemporary anti-corporate activists have adopted remarkably similar strategies by 
conducting painstaking research in order to uncover grotesque images and stories that they can 
set in public circulation in order to destabilize popular sensibilities about how markets should 
work. Some of these modern day activists have even followed the example of earlier abolitionists 
like Thomas Clarkson by featuring the narratives of former slaves in their campaign protests. As 
I explain more thoroughly in chapter five, the best known example of this strategy may be the 
CIW which, during the Taco Bell campaign, conducted its own undercover investigations of 
human trafficking rings in Florida agriculture.
94
 In more recent years the coalition has even 
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followed Clarkson’s lead by assembling a traveling “Modern Day Slavery Museum” featuring 
photographs, documents, and tangible items related to the history and continuing practice of 
human slavery.
95
  
If nothing else, these last few examples suggest that some of the anti-corporate activists 
of our day have been inspired by the gradualist strategies of the English abolitionists. The same 
cannot be said for many of the English abolitionists’ activist contemporaries. I say this because, 
as the nineteenth century progressed, market based activism took a distinctly instrumental turn, 
especially in the new labor unions that emerged in response to the Industrial Revolution. 
Activists during this period came to prioritize the changing of short term market behaviors over 
changing public attitudes. One finds evidence of this shift in emphasis, for example, during the 
early industrial era in the U. S., a time when many journeymen craftworkers came to realize that 
the new emphasis on profitability and large scale production in many businesses often led to 
sharp decreases in their annual incomes.
96
 As a direct result of this development workers in 
several major cities staged dozens of labor strikes and work stoppages large and small. Two of 
the best known incidents during this era were the Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers 
(shoemakers) strike in 1806 and a wide-scale carpenters strike in New York City in 1809.
97
 The 
journeymen workers who participated in these actions attempted to use economic pressure to 
convince business leaders to pay higher wages and improve working conditions. This does not 
mean, however, that they abandoned rhetorical disclosure entirely. Indeed, a careful reading of 
the history of the rise of the labor and consumer movements in the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries shows that market-based activists demonstrated a consistent interest in time-tested 
strategies and tactics related to public, storytelling disclosure.  
During this same era, activists representing other interests also demonstrated a preference 
for instrumental strategies. American abolitionists staged maple “buycotts” (i.e., purchasing 
maple syrup in place of sugar) in an attempt to pressure U.S. companies to stop importing slave-
produced sugar from Barbados.
98
 They later extended this project to include products 
manufactured with slave labor in the American South. The Sabbatarian movement adopted a 
similar strategy by asking consumers to shun businesses that manufactured or sold goods on 
Sundays in violation (as they saw it) of the Christian Sabbath.
 99 
These actions, however, did not 
represent the sum total of the American abolitionists and Sabbatarians’ strategies and tactics. The 
two groups also circulated pamphlets and news stories featuring compelling stories about things 
like the horrors of slavery and the scandalous hypocrisies of Sabbath-breakers.
100
  
One finds evidence of this sort of a distinctly instrumental logic as well in the Swing 
Riots in England in the 1830s in which agricultural laborers donned sashes and smashed 
threshing machines.
101
 Like the Luddites a generation earlier, the Swing movement claimed a 
mythical leader, Captain Swing, a tough talking rowdy who wrote threatening, ironic letters to 
authorities.
102
 As this last example suggests, even as nineteenth century protestors refined 
strategies and tactics for direct action against business interests, they continued to use 
carnivalesque parody and iconoclastic rhetorical techniques to disclose what they saw as 
egregious inconsistencies between discourse and practice.  
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These early labor actions also presaged the rise of larger, more organized labor 
movements in the latter half of the nineteenth century, including the Knights of Labor, the 
American Federation of Labor, and the Trades Union Congress began to attract huge followings 
in the U. S. and Europe.
103
 As they grew, the new labor unions pioneered direct action strategies 
such as collective bargaining, labor strikes, and work stoppages that would become widely 
practiced in decades to come.
104
 In doing so they also provided cogent examples for activists 
who would follow on the limits and potential of direct action campaigns. On several occasions, 
as in the Pullman strike of 1894 and the massive textile workers strike of 1934, workers 
discovered to their misfortune that companies and governmental authorities were sometimes 
willing to use violence to suppress what they viewed as radical demands.
105
 In yet other actions, 
including the United Auto Workers sit-down strike of 1936-37 and the long series of strikes, 
court cases, and work stoppages that led to the eight-hour workday, labor activists demonstrated 
that under the right conditions it was possible to transform corporate labor standards through 
persistent action.
106
 Although historical accounts of these actions have tended to emphasize their 
strategic and instrumental dimensions, carnivalesque storytelling disclosure continued to play a 
crucial role.
107
 One of the primary functions of a labor strike, after all, is to inspire public 
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sympathy by disclosing the ugly truth regarding wage scales and working conditions. If this were 
not so, then striking workers would dispense with the picket signs and parades and simply stay 
home from work. A picket line is a storytelling venue.  
At a minimum, this brief overview of the rise of the labor movement suggests that, as 
time progressed, anti-corporate activists learned to develop more sophisticated strategies that 
were more likely to inspire public sympathy and win concessions from their corporate 
opponents. Even as they did this, however, labor unions and other activist groups were forced to 
negotiate radically evolving ideological terrain. In 1800, an abolitionist could hold up a picture 
of a suffering slave bearing the inscription “Am I not a man and a brother?” confident in the 
knowledge that any subsequent debates would, in all likelihood, be conducted on theological 
grounds. The abolitionists understood, in other words, that by disseminating disturbing images 
and stories about slavery to public audiences they were invoking Christian sensibilities regarding 
charity toward the poor and suffering. Nor were these concepts merely abstract notions bandied 
about in churches and coffee shops. They were key elements (however dimly realized) of the 
English and American national identities.  
A century later there had been a sea change in public attitudes on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and activists were forced to find ways of advancing arguments in what had become a 
more complex and predominantly secular environment. At the start of the nineteenth century the 
ideas John Locke and Adam Smith had advanced about human liberty and economic 
individualism still sounded novel or even revolutionary.
108
 But after a century or so of 
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astounding economic growth and colonial expansion many, even within the academy, had come 
to embrace these ideas as natural law and as entirely consistent with a social Darwinian view of 
the world that assigned a privileged status to White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.
109
  
To make all of this even more complicated, if activists were to coordinate campaigns 
over large distances and disclose corporate practices to dispersed audiences, they would need to 
learn how to tell their stories in ways that would attract attention from the new mass media 
(including mass market newspapers, radio, and eventually television and digital media). One can 
get a sense of how activists learned to negotiate this complex new landscape by reviewing 
several prominent events in the history of anti-corporate protest movements in the twentieth 
century. These include shocking exposés of harsh working conditions in American industry, 
satirical responses to advertising images, and the emergence of full-scale anti-corporate 
campaigns alongside the civil rights and anti-war protests of the 1960s. 
In the first instance, I am thinking of two well-known incidents: Lewis Hines’ publication 
of disturbing photographs of child labor and the publication of Upton Sinclair’s novel The 
Jungle. The Hines photos are important because they demonstrate how an activist organization, 
in this case the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC), could use a new type of public media 
(newspaper photography) to disclose previously occluded corporate practices which ran contrary 
to public sensibilities about individual liberties.
110
 At the start of the twentieth century the notion 
of economic freedom had been woven into the nation’s historic narrative in complex ways.111 
Hines’ photographs of soot-covered pre-pubescent coal miners and waifs on factory assembly 
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lines did not square with Horatio Alger narratives of equal opportunity. The pictures were meant 
to inspire anger, and they did.  
Hines crisscrossed the nation presenting “stereopticon” shows of his news photos and 
lecturing on child labor as a representative of the NCLC. As one journalist of the day recounted 
after one such presentation, the images depicted “a state of affairs, which is terrible in its reality 
– terrible to encounter, terrible to admit that such things exist in civilized societies.”112 The 
quotation is instructive because it suggests how notions of economic and educational opportunity 
had bonded with conceptions of what counts as “civilized” and become part of the national ethos. 
As Robert Wiebe explained, descriptions of children as “the carrier[s] of tomorrow’s hope” 
would have been “utterly alien” to most public audiences only a few decades earlier. And yet, by 
the start of the twentieth century, Western societies struggled to square gritty photographs of 
child workers with popular visions of an enlightened, technological future.
113
  
Despite these sweeping changes in public attitude, child labor proved difficult to 
eradicate, and it was not until the Great Depression of the 1930s, when adults began competing 
for jobs previously held by children, that the practice was effectively de-normalized. As evidence 
of the difficulty of the struggles, although Congress passed laws limiting child labor in 1916 and 
1918, the Supreme Court later overturned the laws on the grounds that, as one author later 
explained, they “denied children the freedom to contract work.”114 Given this deep cultural and 
legal ambivalence about the status of child labor, Hine’s photographs are widely credited as 
having played a decisive role in helping to stay the invisible hand of the economic marketplace 
from extending to pre-adolescent labor. 
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In the second incident from this era, Upton Sinclair claimed that in writing his novel The 
Jungle (a fictional exposé about a Lithuanian immigrant family’s experiences working in the 
meatpacking industry) that he “aimed at the public’s heart, and by accident … hit it in the 
stomach.”115 It is easy to see why this might happen given Lewis’ graphic descriptions of a 
workplace in which rats were rampant and a worker who fell into a machine could end up in a 
can of lard.
116
 The novel sold more than 25,000 copies in the first six weeks and prompted 
President Theodore Roosevelt to call for investigations into the meatpacking industry.
117
 This, in 
turn, led to the passage of the 1906 meat inspection act, an event that prepared the way for the 
creation of the United States Food and Drug Administration.  
The difficulties Hine and the NCLC faced in battling child labor and the surprising 
response to Lewis’ novel can teach us something about the sensibilities of the times, but also 
about the indeterminacies of public narrative disclosures. In any era, if a political critique is to 
gain political leverage it must find purchase in some widely shared intuitive conception of moral 
standards.
 118
 Such standards are not always as easily identified as one might think. The same 
readers who clamored for the government to clean up fetid meat packing plants appeared largely 
unfazed by lengthy and vivid descriptions of what amounted to wage slavery in the meatpacking 
industry. This does not mean that in writing his novel Sinclair missed the mark entirely. In a 
nation that had come increasingly to think of itself as the vanguard of Western civilization, his 
grotesque stories about rodent carcasses and putrid flesh were not only nauseating but radically 
at odds with national identity narratives. As happened in the abolitionist movement and the 
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American Revolution a century earlier, when the disturbing texts and tales of people like Sinclair 
and Hines began to circulate in centrifugal fashion among the general population they disturbed 
dominant narratives and prompted calls for a reformation of the political order.  
As the century progressed, activists continued to view the market-place as contested 
terrain – an area where, by disclosing the often grim details of industrial production and by 
challenging corporate advertising fictions, they could advance the interests of civil society. In 
several instances, this involved popular authors using literary fiction to skewer corporate 
hyperbole. In a novel published in 1910, H. G. Wells served up a parody of rags to riches 
narratives and patent medicine scams by describing the rise and fall of the Tono-Bungay 
company (“Ton o’ Bunk, Eh?”).119 Two Broadway plays from the 1920s and 30s, It Pays to 
Advertise and Nothing but Lies, took aim at the hyperbolic claims of corporate advertising and 
depicted advertising and public relations professionals as scheming crooks.
120
 When the nation 
fell on hard times during the Great Depression, large companies continued to churn out 
advertising campaigns, and in the process provided their critics with even more fodder for biting 
political satire. During the Depression years of the 1930s Ballyhoo Magazine published fake 
advertisements to draw attention to rampant poverty and encouraged people to become “toucher-
uppers” by writing satirical comments on advertising billboards.121 By ridiculing the corporate 
advertising schemes, these authors provided yet another way of addressing the problem of 
finding a standard for critique in a secular era. In effect, they argued that, whatever their merits 
as business enterprises, corporations often failed to live up to the ethical standards of their own 
institutional discourse. 
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The rapid diffusion of new communication technologies in the years following World 
War II provided anti-corporate activists with unprecedented opportunities for coordinating the 
activities of large numbers of people across vast geographic distances and for using public media 
to disclose controversial business practices that occurred in remote locations around the globe. It 
was in this era that full-blown anti-corporate campaigns resembling the Stevens and Taco Bell 
campaigns began to emerge in global markets. In the next two chapters I conduct close readings 
of those two campaigns. Before doing that, I want focus on two examples of campaigns that 
helped to set the stage for these actions by demonstrating how – by staging carefully timed, high 
profile public protest events – activists could attract the attention of global media and tell their 
stories to a global audience. The first is the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
sponsored “sit-ins” at Woolworth’s lunch counters. The second is the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) campaign to convince Dow Chemical to stop the manufacturing and sale of 
Napalm.  
Turning to the first example, SNCC’s original sit-in at a Woolworth’s lunch counter in 
1960 is a clear example of a carefully thought out kairotic (or prospective) strategy in which an 
activist group operating on a shoe string budget was able to exploit a corporate vulnerability. 
This is evident, if for no other reason, because the students had no shortage of segregated dining 
establishments to choose from when they planned their initial protest in Greenville, South 
Carolina.
122
 By crossing the Jim Crow line at a Woolworth’s lunch counter they demonstrated 
how companies with a national presence were perpetuating racism in the South through passive 
complicity. Their refusal to leave the lunch counter when asked constituted a violation of social 
decorum that cost nothing and could be copied easily by others. In an earlier era, such an action 
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might have attracted local attention. But in 1960 the story about “Negro” students attempting to 
cross a racial barrier was quickly picked up by the Associated Press, United Press International, 
and the New York Times.
123
 By the time Woolworth’s announced the full desegregation of its 
lunch counters nationwide six months later, an estimated 50,000 people had participated in sit-
ins at company stores in 54 cities in nine states.
124
  
SNCC’s Woolworth’s campaign was but one of several large scale civil rights oriented 
anti-corporate campaigns during this time period, including Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF) campaign against Kodak and the United Farm Workers’ (UFW) national grape 
boycotts led by Cesar Chavez.
125
 In each instance the sponsoring organization staged high profile 
actions that drew the attention of national media to disclose, not only discrepancies between 
corporate discourse and corporate actions, but how corporations often failed to comply with a 
growing body of civil rights related federal legislation and judicial rulings.
126
  
One finds a similar emphasis on kairotic timing and the identification of corporate 
hypocrisies in anti-corporate campaigns sponsored by radical student groups during this same 
period. Student activists improved upon media strategies of the civil rights movement by 
focusing even more intently on staging visual spectacles designed to attract the attention of 
journalists from around the globe. By the late 1960s, activist groups such as the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) were developing anti-corporate campaigns in relation to protests 
against the Vietnam War, and in so doing, they helped to pioneer the centrifugal dissemination of 
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activist arguments and stories via the new visual medium of television.
127
 As former SDS leader 
and media critic Todd Gitlin observed, “for their different reasons the media and the movement 
needed each other. The media needs stories, preferring the dramatic; the movement needed 
publicity for recruitment, for support, and for political effect.”128 In this passage Gitlin is 
speaking generally about the tenuous and sometimes counter-productive relationship between the 
SDS and mass media in the 1960s and 70s, a time when the group was engaged in war protests 
on college campuses across the nation.  
Gitlin’s observations about the relationship of student radicals and global media are 
germane to a discussion of anti-corporate activism because he was also signaling the war 
protestors’ interest in using media events to challenge the actions of corporations in general and 
Dow Chemical in particular.
129
 They were interested in Dow for one reason: it owned the federal 
contract to manufacture Napalm (a controversial form of jellied gasoline) for military use in 
Vietnam. As with the Woolworth’s sit-ins only a few years earlier, the Dow campaign was 
calibrated to disclose a corporate practice that was linked to a contentious issue of public 
significance. The Napalm contract amounted to less than one percent of the company’s sales in 
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1967.
130
 Nevertheless, it provided a perdurable link between Dow Chemical and some of the 
most controversial events in the Vietnam War. It enabled protestors to argue that the company 
had profited from the death and disfigurement of innocent women and children.  
The Dow campaign began in the fall of 1966, ran through the fall of 1969, and featured a 
long series of events tailored to attract the attention of the press.
131
 A group of nuns, priests and 
draft resisters broke into Dow’s offices in Washington, D.C. and threw blood on its filing 
cabinets.
132
 Student groups staged 183 protests against the company over two years, many of 
them featuring graphic images of civilians and soldiers who had been disfigured or killed by 
burning napalm.
133
 The Medical Committee for Human Rights sponsored a first of its kind 
shareholder resolution advocating the company halt sales of napalm for military purposes.
134
 
And the SDS worked with several other activist groups to sponsor a national boycott of Saran 
Wrap and other consumer products manufactured by Dow.  
By 1969, the company had had enough and it quietly backed away from Napalm by 
submitting an intentionally high bid for renewal of their federal contract to supply the product to 
the U.S military.
135
 The strategy worked. Dow Chemical lost the contract, but by then the 
damage to the company’s reputation had already been done. Many in the public had already 
come to associate the “decisions of a major chemical corporation with charred infants.”136 That 
some members of Dow’s management expressed anxiety about this development suggests yet 
another technique activists have used to gain rhetorical leverage against corporations in a diverse 
and secular age. They placed the company name in dialogic tension with actions so extreme that 
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they were likely to offend the moral sensibilities of anyone (including company management), 
regardless of their religious or cultural identifications. 
In the present context, the campaigns against Dow Chemical and Woolworth’s are 
important in that they demonstrate how anti-corporate activists were able to adapt ancient 
rhetorical techniques and time-tested campaign strategies in an age of global media. More to the 
point, they used rhetorical practices similar to those that market-based activists had been using 
since the eighteenth century to coordinate actions, disclose hidden violence, set disturbing stories 
in the public circulation and destabilize dominant fictions. By the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century, activists were learning to adapt their practices to the exigencies of a more 
secular and inter-connected era. In the years since, they have developed strategies for disclosing 
violence and appealing to public consciences that do not rely on partisan religious sensibilities. 
As activists refined their rhetorical techniques, and as activists around the globe gained access to 
new communication technologies, the number of anti-corporate campaigns increased 
exponentially. By the start of the new millennium people across the globe had become 
accustomed to hearing and reading about anti-corporate campaigns like the National Labor 
Committee’s (NLC) Kathie Lee Gifford campaign, the United Students Against Sweatshops 
(USAS) Nike campaign, and the numerous environmentally-oriented protest actions sponsored 
by Greenpeace.
137
 These anti-corporate campaigns are but the best known of hundreds in recent 
years, and they represent an unprecedented wave of anti-corporate activism at the international 
level. In the second half of this chapter I provide more in-depth histories of two of the best 
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known campaigns of the current era, each of which has helped to shape the practice of anti-
corporate activism in the twenty-first century. 
Reflecting on History 
The history of cooperative business ventures in the West can be traced back at least three 
thousand years, however, it was not until the eighteenth century that governments began to issue 
charters for a new type of cooperative business venture known as the general business 
corporation . Many investors and politicians were initially wary of the new arrangement. It was 
not until American and British authorities offered limited liability to anyone willing to invest in 
large scale railroad projects that corporation’s began to attract large numbers of investors.  By 
the closing decades of the nineteenth century, these same governments were under pressure to 
find ways of curbing the monopoly power and political influence of large corporations such as 
Standard Oil and the United States Steel Corporation. One of the ways companies responded to 
their critics in the governmental and public spheres was by developing powerful public relations 
and advertising strategies for the purpose of managing public opinion and wooing customers. As 
testimony to the success of their efforts, by the close of the twentieth century corporate 
advertising and public relations messages had become a sort of wallpaper of daily life for 
consumers in the developed world. As Naomi Klein has argued, the new corporate globalization 
has given us a “New Branded World.”138 
The same companies whose brands now crowd for our attention in retail stores and on 
computer screens have also developed elaborate international supply networks for manufacturing 
and delivering goods and services to consumers in an efficient manner and at the lowest possible 
cost. What consumers see are the glittering facades – the TV ads, product labels, and billboards. 
But the global corporate supply chains operate quietly in the background. The entire corporate 
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system (including supply networks, advertising and public relations schemes, and the legal 
firewalls that protect investors) serve to diffuse ethical responsibility and prevent recognition of 
things like substandard wages, environmental dumping, or sexism. In fact, two centuries after 
governments began to issue corporate charters, anti-corporate activists continue to struggle to 
respond to exigencies that sound remarkably similar to those the Luddites and abolitionists faced 
two hundred years ago: unemployment, harsh working conditions, and even chattel slavery.  
In their efforts to respond to these sorts of egregious harms, the activist movements I 
have reviewed have consistently stressed the importance of public transparency. English 
philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham provided a cogent explanation of the activist 
argument for transparency when he wrote: “[T]he grand security of securities is publicity:—
exposure—the completest exposure of the whole system of procedure—whatever is done by 
anybody, being done before the eyes of the universal public. By this means, appropriate moral 
aptitude may be maximized—appropriate intellectual aptitude may be maximized—appropriate 
active aptitude may be maximized.”139 In the present context this means that if corporations are 
to be persuaded to operate in socially responsible ways, the first step is public transparency. In 
other words when consumers, investors, and management are operating with roughly the same 
information, or so the logic goes, radical transformations in business practices and market 
standards become possible.  
Some critics of corporate practices have objected to this line of reasoning by questioning 
whether corporations, as currently conceived, are even capable of recognizing social 
responsibilities. Authors such as Robert Monk and Nell Minow have their doubts. They argue 
that the corporation is essentially “an externalizing machine the same way a shark is a killing 
machine – no malevolence, no intentional harm, just something designed with sublime efficiency 
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for self-preservation, which it accomplishes without any capacity to factor in the consequences to 
others.”140 A corporation, that is, must be viewed for what it is: an amoral business enterprise 
designed for the express purpose of side-stepping legal accountability in order to generate profits 
for shareholders.
141
  
Although Monk and Minow are contemporary authors, their shark analogy echoes a 
common theme in anti-corporate rhetoric since the eighteenth century: corporations are 
impersonal organizations that prioritize profits over people. Over the history of anti-corporate 
activism some activist groups have stressed this line of thinking more doggedly than others. 
Many in the labor and environmental movements, for example, have followed the lead of the 
Luddites by viewing management at any corporation they target as an intransigent enemy that 
must be defeated through direct instrumental action. Any attempt to domesticate a shark is 
ultimately futile. Other activists have followed the lead of the abolitionists by looking beyond 
limited liability laws in order to appeal to the consciences of individual managers, investors, and 
consumers.  From abolitionist campaigners such as William Wilberforce, to “toucher-uppers” 
during the Depression, to modern day anti-corporate protest groups like the CIW – these activists 
have adopted a more patient, gradualist strategy aimed at using timely disclosures to shift market 
practices over long periods of time.  
When viewed in historical context, these differences basically amount to a variation in 
strategic emphasis. A careful review of the history of market-based protest movements in the 
West makes clear that for more than two centuries anti-corporate activists (even those who view 
corporations as incorrigible institutions) have shared an interest in using narrative disclosure to 
rally public audiences in support of their causes. Since the earliest days of the Industrial 
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Revolution, activists have staged carnivalesque performances, displayed grotesque images, and 
circulated disturbing stories – all in an effort to disclose secretive practices and convince 
powerful business enterprises to change their ways.   
In the next two chapters I provide case studies of the campaigns against the J. P. Stevens 
and Taco Bell Corporations respectively. The former campaign was conceived as a power on 
power confrontation between a textile union and one of the nation’s largest textile manufacturers. 
As such it constitutes a paradigm instance of a martial campaign, featuring direct action 
strategies including labor strikes and consumer boycotts aimed at extracting specific concessions 
from management, all the while downplaying any attempts to change management attitudes 
toward the union cause. By contrast the Taco Bell campaign counts as a paradigm example of a 
confrontation/alliance campaign that was conceived from the beginning as a long-term effort to 
change the attitudes of certain corporate leaders and investors toward the CIW’s activist claims 
and thereby influence the defacto corporate social responsibility standards of international 
markets. 
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Chapter 4: “Power on Power” Campaigning: ACTWU versus J. P. Stevens 
“The greater the number of temptations to which the exercise of political power is 
exposed, the more necessary it is to give to those who possess it, the most 
powerful reasons for resisting them.” 
Jeremy Bentham
1
 
 
What I am calling the Stevens campaign was actually the culminating event in a 
seventeen-year effort to unionize J. P. Stevens and, ultimately, the Southern textile industry.
2
 In 
this study I am primarily interested in the years 1976 – 1980, the time period during which the 
innovative young labor organizer Ray Rogers and his associates at Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) developed and implemented their novel “corporate campaign” 
strategies, including a national boycott of J. P. Stevens’ products. If we are to understand the 
importance of the Stevens campaign in union history, and as an exemplar for later anti-corporate 
activists, the conflict must first be placed in historical context.  
My discussion of these themes begins with a fairly detailed history of the Stevens 
campaign, including an opening gloss on how a legacy of labor-related violence and 
institutionalized racism in the American South contributed to a long-term standoff between labor 
and management in the U. S. textile industry. I then provide a more extensive overview of 
important events in the Stevens campaign, beginning with the strategic merger of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) and the Textile Workers Union of 
America (TWUA) and continuing on to a discussion of prominent events such as the staging of a 
national boycott and the strategic shifting of union retirement funds among various banks in 
order to gain economic leverage against company management. I conclude this first section of 
                                                 
1 Jeremy Bentham, “On Publicity,” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham: Part VIII, ed. John Bowring 
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1839), 310.  
2 TWUA kicked off the campaign by distributing a brochure entitled “America’s Stake in the South” in 
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Union of America, America’s Stake in the South, undated pamphlet, folder 216, box 1462, ACTWU NC Joint Board, 
Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
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the chapter by discussing culminating events in the Stevens campaign, as well as events from 
several subsequent campaigns that employed martial strategies similar to those ACTWU used 
against J. P. Stevens. In the second half of the chapter I conduct a critical analysis of several key 
moments in the Stevens campaign in order to show how they exemplify the martial typology 
within prospective narrative disclosure. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the 
Stevens campaign has influenced the attitudes and practices of anti-corporate activists and 
corporate managers in subsequent years.  
The J. P. Stevens Campaign: A Brief History 
In the early decades of the twentieth century U. S. textile manufacturers began to move 
their factories from the heavily unionized states in New England and the Mid-Atlantic region to 
the American South where “right to work” laws insured they would have access to a steady 
supply of “one hundred percent Anglo-Saxon, cheap, contented labor.”3 During this era 
communities like Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina (which later became the focal point of the 
Stevens campaign) developed into paternalistic “mill towns” where textile companies were not 
only the chief employers, they also typically held title to their employees homes and maintained 
controlling interests in local governments, small businesses, and hospitals.
4
 Textile companies – 
quite literally – managed employee’s lives from cradle to grave. This hardly means, of course, 
that Northern industrialists had no interest in preserving Southern culture. When companies like 
J. P. Stevens set up shop south of the Mason-Dixon line they quickly adapted to local traditions 
                                                 
3 Mimi Conway, Rise Gonna Rise: A Portrait of Southern Textile Workers (New York: Anchor Press, 1979), 
12. 
4 Roanoke Rapids was in nearly all respects a quintessential mill town. It was founded in the 1890s in the 
closing years of the “Cotton Mill Campaign” (an organized attempt by Southern lawmakers and business interests to 
attract Northern manufacturers). By 1913, the community’s chief architect, Sam F. Patterson “was more than merely 
the principal employer in Roanoke Rapids. By himself and through his mill bosses, Patterson was the town’s 
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Rise Gonna Rise, 15; Jacquelyn Hall, et. al., Like a Family: the Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World (Chapel 
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by hiring Blacks for only the most menial and demanding jobs – typically as janitors or cotton 
bail handlers.
5
 Women could work on the factory floor, but they rarely advanced to higher 
paying supervisory positions.
6
 
The history of the J. P. Stevens Company exemplifies these patterns.
7
 In 1813, Nathaniel 
Stevens opened a textile mill in Massachusetts to produce woolen fabrics. The family business 
prospered quickly, and in 1865 Nathaniel’s grandson, John P. Stevens, took the helm and 
expanded into retail marketing.
8
 By the start of WWI the company was one of the nation’s 
largest textile manufacturers, boasting corporate offices in Manhattan and nine cotton mills 
scattered throughout New England. In 1929, Yale educated Robert Ten Broeck Stevens 
succeeded his father as president of the company, and by 1946 Stevens had taken the company 
public and accelerated efforts to close down mills in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states and 
open them in the South.
9
 Between 1951 and 1980 the company closed nineteen northern 
manufacturing facilities, eight of which were unionized.
10
 Stevens remained at the helm of the 
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communications from the time. See for example the pamphlet “J. P. Stevens Today,” which provides a glowing 
overview of the company’s history and its several divisions. J. P. Stevens and Company, “J. P. Stevens Today;” J. P. 
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company until his retirement in 1974, stepping aside only briefly from 1951-53, to serve as 
Secretary of the Army. His hand-picked successor, James D. Finley, is said to have shared 
Stevens’ passion for military precision, as well as his life-long antipathy toward labor unions. By 
the 1970s the J. P. Stevens Company was the nation’s second largest textile manufacturer with 
46,000 employees and 1.1 billion dollars in annual sales.
11
 
When the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) set a goal of expanding its 
presence in the American South, J. P. Stevens made an appealing target for several reasons. First, 
it was a major manufacturer, and union leaders reasoned any progress made in organizing J. P. 
Stevens would make it easier to recruit workers in factories run by other companies.
12
 Second, 
they reasoned the timing was right for a major push in the South.
13
 Union’s had made two 
previous, unsuccessful attempts to organize large numbers of textile workers in the region. In the 
first effort, the famous “Uprising of ‘34,” factory owners – often working in cooperation with 
state and local officials – used overt violence and intimidation to suppress a general strike 
involving more than 170,000 mill workers.
14
 Just over a decade later the new TWUA sponsored 
“Operation Dixie” (1946-1953). Once again, management responded strenuously – albeit with 
less violence – and the union succeeded in recruiting fewer than 12,000 new members.15 For the 
next decade or so, the TWUA concentrated on organizing small factories in the region, but by 
1963 they concluded the time had come for another large scale organizing effort in the Southern 
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textile industry. A primary reason for the decision was that, as a result of the dramatic social and 
legal advancements of the Civil Rights Movement, textile factories had been forced to hire more 
Black and female workers.
16
 Changes in civil rights standards and labor laws had also made it 
more difficult for companies to intimidate or fire workers for participating in union activities.  
This hardly meant management at all manufacturing facilities had become equally 
tolerant. The J.P. Stevens Company, in particular, was highly vulnerable to anti-corporate 
activism because it appeared to be swimming against the current. As one NLRB examiner 
concluded, over several decades the company had made “a systematic attempt to rid itself of 
union adherents.”17 TWUA leaders calculated (in kairotic fashion) that by targeting a corporation 
with an extensive record of NLRB violations, they could more easily build a case at local mills 
and in the press regarding the benefits of union representation in the American South.
18
 
J. P. Stevens’ management team apparently decided early on to oppose the TWUA’s 
organizing campaign at every juncture, even if this required violating NLRB regulations and 
paying large fines.
19
 That said, Robert T. Stevens and other company executives claimed they 
never sanctioned racism or sexism, and they aggressively defended J. P. Stevens as providing 
safe work environments and jobs that paid well for tens of thousands of people.
20
 In his only 
media interview on the subject, Stevens rejected union efforts to frame the company as a serial 
law-breaker. Clearly incensed, he told a Virginia newspaper, “You know, we haven’t existed in 
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this country and this industry, and made progress, for 154 years by being law breakers, despite 
what some people would have you think.”21 In other words, regardless of his company’s long 
history of NLRB violations, he steadfastly maintained the company his great-grandfather had 
founded continued to be what it had always been – a preeminently professional and benevolent 
organization. 
This confident assessment aside, the case the union had been building against Robert 
Stevens’ family enterprise proved difficult to dismiss. In the late 1970s, union organizers 
distributed a booklet with the stark title Re·cid´i·vist in which they provided detailed information 
on NLRB and federal court rulings against J.P. Stevens during the1970s, a period when the 
company claimed to have addressed some of the more egregious issues union activists had raised 
a decade earlier.
22
 The title of the booklet comes from a 1977 legal action in which a judge 
representing the United States Court of Appeals argued J.P. Stevens’ long history of anti-union 
activism had “earned the company its reputation as the most notorious recidivist in the field of 
labor law [emphasis added].”23 The booklet sub-divided rulings against the company into five 
categories: “Discharges” (“firing workers who tried to exercise their right to organize.”); 
“Intimidation” (a long list of illegal practices including “Threatening... Discriminating... 
[F]iring... [and] Blacklisting”); “Bad Faith Bargaining” (“contumaciously failed to bargain in 
good faith” when unions won bargaining rights); “Equal Employment” (systematic denial of 
employment opportunities and fair wages to African Americans); “Health and Safety” (48 OSHA 
violations in North Carolina alone for 1977, including “failure to protect machine operators from 
hazards... Excessive cotton dust... [and] “Noise levels... 20 times the OSHA standard.”); and 
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“Contempt of Court.”24 The detailing of litigation themes is important in this context as it 
provides a convenient summary of persistent themes in the discourse of the Stevens campaign.
25
 
It is important as well in that it reveals what Robert T. Stevens could not. J. P. Stevens had 
earned a reputation as a company which “deliberately took their chances [by ignoring the courts 
and the NLRB] because they thought it profitable for them to do so.”26 The conclusion squares 
with the historic record. By the time J. P. Stevens’ management decided to give in to ACTWU’s 
demands in the fall of 1980, the company had acquired the most extensive record of federal labor 
violations in the history of the U. S textile industry.
27
 
Judicial and regulatory rulings aside, J. P. Stevens’ hard-nosed techniques for dealing 
with unions were highly effective in at least one respect. They prevented large numbers of 
employees at most of the company’s textile mills from siding openly with the union. Organizers 
were reporting that although many workers were privately sympathetic toward the union cause, 
they feared speaking out, lest they be demoted or fired or – worse – lest the company shut down 
the factory and transfer their jobs elsewhere.
28
 After ten years of concerted efforts, the TWUA 
had succeeded in winning elections in only ten of Stevens’ 160 factories.29 The epicenter of 
support for unionization was the large complex of mills in and around Roanoke Rapids where, in 
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1974, after several years of intense effort, a majority of the workers had voted in favor of 
unionization.
30
 Two years later, negotiations between labor and management had yet to produce 
a bargaining agreement, and union leaders became convinced they would need to make 
fundamental changes in their campaign strategies if they were to persuade the company to 
bargain in good faith. After extended discussions among representatives from TWUA, the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), the AFL-CIO, Carolina Citizens for 
Economic Justice, and the Institute for Southern Studies, union leaders settled on a plan for a 
complex and expensive campaign featuring a national boycott of J. P. Stevens’ products.31 They 
hired a controversial young labor activist named Ray Rogers to help plan the action. Rogers had 
come to the attention of union leadership in the Farah Jeans boycott two years earlier where he 
played a key role in convincing merchants in Birmingham, Alabama to stop selling slacks 
manufactured by non-union workers.
32
 
According to a confidential ACTWU “Blue Print,” union leadership expected the new 
strategy would cost nearly 2.5 million dollars and require the hiring of between 50 and 60 new 
organizing staff.
33
 The blue print makes clear as well that the boycott would be only one 
component of a three-pronged offensive “aimed at [J. P. Stevens’] plants, in the courts, and in the 
marketplace.”34 In practice, this meant the union would redouble its efforts to educate and 
organize workers, continue to challenge Stevens before the NLRB, and take advantage of “the 
                                                 
30 Conway, Rise Gonna Rise, 10; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 74. 
31 ACTWU had already decided on the basic framework for the boycott of J. P. Stevens before they hired 
Rogers. The Institute for Southern Studies provided a detailed proposal for the campaign in May of 1976 about the 
same time Rogers joined the campaign organizing staff. Bob Arnold, et. al., “Confidential: To: Interested Parties,” 
memo from Institute for Southern Studies to ACTWU dated May 10, 1976, folder 1, box 3374, Emory Via 
collection, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta; Frank W. 
Emig, untitled memorandum and attached proposal containing joint AFL-CIO/ACTWU “blueprint” for Stevens 
campaign, dated June 8, 1976, folder 39, box 1839,AFL-CIO Region V 1976-1978 collection, Southern Labor 
Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta; Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: 
The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 76. 
32 Minchin, Don’t Sleep with Stevens!: The J. P. Stevens Campaign, 122; Rogers, interview by author. 
33 Emig, untitled memorandum. 
34 Ibid. 
126 
lessons learned in the massive Farah boycott of 1972-74... [in order] to mobilize the labor 
movement and friendly forces in the community against Stevens [sic] consumer products.”35 
With these goals in mind, ACTWU officials appointed Ray Rogers “boycott director,” and he 
oversaw the development and implementation of a novel set of strategies and tactics he dubbed 
the “corporate campaign.”36 The new techniques emerged from a period of intensive research 
and strategy development.
37
 Beginning in 1976, the boycott staff worked closely with the 
Corporate Data Exchange (CDE) to conduct intensive research on the J. P. Stevens Corporation 
and its board of directors.
38
 The staff then used what they learned to develop a complex 
campaign strategy that drew upon public disclosure tactics pioneered in the Farah boycott and 
proxy voting strategies first used by Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation.39 Rogers and 
the ACTWU boycott staff refined these techniques by developing plans for disclosing 
information pinpointing the economic and inter-organizational interests of individual executives 
and for tactically shifting union funds among major banks.
40
 By combining a wide range of 
carefully timed campaign strategies and tactics (including pension fund investment strategies, 
consumer boycotts, union organizing drives, and disclosures of little-known financial 
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relationships) the union hoped to keep management perpetually off-balance, thereby gaining a 
tactical advantage against a more powerful opponent.
41
 In a New York Times interview from 
1984, Rogers provided a pointed summation of the new technique. Unions are unlikely to get 
very far, he claimed, “by simply trying to harass and embarrass” management. If they are to win 
concessions, a campaign must “organize” labor and “disorganize” with a “divide and conquer 
strategy” in which corporate interests are pitted against one another and “forced to deal with 
inescapable economic and political pressure.”42 From Rogers’ perspective, in other words, in any 
given anti-corporate campaign disclosure strategies can certainly help to shape public 
perceptions and encourage public participation, but the primary field of conflict will always be 
material.
43
 Corporations can ignore ideas, but they will always pay attention to money. For this 
reason, a battle against a corporation will always be an expensive, complex, and highly 
confrontational affair. 
Some union staff wondered aloud whether Rogers’ plans were too ambitious, time 
consuming, and expensive.
44
 In the end, the Stevens campaign was undeniably costly, but it also 
exceeded the expectations of many critics within the labor movement by attracting international 
attention for the boycott and by convincing management to honor labor contracts at those 
facilities where ACTWU had won elections.
45
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The boycott committee kicked off the new campaign at J. P. Stevens Corporation’s 
Annual Stockholders’ Meeting, held in Manhattan in February of 1976.46 At that meeting the 
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) used proxy votes to introduce two 
“disclosure” resolutions. Specifically, the ICCR wanted management to provide demographic 
information on the company’s workforce (in order to demonstrate compliance with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964) and a detailed accounting of the company’s history of NLRB violations (so 
they could assess “the potential financial impact of protracted conflict with the unionizing 
effort”47). The ICCR arranged for a dozen or so people to speak in favor of the resolution, 
including a Catholic nun, an elderly woman suffering from brown lung disease, and Coretta Scott 
King, widow of the slain civil rights leader. When her turn came to speak, Ms. King quoted her 
husband who “at the height of the Montgomery bus protest … said ‘Our struggle is not toward 
putting the bus company out of business, but toward putting justice in business.’”48 Her brief 
remarks received a standing ovation from all of the protestors and most of the shareholders 
present. The company board and executives remained seated and later deflected blame for the 
numerous tales of discrimination, disease, and injury they heard that day. As James Finley told 
the audience, “We’ve made some, ah, misjudgments along the way.”49 Finley and the rest of the 
board voted to rebuff the ICCR resolutions, but over the next two years they found it 
increasingly difficult to ignore the union’s new strategy of combining narrative disclosure with 
intense economic pressure. 
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In local factories across the South and at public protest events on college campuses, retail 
outlets and other venues in at least 25 cities across the nation, the union distributed literature 
detailing J. P. Stevens’ history of NLRB violations and providing graphic accounts of unsafe 
working conditions and discrimination in its factories.
50
 At the same time they attempted to 
leverage these efforts by mounting an intensive letter-writing campaign in which union members 
and boycott supporters wrote to J. P. Stevens’ board members, as well as executives in 
companies with whom they did business, to demand the company address workers’ concerns. 
Rogers justified the latter tactic in a letter he wrote to an ACTWU organizer in Atlanta 
explaining executives at companies with strong financial ties to J. P. Stevens, including 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Avon, and New York Life, “have to be concerned over [their] 
image with the large constituencies organized labor represents.”51 In the coming months Rogers 
and the union would provide executives with a second reason to attend to labor constituencies by 
threatening to withdraw an estimated one-billion dollars in union retirement funds from one of J. 
P. Stevens’ principal lenders, Manufacturers Hanover Trust.52 
By March of 1978 the union’s tactics began to produce results when two people resigned 
from the board of directors of Manufacturers Hanover Trust.
53
 The first was James D. Finley of 
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J. P. Stevens who admitted he had made the decision as a result of union pressure.
54
 The second, 
David W. Mitchell, chairman and chief executive officer of Avon Products, cited personal and 
family reasons in announcing his decision not to run for re-election. Two weeks later, Mitchell 
announced he would step down from the board of J. P. Stevens as well, explaining “I cannot 
permit Avon to be drawn into the conflict and to be subjected to the pressures which the union is 
exerting as a result of my Stevens Board membership.”55 Indeed, Mitchell had been under 
intense pressure for months from Avon distributors, customers, and women’s rights groups to 
distance the company from J. P. Stevens. Delegates at the 1977 International Women’s Year 
Convention had sent thousands of postcards to Avon demanding to know how a company that 
marketed primarily to women could justify associating with a corporation that had a well-
established record of sex discrimination. The deluge of mail and phone calls did not let up until 
Mitchell finally agreed to resign from the two boards.
56
 
The Avon campaign was part of a larger effort in which ACTWU worked with union, 
church, human rights, and student organizations to coordinate public protest events and letter-
writing campaigns directed at J. P. Stevens’ management and national retailers who sold their 
products, including Woolworth’s, Federated, Gimbels, Macy’s, and Jordan-Marsh.57 The protests 
were often theatrical and memorable. The New York City chapter of the National Organization 
of Women staged a street theatre protest, culminating in the burning of J. P. Stevens brand bed 
sheets. Students at NYU, Rutgers, Columbia, and Princeton held “teach-ins” featuring talks by 
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former mill workers.
58
 On November 30, 1978 ACTWU coordinated Justice for J. P. Stevens’ 
Workers Day rallies in 74 cities across the country.
59
 In Indianapolis, protestors staged a “hard 
times luncheon” at a Hilton Hotel and concluded by asking the staff what company had 
manufactured their table linens.
60
 When told the fabric had come from J. P. Stevens, protestors 
immediately ripped the linens off the tables in melodramatic fashion and dumped them 
unceremoniously on the floor along with their entire meals. The largest Justice Day event that 
day was held in New York City where more than three-thousand people joined in a noisy rally 
outside the Stevens Tower in Manhattan, many of them carrying pre-printed signs bearing union 
slogans such as “Tear the Fabric of Injustice!” “Cotton Dust Chokes!” and, most memorably, 
“Don’t Sleep Tonight with J. P. Stevens!”61 
The Justice Day protests, like most of the other boycott related events, were carefully 
planned by ACTWU staff, but the union leaders had very little control, at least in the beginning, 
over a development that would draw international attention to their cause – the 1979 release of 
the film Norma Rae. The film was inspired by the true life experiences of Crystal Lee Sutton, a 
union activist who had been fired by J. P. Stevens.
62
 Journalist Henry P. Leifermann first learned 
of Sutton’s story when he wrote a New York Times article on the Stevens campaign.63 He later 
wrote a full-length book about Sutton’s experiences and sold the movie rights to a Hollywood 
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producer.
64
 The film takes some liberties with the story line and dwells more on “Norma Rae’s” 
complicated love life than her union organizing activities at the fictional O. P. Henley textile 
mill. Nonetheless, its depictions of arduous daily working conditions is confirmed by testimony 
Crystal Lee and others provided to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
1974 about their experiences working at the J. P. Stevens plants in Roanoke Rapids.
65
 
Sally Fields won an Academy Award for her role as Norma Rae and, by at least one 
account, the film introduced the union’s cause to “a potential audience of seventy-five million 
people,” many of whom knew little or nothing about working conditions in Southern textile 
mills.
66
 The movie also helped to attract celebrity and political endorsements for the Stevens 
campaign and provided ACTWU with an articulate and charismatic advocate in the person of 
Crystal Lee Sutton. In several respects Sutton’s story embodied the complexities of the union’s 
cause and its defiant tone. She was a tough-talking, thrice married woman who was 
unintimidated by male authority figures in the workplace. As a result, she was a felicitous match 
for the situation and time period – a defiant, working class woman who spoke with conviction 
and clarity about important issues of the day such as race, class, and political hypocrisy. 
Public Backlash against the Stevens Campaign 
Just as progressive groups rallied in support of the J. P. Stevens boycott in the 1970s, so 
too conservatives rallied in opposition to unionization, first in Southern textile communities, and 
over the next few decades in communities across the nation where corporate management teams 
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attempted to rally public support to fend off union organizing efforts.
67
 One can trace two 
prominent, interrelated themes in the discourse of the boycott opponents in the factories and 
small towns of the South during this time: racism and a pervasive suspicion of people and 
organizations perceived as interlopers in local affairs. In the first instance, given that only fifteen 
years earlier the same communities where J. P. Stevens maintained textile mills had lived under 
laws mandating racial segregation, it is hardly surprising ACTWU would begin to experience 
difficulties recruiting white members.
68
 The spirit of Jim Crow had retreated, but not entirely. 
The employee education committees that sprang up to oppose unionization in textile 
communities were almost exclusively white, and in some instances the arguments they advanced 
were unambiguously racist.
69
 The founder of the Roanoke Rapids Employee Education 
Committee, for example, complained to Mike Wallace of CBS News that unions supported 
“Nigger rights” and explained, “Most of the ones you get at the union hall are colored.”70 
That sort of racist language was certainly inflammatory; however, it was also atypical – 
at least in the publicly available records of the employee education committees. Suspicion of 
outside intruders into local communities was by far the more common theme in the promotional 
literature of anti-union organizations and in news stories and editorials from the time period.
71
 
As one union opponent explained, “This was a nice little town, and everybody was happy, like 
one big family, and all at once the union came in and a bunch of young people, they went to join 
the union and get something for nothing. It split the town in two, you’ve got troubles.” 72 In 
keeping with these sentiments, opponents frequently stereotyped unions as arising solely as a 
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result of “third party” agitators intruding into the private relations of Southern businesses and 
their employees.
73
 Never mind that the majority of the union organizers and church leaders 
active in the campaign were from the South, the participation of college students, union activists, 
and church groups from other sections of the country was read as de facto proof that textile 
unions were a meddlesome, counterproductive influence in labor negotiations.
74
  
This situation was not without its ironies, especially since suspicion of outside interests 
did not extend to J. P. Stevens management in New York City. In news stories and in employee 
education committee documents, ACTWU’s opponents consistently defended the company as a 
force for good in local economies: a responsible employer with a long history of providing much 
needed jobs to those who chose, of their own free will, to accept them.
75
 Objecting to this line of 
reasoning was futile, they argued, because, if the textile mills were to close, the economies of 
small towns like Roanoke Rapids would simply collapse. In the black and white logic of 
ACTWU’s most vocal opponents, it was better to be a loyal employee than an unemployed union 
rabble-rouser.  
J. P. Stevens, of course, had a material interest in the arguments being advanced by 
employee education committees. The company demonstrated as much by adopting a four tier 
strategy in response to the boycott. They funded surrogate organizations that channeled funds to 
employee education committees, enabling them to set up offices, coordinate activities, and 
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distribute materials at the local level.
76
 They published a flurry of professional-looking letters 
and pamphlets telling management’s side of the story and scheduled executives to speak on 
college campuses and to meet with various church groups.
 77
 At the same time, they cooperated 
with other textile companies to mount an intensive and ultimately successful lobbying effort in 
opposition to the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1977 (the so-called 
“Stevens Bill”).78 Finally, they used a two-step tactic of violating fewer NLRB regulations and 
improving pay at their non-union facilities in order to limit ACTWU’s ability to recruit new 
members. As a direct result of these actions, by the late 1970s ACTWU had been placed in the 
difficult position of battling a corporation which, whatever its history, was now leaning on local 
factory managers to abide by the law.
79
 
J. P. Stevens’ more conciliatory strategy was good news for boycott supporters, for it 
enabled them to argue that the campaign had helped to improve working conditions at textile 
factories across the South. By 1979 even union opponents were admitting textile unions had 
benefited Southern workers. As anti-union consultant George Hood, one of the architects of the 
employee education committee strategy, admitted, “The union has done a lot of good, there’s no 
question about it, at Stevens. Things are much better today because of the union presence.”80 By 
the late 1970s African Americans and women were receiving noticeably better pay and better 
opportunities for advancement in most Southern textile mills than in earlier decades. J. P. 
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Stevens and other textile manufacturers in the region had also made significant improvements in 
workplace safety and retirement benefits. Stories of overt discrimination, on-the-job injuries, and 
brown lung disease were beginning to lose their currency, at least in relation to J. P. Stevens’ 
non-union facilities. Employees at those mills where the union had won majority votes continued 
to complain they were being forced to endure lower pay and harsher working conditions than 
their peers at non-union mills.
81
 
The improvements in daily working conditions, however, made it more difficult for 
ACTWU to frame J. P. Stevens as “the Nation’s number one labor law violator.”82 In the end, the 
improvements also placed management in a tenuous position. The company’s decision to 
improve wages and working conditions in many of its factories had done little to placate boycott 
supporters, who remained focused on their stubborn refusal to bargain in good faith with the 
union in Roanoke Rapids and other locations where ACTWU had won majority support. Under 
intense pressure from the NLRB and the federal courts to end the stand-off, in the spring of 1978 
the company began secretive negotiations with union representatives.
83
 By October of 1980, the 
two parties had worked out a compromise and announced an historic agreement under which J. 
P. Stevens recognized ACTWU as the official bargaining agent in those workplaces where it had 
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won elections, and the union agreed to refrain from using corporate campaign strategies against 
the company in future contract negotiations.
84
  
Emulating the Stevens Campaign 
In subsequent years dozens of other organizations emulated ACTWU’s  “corporate 
campaign” strategies. In not a few instances this was because Ray Rogers either organized the 
campaigns or worked as a consultant.
85
 However, in most of the campaigns I reviewed that 
employed martial style campaign strategies there was no obvious connection to Rogers or the 
consulting agency he founded in the 1980s.
86
 The majority of the campaigns that employed 
strategies similar to those used in the Stevens campaign were in labor contexts, but many others 
were not. Some of the most prominent examples include the campaigns against Continental 
Airlines in 1983, Hormel Foods in 1985, American Airlines in 1986, and Ravenswood 
Aluminum in 1990.
87
 During this same time period other groups began to adapt Rogers’ brand of 
direct action techniques to non-labor contexts by sponsoring anti-corporate campaigns with 
clearly articulated short-term goals in which they confronted management on several fronts. 
Examples of the latter include Rain Forest Action Network’s (RAIN) 1989 campaign against 
Mitsubishi in which it used a combination of shareholder activism and street theatre to convince 
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the company to halt harvesting of old growth timber; the1992 campaign in which Greenpeace 
worked with Ray Rogers to develop a campaign to force DuPont and a host of other chemical 
manufacturers to halt the production of Freon and other ozone depleting chemicals; and the 
“Merchants of Shame” campaign begun in 1998 in which the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) has used a combination of civil suits and public shaming strategies to pressure 
companies including Detroit-Edison, Wal-Mart, and Smith-Barney to address documented 
patterns of sexual abuse and discrimination in the workplace.
88
 
The standard wisdom about the use of corporate campaign tactics in these sorts of post-
Stevens actions holds that once the techniques became well-known they became difficult to 
repeat. As one source put it, “The Stevens victory did not translate into a series of easy wins for 
labor.” 89 This was nowhere as clear as in the American South where ACTWU was unable to 
capitalize on the gains of the Stevens campaign by winning elections at large numbers of other 
textile plants.
90
 Indeed, ACTWU’s new difficulties proved a harbinger of things to come. The 
labor movement fell on hard times in the 1980s and 90s, due in large part to a steep decline in 
manufacturing jobs as employers began to move facilities to places like El Salvador, China, and 
Bangladesh, where they could hire workers for a fraction of the price they had been paying in the 
U. S. It was due as well to a shift in attitudes among many in management. Executives at many 
firms felt emboldened by the example of J. P. Stevens, which had demonstrated it often cost less 
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money to pay NLRB fines than to cooperate with unions.
91
 This helps to explain why, as Stephen 
H. Norwood has documented, many companies took a hard line with unions in the 1980s and 90s 
by firing organizers and hiring labor consultants who specialized in defaming and intimidating 
union activists.
92
 At the same time, many of these same companies hired more mid-level 
personnel managers and implemented proactive “human resources management” strategies 
designed to keep track of employees’ concerns and tamp down potential conflicts. 
None of this was good news for the labor movement. Complaints filed with the NLRB 
spiked during this period while union membership declined from 20% of the non-agricultural 
workforce in 1983 to 13.5% in 2000.
93
 The best known example of management taking a hard 
line with unions in this era is undoubtedly the strike against Hormel Foods in Austin, Minnesota 
in 1985.
94
 The union sponsored an extended corporate campaign but was forced to concede 
defeat after the company locked them out, Ray Rogers was temporarily thrown in jail, and the 
state’s Democratic governor called in the National Guard to maintain order.95 The great lesson of 
the Hormel strike was that popular support is the life blood of anti-corporate activism. Since the 
action against Hormel took place during a steep economic recession (a time when other meat 
processing companies had either cut wages or gone out of business) the union failed to win the 
sort of broad public sympathy that had forced the hand of management at J. P. Stevens. 
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In later campaigns such as the United Steelworkers’ strikes against Ravenswood 
Aluminum in 1990, Bridgestone/Firestone in 1996, and Bayou Steel (1996) union strategists 
focused on increasing the participation of rank-and-file workers in daily decision-making, 
building coalitions with local human rights groups, and even making humanitarian appeals to 
individual corporate executives.96  In all three instances, the union won surprising victories 
against what appeared to be overwhelming odds. The changes in strategy began to pay dividends 
in other labor campaigns as well, and by the start of the new millennium labor unions and other 
activist organizations were sponsoring anti-corporate campaigns with increasing frequency and 
finding that management, while not always cooperative, was more likely to listen to their 
concerns than they had been a decade or so earlier. 
These dramatic shifts in the practice of anti-corporate activism, I contend, make more 
sense when the strategies of the Stevens campaign are understood as a paradigm instance of 
prospective narrative disclosure. In the second half of the chapter I unpack this claim in 
considerable detail by revisiting several key events in the campaign in order to demonstrate how 
they exemplify the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the martial typology.  
Martial Strategies in the Stevens Campaign 
Most accounts of ACTWU’s campaign against the J. P. Stevens Company have focused 
on the sudden emergence of an innovative, controversial, and sometimes counterproductive set 
of direct action strategies dubbed the “corporate campaign.”97 Until recently, that is, scholars 
have tended to accept the union’s own description of the Stevens campaign as a series of power 
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on power confrontations in which the union used a combination of economic pressure and 
disclosures of financial relationships to convince a reluctant corporate board to come to the 
bargaining table. My research suggests, however, that this reading of the union’s upset victory 
against a multinational corporation may be too simplistic. More specifically, a careful reading of 
campaign related academic literature and hundreds of primary documents makes clear that the 
public dissemination of first person stories disclosing egregious working conditions in Southern 
textile mills was the decisive factor in ending the campaign. J. P. Stevens’ management decided 
to cooperate with ACTWU, not because the union’s national boycott had hurt sales (it had not) or 
because of union investment strategies, but because they had been made to look like greedy, 
heartless ne’er do wells. By the time they sat down with union representatives, company 
executives were under intense pressure from the public and from management at other textile 
companies to bring the conflict to a dignified close.
98
  
I am not the first to question the limitations of accepting the union’s account of power on 
power strategies in the Stevens campaign at face value. In the first book length study of the 
Stevens campaign, labor historian Timothy Minchin argues that African-American and women’s 
groups played a crucial role in galvanizing public support for unionizing J. P. Stevens’ textile 
factories and in convincing management to settle the conflict. My research confirms Minchin’s 
insight about the importance of women and minorities and extends on it by demonstrating how, 
by setting stories about things like workplace injuries and discrimination in public circulation, 
ACTWU was able to hold management accountable in the public sphere.  
To be clear, none of this should be taken to mean the union’s well-known direct action 
strategies (maneuvering of bank funds and bringing suit before the National Labor Relations 
Board, for instance) had no influence whatsoever on management decisions or on the strategies 
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employed in subsequent anti-corporate campaigns. Rather, my argument is that storytelling was 
the sine qua non of the Stevens campaign. ACTWU’s strategies, in all likelihood, would have 
failed entirely had they not been executed at a time when management had already been thrown 
off balance by the public circulation of shocking stories about daily work life in Southern textile 
mills. That said, there is no doubt the direct action strategies ACTWU developed for the Stevens 
campaign were widely imitated in the closing decades of the twentieth century and continue to 
influence anti-corporate activism even today. Critics have sometimes dismissed ACTWU’s 
corporate campaign strategies as overly aggressive and counterproductive.
99
 These criticisms 
notwithstanding, there is no question that the Stevens campaign was one of the earliest (and most 
important) milestones in the contemporary anti-corporate globalization movement.
100
  
My discussion of these themes unfolds in two stages. I begin by providing extended 
discussions of three interdependent dimensions of ACTWU’s rhetorical strategies: public 
disclosures, kairotic strategy development, and storytelling circulation. I then consider how these 
strategies influenced the outcome of the campaign, the practices of other anti-corporate activists, 
and the de facto CSR standards of global markets.  
Rhetorical Disclosures in the Southern Textile Industry 
In planning and managing the Stevens campaign, ACTWU employed rhetorical strategies 
conforming to a pattern of prospective narrative disclosure. The historical timeline of the 
campaign, conforms in large part to the three step process I described earlier beginning with 
intensive research and continuing on to strategy development and public, storytelling disclosure. 
More importantly, a close reading of the history of the Stevens campaign and of campaign 
related texts provides compelling evidence of the union’s interest in plurivocal storytelling 
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circulation and of management’s competing interest in maintaining monovocal control over 
company discourse.  
Regarding the former claim, at the Southern Labor Archives at Georgia State University, 
I found a variety of texts (including handwritten notes from ACTWU meetings, confidential 
memorandums to union staff and internal documents detailing interactions with the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility) that provide direct evidence the union conducted extensive 
research on J. P. Stevens and planned campaign strategies in a top-down manner in conjunction 
with other activist organizations.
101
 To consider but one of several possible examples, in a four 
page internal memo entitled “Profile of J. P. Stevens,” union leaders included detailed 
information on the company’s history, economic resources, product lines, and board of 
directors.
102
  
Another class of documents provides evidence the union staff employed intensive 
research strategies for the purpose of exposing practices that would problematize the carefully 
crafted narratives one encountered in the company’s public documents. Here I am thinking of the 
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rather extensive body of campaign literature in which union strategists attempted to build a 
persuasive, thoroughly footnoted case against J. P. Stevens to justify their boycott strategy.
103
 
What is more, in my interview with Ray Rogers, who chaired ACTWU’s J. P. Stevens boycott 
committee, he confirmed the union spent considerable time and energy developing a complex set 
of strategies for encountering the company on several fronts (e.g., through the courts and with 
organizing drives, consumer boycotts, protest marches, and rhetorical disclosure).
104
 Taken 
together the interview and texts confirm the observation of ACTWU organizers Si Kahn and 
Charlotte Brody that in their year and one-half of intensive preparation the union produced 
“enough memos on strategies and tactics… to fill a small book.”105 
All in all the sources I reviewed provide a detailed picture of union leaders planning and 
managing a complex public campaign focused on convincing J. P. Stevens’ management to sign 
bargaining agreements in those mills where workers had voted for union representation and, 
beyond that, to expand the union’s presence in the Southern textile industry. Toward that end, 
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they determined to disclose self-serving financial relationships and disquieting information about 
how the company had been profiting from human misery. Most scholarly accounts have focused 
on the first of these two modes of disclosure – regarding inter-relationships among banks, 
corporations, and boards of directors. My work deviates from this pattern, by documenting a 
more far-reaching and influential strategy of disclosing, not only financial relationships among 
corporate executives, but also the harrowing first-person experiences of individual textile 
workers.  By way of explanation, it was in reading stories told by workers at J. P. Stevens’ textile 
mills that I first arrived at a tentative definition of prospective narrative disclosure. In the next 
few pages I give a more fully-developed account of what I learned from reading those 
documents. More specifically, I explain how the union was able to use storytelling disclosure to 
shift public perceptions of J. P. Stevens to the point where they were widely perceived, even 
among management at other corporations within their industry, as marketplace pariahs. This 
shifting of public sensibilities, I maintain, was crucial to the decisions of J. P. Stevens’ 
executives to end their standoff with the union.  
The many graphic descriptions of workplace misery one encounters in ACTWU’s 
campaign literature recall Edwin Black’s description of the “open hand” of rhetorical appeal and 
“the closed fist” of coercive power.106 Keeping with Black’s analysis, in these texts the union 
served as a “translator” – an artful mediator enabling public audiences to view secretive aspects 
of corporate discourse and practices. This does not mean union strategists simply held a mirror 
up to randomly selected scenes in J. P. Stevens’ textile mills. Rather, they disclosed specific 
incidents and relationships in a prospective (or to use Black’s terminology, “prophetic”) 
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manner.
107
 That is, by revealing the truth regarding material conditions, the union was able to 
“‘turn’ the frontier into a crossing,” and disclose an alternative telos, a new way forward toward 
a less coercive future.
108
 
One finds a striking example of this type of public revelation in a tri-fold ACTWU 
campaign pamphlet entitled simply “What’s under the Covers?” The union distributed four 
versions of the pamphlet, all of them conforming to the same simple formula.
109
 The cover is a 
near duplicate of a J.P. Stevens advertising image, and when readers opened it they found one of 
four different messages regarding discrimination, work-related accidents, brown lung disease, or 
“runaway shop policies.”110 The most startling image in the group is of seventeen-year-old Kathy 
Peace who was fired after losing two fingers in an industrial accident. The front cover of the 
pamphlet is printed in color, but the interior image of the injured young woman is in black and 
white, thus highlighting the contrast between the glossy surface of the company’s public 
relations and advertising narratives and the gritty reality of daily work experiences for many 
textile workers. Her eyes do not meet the camera. Instead she stares down at her injured hand, 
which she holds out as if presenting it as atechnical evidence before a jury of her peers. The 
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words printed beneath the photograph fill in the subtext. “Hundreds of men and women who 
work for J. P. Stevens, America’s second largest textile firm, have been injured on the job 
because of the company’s negligence.”111  
The document is mimetic in the sense that it provides compelling, first-person evidence 
of workplace violence and of callous neglect. Moreover, by setting the young woman’s mute 
testimony in dialectical tension with an easily recognizable J. P. Stevens’ advertising image, the 
union provides an unmistakable example of Burkean “planned incongruity.”112 Through “rational 
planning,” in other words, they were able to identify a corporate narrative about material civility 
(in the form of an advertising image) and “wrench it loose and metaphorically apply it to a 
different category.”113 In this instance, one could use the phrase “pariah corporation” to describe 
the new rhetorical category.  
During the Stevens campaign ACTWU distributed at least a dozen different pamphlets 
nationwide featuring these sorts of graphic images and stories.
114
 One of the most widely 
circulated was entitled simply Testimony and included stories and fragments of stories from more 
than a dozen employees and former employees of J. P. Stevens.115 The pamphlet includes, for 
example, the stories of Mildred Whitley whose job was threatened after she missed work for 
mastectomy surgery, Lundee Cannon who spoke of developing brown lung disease from 
working in a factory where the air was laden with cotton dust, and Robert Mallory who was 
ignored by management when he demanded to know why he was being paid less money but was 
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expected to do more work than his white peers.
116
  The references to named individuals in these 
texts stand in contrast to the campaign related discourse of J. P. Stevens in which, as I will 
explain shortly, employees are seldom named, and when they are, they tend to echo “the 
company line” in uncanny ways. When read in context, in other words, there can be no doubt the 
union intended the bleak images of people like Kathy Peace to serve as a synecdochal 
representation of a pattern of systematic and egregious violations of safety and human rights in 
the Southern textile industry at mid-century. 
The pamphlets leave no doubt as well that the union was encouraging a thoroughgoing 
“hermeneutic of suspicion” regarding the narratives in J. P. Stevens’ corporate literature.117 That 
is, by distributing campaign literature featuring disturbing images and stories union strategists 
hoped public audiences would come to view the glossy surface of the company’s public 
discourse as fictive and deceptive, as hiding ugly truths about money, pain, and power. The 
compelling accounts of racism, sexism, and workplace injuries found in these documents lent 
credibility (or to use Ricoeur’s term, kerygma) to the union’s disclosures of little-known 
financial relationships between J. P. Stevens and other corporate institutions.
118
 Moreover, by 
acting first and presenting first person accounts of egregious harms, ACTWU was able to shift 
the burden of proof onto executives who had been caught very much off guard. So, for instance, 
by linking the CEO of Avon to J. P. Stevens, the union was, at the same time, establishing a 
metonymic link between Avon Corporation and the stories of workplace coercion and 
discrimination coming out of Southern textile factories.
119
 And by connecting management at 
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several companies in this way to haunting depictions of daily misery they disturbed regnant 
conceptions of corporate accountability and provided heuristic examples for later activist 
campaigns.  
Of course, as is well known, the union also worked to identify answerable decision 
makers in J. P. Stevens’ management and among the network of banks and other companies that 
lent the company financial and professional support. Ray Rogers and his associates on the 
ACTWU boycott committee viewed these sorts of disclosures as a lynch pin tactic in their 
overall campaign strategy.
120
 Their logic was straightforward. Because of limited liability laws it 
was nearly impossible for the union to hold Robert T. Stevens, James Finley and other members 
of the management team of J.P. Stevens Corporation legally responsible for egregious working 
conditions and violations of human rights in their company’s Southern factories. However, by 
disseminating compelling stories about threats to human rights, safety, and health in J. P. 
Stevens’ textile mills, ACTWU was able to frame these executives – along with the company’s 
board of directors and its largest investors – as ethically answerable for their role in perpetuating 
human suffering. More to the point, union activists were able to cut through the overlapping 
matrices of organizational power to disclose people who had been creating and managing wealth 
without “answering for life.”121 
What these examples make clear is that the union’s efforts to peel back the fictive surface 
of J. P. Stevens’ public narratives in order to reveal ugly truths were fundamental to their 
campaign strategies. They provide evidence as well that ACTWU intended to hold J. P. Stevens’ 
management publically accountable for the horrific incidents recounted in campaign literature. 
What these initial examples do not make clear, however, is that ACTWU had to proceed with 
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care when distributing campaign related literature in rural textile communities, lest they run afoul 
of local authorities. To understand these dangers and how the union sidestepped them in order to 
set the workers’ stories into public circulation on the national and international levels will require 
a more in depth review of kairotic strategies in the Stevens campaign. 
ACTWU’s campaign strategies were kairotic in the sense that they took advantage of 
important advancements in the Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century and featured 
carefully timed instrumental actions (shareholder actions and tactical shifting of union retirement 
funds, for example) and public storytelling disclosure. On the first point, it is widely recognized 
that in the years following World War II, civil rights activists won a series of legal and popular 
confrontations that eventually produced tangible changes in what passed for common sense in 
relation to racial and gender equality. The Stevens campaign was timed to take advantage of 
these developments, to capitalize on a moment in history when it became possible to “overcome 
the threshold of stability” regarding race, gender, and labor relations in the American South. 122 
This was not a naïve calculation. As I explained in the previous chapter, only four decades earlier 
during the Textile Workers’ Strike of 1934 (aka, the “Uprising of ‘34”), the textile industry had 
violently suppressed a large scale labor initiative in the region.
123
 It is important to keep this bit 
of history in view when assessing the impact of ACTWU’s power on power strategies. It seems 
unlikely that between the Uprising of ‘34 and the start of the late 1970s that labor unions could 
have accumulated economic and political resources sufficient to challenge a multinational 
corporation like J. P. Stevens on anything approaching equal terms. To the contrary, the most 
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likely reason J. P. Stevens and other textile companies did not crush unionists in the 1970s was 
that there had been a qualitative shift in public attitudes toward race, gender and many forms of 
institutionalized violence since the 1930s.
124
  
Again, this does not mean that kairotic, instrumental action within the material economy 
played no role whatsoever in forcing the hand of management. Still, the closer one looks at 
claims that those sorts of actions were definitive in the Stevens campaign, the more difficult they 
become to defend. ACTWU’s national boycott of J. P. Stevens’ products and its shifting of union 
retirement funds among New York banks had relatively little impact on the company’s 
profitability or its short term cash flow. The union’s initial use of proxy voting tactics at J. P. 
Stevens’ annual meetings proved even less effective (at least in economic terms). ACTWU 
succeeded in introducing several activist motions and in scheduling union speakers to address 
shareholders. Although union speakers (including Coretta Scott King) proved embarrassing for 
the company, management easily rebuffed the union’s proposed changes to its policies.125 
ACTWU’s proxy voting strategies proved more effective in the fall of 1980 at Metropolitan Life 
when, under threat of having to hold a costly election for their board of directors, the insurance 
company began to lean on J. P. Stevens to end the boycott.
126
 By that time, however, the 
company and the union had been negotiating in secret for more than a year and a settlement was, 
in all likelihood, a foregone conclusion.
127
 
As I explained earlier, a close reading of the history of the Stevens campaign and of 
campaign-related documents provides compelling evidence that kairotic, storytelling disclosure 
rather than boycotts and bank transfers were the most important factor in management’s decision 
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to end the campaign. This conclusion is in line with de Certeau’s observations on the tactical 
uses of storytelling and the importance of allowing memory to gather force until it stands the 
greatest chance of upending history.
128
 One can recognize these sorts of tactics, for example, in 
the events leading up to the resignation of Avon CEO David W. Mitchell from two corporate 
boards.
129
 By setting disturbing accounts of daily work-life at J. P. Steven in public circulation, 
the union was able to pinpoint a glaring contradiction in Avon’s corporate discourse. It could not 
continue to promote itself as a company that offered women free-market opportunities while at 
the same time lending strategic support to J. P. Stevens, a corporation that had become 
metonymically linked in the public imagination with egregious violations of women’s rights. 
The Mitchell resignation, as it turns out, presaged the actions of several J. P. Stevens’ 
executives. By 1980 media reports suggested a new crop of managers had grown weary of 
having their company framed at every turn as a “corporate pariah.”130 J. P. Stevens appears to 
have caved in, not because they had been overpowered in a material sense, but because a 
reshuffled management team finally determined their corporate practices were fundamentally out 
of step with the ethical sensibilities of the national marketplace of the late twentieth century.
131
 
To understand just why kairotic storytelling disclosure could overcome corporate resistance and 
bring about this sort of result will require a more thorough discussion of storytelling circulation 
and its relation to popular reasoning.  
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When ACTWU engaged in a conscious strategy of disseminating bruising stories about 
the daily work experiences of textile workers, they were not so much developing novel campaign 
strategies as they were revisiting an ancient rhetorical tradition in order to discover how “to 
make the weaker position seem the stronger.”132 To that end, ACTWU developed a national 
strategy for distributing campaign materials featuring carnivalesque and grotesque stories and 
images. In this way they hoped to grab the attention of popular audiences and the national media. 
These actions ultimately enabled the union to rally the centrifugal (plurivocal and decentralizing) 
forces of public opinion in order to challenge management to comply with their demands and the 
rulings of the NLRB. Management responded to these efforts with a series of distinctly 
centripetal (monovocal and centralizing) initiatives aimed at reinforcing corporate narratives and 
reasserting precise, top-down control over their organizational discourse.  
Turning first to union strategies, by distributing campaign literature featuring grotesque 
and carnivalesque stories and images, ACTWU was able to disclose workplace violence and 
issue scathing parodies of corporate hierarchies. I found several compelling examples of 
grotesque realism, for example, in campaign pamphlets ACTWU distributed from offices it set 
up in large cities across the nation during the Stevens campaign.
133
 They include images and 
stories about missing fingers, a severed arm, a severed hand, brown lung disease, and a double 
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mastectomy.
134
 The gruesome depictions of damaged bodies one encounters in these documents 
serve as negative boundary markers, denoting the limits of the human conscience at a particular 
moment in time. They serve to disclose an ugly history and prompt (through visceral rejection) a 
demand for a future in which, at the very least, people are less likely to be brutalized in the ways 
the union described.
135
  
I also found numerous examples of carnivalesque inversion in the Stevens campaign, 
including two prominent protest actions that exemplify the union’s efforts to subvert political 
hierarchies in order critique corporate practices. The first is an incident I mentioned earlier where 
protestors dumped their table cloths, meals and all, onto the floor of a Hilton Hotel.136 The second 
is a picket sign reading “Don’t Sleep Tonight with J. P. Stevens!” that appeared in several protest 
events.
137
 In each of these examples, the salience of the human body and its animal functions 
serves as a common denominator, in effect marginalizing social taxonomies by bringing biology 
to the fore. In the first instance, it hardly seems accidental that activists would stage a protest in 
an exclusive hotel frequented by wealthy business executives. By posing as wealthy, pompous 
customers who explode over a seemingly minor issue, the protestors drew attention to the 
enormous power discrepancy between employees and management. In Medieval carnivals the 
performers would, no doubt, have pushed this parody to its natural limits by belching, passing 
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gas, or displaying body parts.
138
 Still, even within this (apparently) more modest performance 
one can recognize how the salience of consumption discloses the humanity of superiors, thereby 
temporarily erasing differences between rich and poor, managers and employees. Regardless of 
their income levels or professional titles, everybody eats.  
In the second example, protestors used personification to demote “J. P. Stevens” to the 
level of a college student and to invoke an image of a promiscuous and undesirable sexual 
partner – someone to be shunned, perhaps as a result of their infidelity or their disease status. 
Allusions to profligate behavior and sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis in particular) were 
common in medieval carnivalesque performances. Consistent with this pattern, the union 
destabilized corporate narratives by placing them in dialogic proximity to promiscuity, disease, 
and decay.
139
 Even more important, by depicting J. P. Stevens as a spurned lover, the protesters 
echoed the predicament of many employees caught between a desperate desire to fulfill their 
bodily needs (that is, by working to gain food and shelter) and their natural reluctance to pursue 
those ends by cooperating with a coercive employer. As with the grotesque images of damaged 
bodies in the union’s campaign literature, the salience of the human body in this syphilitic 
metaphor serves temporarily to stand social order on its head and to open a space in which 
audiences might catch a glimpse of a reconfigured social order. Through personification and 
debasement, they disclosed the humanity of management and provided a satiric channel for 
expressing revulsion toward their actions.  
The union’s strategy of circulating carnivalesque and grotesque stories and images was 
not without risks. In that sense, the strategy constituted a rhetorical wager that by telling sad and 
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compelling stories they might galvanize public audiences in support of ACTWU’s cause. Put 
another way, by circulating such stories in public venues, the union gained the attention of 
popular audiences and the media, but they also sacrificed a significant measure of strategic 
control. Union strategists controlled the types of stories they included in campaign literature and 
protest events, and they often took care to distribute literature and stage events in locations 
around the country where they determined they might find sympathetic audiences. Beyond that, 
they had to depend on public storytelling circulation, meaning that if people found the stories 
compelling, then they would repeat them to others and the workers’ accounts would begin to 
spread out in a diffused, centrifugal manner that defied narrative control.
140
 People read 
campaign literature and sometimes repeated what they had learned, one person to another at 
kitchen tables and water coolers. When journalists sometimes included the workers’ stories (or 
fragments thereof) in news stories, they skipped political boundaries and cropped up in 
conversations in remote locations.  
In this way, ACTWU’ grotesque and carnivalesque stories became travelers, “moving 
from context to context, shifting in content and refraction, as they jump-start[ed] the future.”141 
Put another way, by placing a set of compelling texts in public circulation, the union was able to 
generate a whole series of “publics,” that is to say, “social space[s] created by the reflexive 
circulation of discourse.”142 As the workers’ texts entered into public circulation, details of their 
contents were taken up by sympathetic readers and passed on to others. “The concatenation of 
[these] texts through time,” served to stimulate wide scale public empathy for the plight of 
Southern textile workers.
143
 To say that ACTWU engaged in kairotic storytelling action, 
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therefore, is to say that the union wagered legions of people would take the word of a handful of 
textile workers rather than the polished, public relations narratives of a multinational corporation.  
The strategic, “centrifugal” dissemination of stories in the public and private spheres was 
a keystone of ACTWU’s rhetorical strategies and stands in contrast to the centripetal character of 
J. P. Stevens’ organizational discourse. The surprising strengths of the former and the 
vulnerabilities of the latter become evident in a close analysis of how the union selected stories 
and set them in circulation: often in urban centers and college campuses far removed from the 
“humorless terrain” of Southern textile communities. 
To begin, many of the best-known stories from the Stevens campaign followed a similar 
pathway from the factory floor to the public sphere. In brief, some of the stories circulating in 
rural textile mills and union halls about work-related sexism, racism, injuries and the like were 
subsequently investigated by union officials and presented as formal grievances to company 
managers. If the initial complaint was rebuffed at the local level, the story was then included in 
complaints litigated before the NLRB and Federal courts.
144
 The union recounted some of the 
most graphic and memorable incidents in pamphlets and even in a documentary film. ACTWU 
staff members working in cities scattered across the nation used the pamphlets and the film to 
spread the word about harsh working conditions at J. P. Stevens textile mills and to encourage 
consumers to shun the company’s products.145 In turn, some of the stories found in these texts 
were eventually picked up by journalists and repeated in news stories and books from the time 
period, thus helping to make the J. P. Stevens campaign a “cause célèbre” in the late 1970s.”146 
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Undoubtedly the most prominent name to emerge from this process was that of Crystal 
Lee Sutton who, as noted earlier, was the inspiration for the award winning film Norma Rae. The 
film has been widely credited with drawing attention to the plight of textile workers and helping 
to convince management to negotiate an end to the campaign.
 147
 Norma Rae is important in this 
context because its popular reception highlights a crucial weakness in arguments of those who 
credit the success of the Stevens campaign to power on power strategies. To wit, if J. P. Stevens’ 
management ultimately gave in to union demands as a result of material pressures and strategic 
disruptions (e.g., financial pressures due to the shifting of union funds and strategic disruptions 
of corporate boards that made it difficult to carry on daily business), then a popular film would 
not have mattered. Norma Rae would amount to little more than an intriguing side show. 
However, if the popular success of the film was a major contributing factor in management’s 
decision to end the campaign, then this lends credence to an alternative reading of the campaign 
in which storytelling circulation is the more important factor.  
This should not be taken to mean that a popular film was solely responsible for 
convincing management to end the campaign. This is true, if for no other reason, because, by the 
time Norma Rae debuted in theaters nationwide, the J. P. Stevens Corporation had already 
endured three years of lousy publicity and embarrassing revelations, and it was already under 
pressure from investors to end the standoff with the union.
148
 What can be said is that the movie 
provided a disturbing account of daily work life in Southern textile mills that many audiences 
found credible and compelling. In that way it also lent credibility to the grim stories recounted in 
campaign literature and public protests. In all likelihood, these factors helped the union to “close 
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the deal” with management in the final year of the campaign. What this means is that, in order to 
make sense of ACTWU’s improbable victory in the Stevens campaign, it is important to look 
past Norma Rae and consider the collective influence of the dozens of other stories the union set 
afloat in the public sphere in the 1970s.
149
 
One person whose story was featured in ACTWU’s campaign discourse was Lucy 
Taylor, and her experience provides a reasonable template for understanding the union’s 
centrifugal storytelling strategies. After working thirty-five years in the weaving room of a J. P. 
Stevens mill in Roanoke Rapids, Taylor developed brown lung disease and was forced into early 
retirement.
150
 She filed a workers’ compensation claim, but management turned her down, 
claiming she should have submitted the paperwork as soon as she had begun to experience 
symptoms several years earlier. She subsequently registered a grievance with the union, and in 
1980 presented her case to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
151
 The court found her testimony 
compelling and subsequently extended workers compensation benefits to thousands of former 
textile workers whose claims, like Taylor’s, had been previously denied. Her victory was 
featured in an “above the fold” news report on the business page of the Charlotte Observer in the 
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spring of 1980.
152
 ACTWU included portions of Taylor’s account in two widely disseminated 
fliers and in the film Testimony shown on scores of college campuses and other public venues in 
the late 1970s.
153
 Newsweek magazine reporter Mimi Conway later featured Taylor’s story 
alongside those of a dozen or so other textile workers in her 1979 book Rise Gonna Rise.
154
  
The progression of Taylor’s story from direct experience to dissemination in various 
media illustrates an important rhetorical distinction. Given that her story had been recounted in 
state courts and in Congressional hearings, management could hardly claim her story had been 
fabricated – at least not entirely. As a result, they were forced to settle on what de Certeau would 
recognize as a rhetorical strategy featuring asyndeton, or the elimination of “conjunctions” in a 
discursive economy.
155
 That is, if they were going to restore the integrity of their organizational 
narratives and halt the flow of disquieting questions from investors and the press, management 
had to find ways of suppressing the stories that had been percolating out of their Southern textile 
mills for several years.  
Put simply, the company had two options (three if one counts conceding to union 
demands). They could continue their attempts to silence workers on the local level by using 
coercive force (threats, firings, black listings, and the like), or they could frame the public 
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testimonies of people like Lucy Taylor and Crystal Lee Sutton as atypical experiences in what 
was, on balance, a professional and fair-handed workplace. As it turned out, through most of the 
campaign the company pursued both strategies simultaneously.
156
 That is, they persisted in 
snubbing NLRB regulations by firing and intimidating union activists and sympathizers. At the 
same time they developed a public relations strategy aimed at framing J. P. Stevens as a 
benevolent corporation that had been unfairly maligned. Both strategies depended on employee’s 
keeping their mouths shut about the persistence of egregious working conditions in textile mills. 
In the end, ACTWU was able to exploit this weakness by taking the mill workers’ stories onto 
the international stage where they were held out as representative of a systematic pattern of 
oppression and abuse in J. P. Stevens’ textile mills. 
By adopting a strategy of setting stories about life in the textile mills in public circulation, 
ACTWU leadership demonstrated an intuitive understanding of the kairotic opportunities 
attendant to an emerging global market. They sensed that many of the shibboleths and 
conventions of Southern textile communities would appear provincial, dated, or even cruel when 
viewed from the perspective of more tolerant terrains. They knew as well that by the late 1970s 
the world was becoming a decidedly more peripatetic and talkative place, and they set about 
developing strategies that would enable them to critique the political order of Southern textile 
mills while remaining beyond the reach of the company’s disciplinary practices.  
They accomplished this by staging protest actions in Los Angeles, New York, and other 
locations where they were more likely to attract the attention of global media. Only a few 
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decades earlier this strategic maneuver would have been difficult or impossible. When Robert T. 
Stevens began moving textile factories southward in the 1940s, he was not only escaping labor 
unions and securing profits, he was building mills in small towns where non-union shops were 
unlikely to draw the attention of muckraking journalists. The rural South was still a place where 
the white majority embraced segregation, sexism, and fundamentalist religion.
157
 Roanoke Falls, 
North Carolina was no exception. Whatever its endearing qualities, and no doubt they were 
many, the town provided a felicitous political environment for a CEO used to running his 
organization with military precision.
158
 This is not to suggest that J. P. Stevens’ management 
enjoyed the sort of all-encompassing political authority of earlier textile companies in the area, 
many of whom ruled factory towns as omnipotent tyrants.
159
 Nevertheless, the history of the 
Stevens campaign and of the Southern labor movement leave no doubt the company exerted 
considerable influence over the small towns where they set up mills. When Stevens’ 
management spoke to city councils, police departments, and state legislatures, they listened.
160
  
ACTWU campaign pamphlets are filled with stories that confirm J. P. Stevens’ political 
clout. These documents include harrowing descriptions of the daily deprivations and hardships 
many experienced in the “humorless terrain” of rural textile factories.161 One of the more 
compelling examples is that of Maurine Hedgpeth, a veteran employee who in the 1960s 
presented testimony to the NLRB about safety violations at the J. P. Stevens textile mill where 
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she worked as a weaver on the third shift.
162
 When local managers found out what she had done, 
they fired her as well as her husband, and the family stared down starvation for the better part of 
four years. As she later explained:  
They told us if any of us was goin’ to get any work we would have to leave town to do it, 
because nobody here would hire us. I told them we would starve before I left town… And 
we almost did… My children would say, ‘Mom, are you going to eat?’ and I’d say, ‘I ate 
while I was cooking.” You just don’t forget things like that. It took me 4 years and 21 
days to get my job back. I had to go all the way up through the courts. …But nothing 
made up for being out of work for 4 years and going without enough to eat.
163
  
 
Hedgpeth’s story and others like it provide powerful evidence that in textile towns in the 
American South at mid-century speaking out against management required unquestionable 
parrhesia, rhetorical bravery.
164
 Moreover, at the time of the Stevens campaign, the Uprising of 
‘34 was a not-so-distant memory for many people in the rural South.165 Only a few decades 
earlier those who had dared to go out on strike against textile companies “were beaten, shot, 
discredited, and evicted from their homes in company-owned towns.”166 By the second half of 
the century management could no longer get away with beating or shooting employees, but they 
often fired anyone who spoke out and blacklisted their families in the community.
167
 For people 
like the Hedgpeths it amounted to nearly the same thing. 
A fundamental weakness of J. P. Stevens’ corporate strategy was that it failed to 
anticipate how easily ACTWU could shift the terrain of the conflict in order to critique company 
practices from remote venues. So long as the conflict was restricted to factory floors and the 
localized public spheres of rural Appalachian towns, management could lean on local authorities 
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and repress union activity with relative impunity. In rural textile communities many had learned 
to accept unsafe working conditions and the denial of opportunities to minorities and women as 
part of the natural order of things.
168
  
During the 1970s ACTWU began to challenge these assumptions by disclosing gritty 
truths about daily work life in sleepy mill towns like Roanoke Rapids, Virginia or White Horse, 
South Carolina. Sometimes they did this by distributing crudely made pamphlets to mill workers 
they were hoping to recruit into the union.
169
 More often, they did this by staging protest events 
and distributing professionally formatted materials in the streets of major cities like Los Angeles 
and Indianapolis and on dozens of college campuses across the nation including Harvard, 
Princeton, and Stanford.
170
 In Southern textile communities J. P. Stevens could discipline union 
employees who dared to distribute graphic or carnivalesque accounts of daily work life. But in 
the streets of Manhattan unionists were free to play the pranksters and parody their employer as a 
spurned, syphilitic lover. In Roanoke Rapids and other mill towns in the American South the 
staging of these sorts of carnivalesque protest events would likely have resulted in people being 
fired, black listed, or worse. By shifting the terrain of the conflict, the union expanded their 
rhetorical options and enabled them to engage in humorous dissent while enjoying a diminished 
threat of direct reprisal. What happened in places like Roanoke Rapids could not always be 
contained there. The twentieth century simply provided too many channels for the global 
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distribution and circulation of carnivalesque and grotesque stories that could be repeated in 
remote locations by people who were not subject to organizational discipline.
171
  
J. P. Stevens responded to the union’s plurivocal storytelling strategies by pursuing an 
unapologetically monovocal strategy of embracing “traditional American values” and framing 
union activists as self-serving criminals. Both of these tactics are on clear display in a pamphlet 
published by J. P. Stevens in 1977 entitled “Straightening Things Out” and in several other texts 
from the same time period, including a series of “captive audience” speeches delivered by local 
factory managers and the script of a remarkable anti-union film featuring interviews with 
Stevens’ employees.172 In each instance, the company and its anti-labor apologists demonstrated 
a keen interest in controlling how people spoke about labor relations and the daily work 
environment in their textile mills. When read alongside one another, the texts display a 
remarkable narrative unity that signals a conscious attempt at exerting centripetal control over 
the centrifugal force of ACTWU’s storytelling practices.173 In that regard, the texts anticipate a 
deeply conservative audience that resonates to the “company line” about the benevolence of 
management and the predatory nature of union activists. In developing these claims I work from 
the center to the periphery, beginning with the company pamphlet, then moving on to the captive 
audience speeches and the film in order to demonstrate how specific themes persisted across a 
series of organizational texts in monovocal fashion.  
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James D. Finley, CEO of J. P. Stevens, set the tone for his company’s response to the 
union campaign in the introduction to the “Straightening Things Out” pamphlet by writing: “This 
booklet is written for the friends of J. P. Stevens. And for those who don’t particularly know the 
Company but are curious – and care – about the truth.”174 When this statement is read in context 
it becomes clear that Finley is drawing a clear distinction between friends and enemies (with the 
union and its allies falling into the latter category) and that when he writes of “truth” he assumes 
his audience will accept the word of a prominent CEO as authoritative – even when he provides 
no discernible warrant for his claims. The document is subdivided into twelve topics 
corresponding to salient themes in ACTWU’s campaign literature including “Labor Law,” 
“Employee Relations,” and “Occupational Safety.”175  
Throughout the text the anonymous management author frames labor interests as 
conspiratorial, violent, and deceptive. ACTWU may have been presenting itself as an 
organization looking out for the best interests of workers, but they were actually interlopers who 
would “readily sacrifice the interest of the employee... in order to increase their own power.”176 
Worse, union activists were responsible for “Cars and trucks … damaged by repeated barrages of 
rocks and stones. Acid poured on machinery. Shots… fired into the cars and homes of employees 
working during the strike.”177 That such behaviors are typical of labor unions is simply assumed. 
The author assumes as well that ACTWU could not be trusted to speak the truth about J. P. 
Stevens’ record before the NLRB. Never mind the 125 times federal courts ruled against the 
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company’s labor practices. This record is held out as de rigueur for a major textile company with 
“a total workforce of more than 45,000 people.”178  
These passages are all the more remarkable since the pamphlet lacks two things one finds 
in abundance in much of the union literature I reviewed: footnotes and first person accounts. 
Whatever else one might say about management’s arguments in the “Straightening Things Out” 
pamphlet – nearly all of their claims about union criminality and deception were difficult if not 
impossible to verify. None of this prevented anti-union activists in Southern textile towns from 
embracing management arguments as their own. In fact, as I will explain in more detail shortly, 
assumptions about the malevolence of labor unions and labor activism became the single most 
distinguishing trait of anti-union discourse in the 1980s and 90s. These developments aside, in 
the more immediate context of the “Straightening Things Out” pamphlet and the closely related 
texts I will consider next, the tactic appears to have back-fired on management. For many public 
audiences in the late 1970s, management’s counter-suspicion tactics simply did not ring true.  
The texts of anti-union speeches delivered by local managers and of a management film 
shown at several employee meetings echo salient themes in the “Straightening Things Out” 
pamphlet. Bakhtin has described this sort of pattern as double-voicing, the articulation of the 
words of one speaker in the mouth of another, in other words, rhetorical ventriloquism.
179
 In the 
“Straightening Things Out” pamphlet, for instance, the author claims, “Stevens has found that a 
direct relationship with its employees works not only to the best interests of the Company, but to 
the benefit and best interests of the employees themselves [emphasis added].”180 Managers at 
local J. P. Stevens’ textile mills repeated this claim in a series of captive audience speeches 
where employees were required to sit through anti-union presentations. At one such event, in 
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Milledgeville, Georgia, a supervisor claimed, “We are deeply convinced that a direct working 
relationship between a company and its employees serves the best interests of both [emphasis 
added].”181 Management speakers used the same argument in similar speeches delivered at mills 
in Wallace and Aberdeen, North Carolina.
182
 The argument is echoed as well in the words of a J. 
P. Stevens mill worker who speaks in a company film shown to workers in a factory in White 
Horse, South Carolina: “If I talk I know what I’m talking about, and I’d rather do my talking... 
Somebody in between I don’t know whether he’s talking about me or somebody else [sic].”183 
The speaker gives no indication he is aware of the irony of his own words – that in demanding 
his own voice he was sticking to the company line.  
Nor are these isolated examples. At points these texts echo one another in detail when 
local supervisors and mill workers repeat specific statistics and phrases from management 
literature. In its “Straightening Things Out” pamphlet, for instance, the company claims 
“Minorities make up 23 percent of J. P. Stevens’ workforce, an increase of over 200% during the 
last ten years [emphasis added]” and goes on to argue that in the previous twelve years it had 
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“spent more than $20,000,000 for environmental controls [emphasis added].”184 Workers in the 
film shown at the White Horse factory repeat these exact arguments with one man claiming that 
since “23% of the employees of J. P. Stevens are black [emphasis added],” which he viewed as a 
considerable improvement, unionization could hurt minorities by limiting job opportunities.
185
 
Another added, “[I]n the last 10 years we have spent more than $20 million regarding the 
abatement of pollution [emphasis added].”186  
At other times the secondary texts amplify themes that remain muted in management 
literature. I am thinking, for example, of the closing words of the company pamphlet: “J.P. 
Stevens has been creating jobs since 1813.”187 This statement marks the end of a document in 
which labor activists are portrayed as a dangerous other willing to use “beatings, stonings, 
shootings, and bombings” to get their way.188 By contrast, the reference to the year 1813 invoked 
a corporate history extending back to the early years of the American republic and including a 
prominent Secretary of the U. S. Army.
189
  
The metonymic linking of J. P. Stevens’ corporate history to national narratives and 
ideology was not lost on those employees who adamantly opposed unionization. The rhetoric of 
participants in employee education committees was salted with talk about God-given “freedom 
of choice,” and caricatures of unions and union organizers as subversives who were opposed to 
“the Bible and what it says,” and “the American Way.”190 These sentiments are echoed as well in 
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a captive audience speech delivered at a plant in Aberdeen, North Carolina where a local 
manager delivered a caustic critique of an ACTWU campaign pamphlet: “I guess the most 
(dishonest) thing about the whole thing is here in the liberty bell that we sort of associate with 
the flag and patriotism and so forth they say ‘freedom and Justice for J. P. Stevens Workers 
[sic]’”191 This sort of conflation of narrative themes from national history and fundamentalist 
religion with anti-union arguments was a consistent theme in the discourse of ACTWU’s 
opponents in Southern textile communities. The practice fostered a “them versus us” atmosphere 
in which the labor movement was objectified as a malignant and eminently unreasonable force 
determined to subvert, not only company policies, but the cultural foundations of Southern and 
American life.   
Read in context, then, one can identify numerous examples of Bakhtinian double-voicing 
in the management pamphlet, the captive audience speeches, and the company film. In these 
texts the words of local managers and anti-union activists mirror specific themes and phrases in 
the written discourse of corporate management. What are missing from these documents are any 
sustained, detailed accounts of first hand experiences in the workplace. Instead, one encounters a 
highly disciplined, two dimensional discourse featuring, on the one hand, pragmatic issues of 
management (e.g., cost containments and threats of plant closures) and, on the other, abstract, 
disembodied accounts of working conditions in which a vote for unionization is tantamount to 
voting against God and liberty. This is true, even in regard to the one text where management 
appears to make a concerted effort to demonstrate they are attending to the concerns of their 
                                                 
191 The speaker was referring to an image of the Liberty Bell that appeared on a series of ACTWU “Fact 
Sheets” purporting to disclose the truth about working conditions at J. P. Stevens’ textile mills and about the 
company’s record before the NLRB. The union distributed at least seven such pamphlets during the Stevens 
campaign including one entitled: “Fact Sheet: J. P. Stevens and its Record of Discrimination and Employment 
Practices.” Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Fact Sheet: J. P. Stevens and its Record of 
Discrimination and Employment Practices;” Greene and Burnett, “Speech by Vivian Greene and Kenneth Burnett,” 
19. 
171 
employees: the film shown in White Horse, South Carolina in which individual mill hands talk 
about work-life at J. P. Stevens. Remarkably, the people featured in the film provide almost no 
first person details about their experiences, preferring instead to channel organizational and 
cultural narratives.  
The monovocal tone of the film is even more striking when compared with ACTWU’s 
campaign discourse, and especially their film Testimony and its accompanying pamphlet by the 
same name.
192
 As I explained earlier, the film and booklet included compelling, detailed first 
person accounts by people like Lucy Taylor of their idiosyncratic experiences of life in the 
textile mills. The stories are remarkable examples of atechnical rhetoric, personal testimonies set 
in a richly documented textual context. By contrast, the textile workers in the management film 
speak in decidedly abstract terms and operate as virtually interchangeable narrators for a set of 
predictable narratives. 
This is not to say the company film was ineffective. While the accounts of work life 
found in the company film and in other anti-union literature from the time period often failed to 
square with material conditions (e.g., by overlooking or minimizing J. P. Stevens’ history before 
the NLRB), they did serve to galvanize many conservative audiences in opposition to the 
ACTWU campaign. More to the point, by resisting the union at every juncture, especially at the 
local level where they could require employees to listen to their arguments, J. P. Stevens 
provided a persuasive lesson for other employers about how to stand up to unions while 
preserving profits.
193
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Furthermore, despite their emphasis on plurivocal storytelling circulation, some aspects 
of ACTWU’s own organizational discourse were distinctly centripetal, that is to say, distinctly 
centralizing and controlling in nature. This tendency toward monovocal control of organizational 
discourse, in fact, is one of the distinctive markers of the martial typology in prospective 
narrative disclosure. One finds evidence of this pattern in the top-down decision-making 
structure of the union, the limited involvement of rank and file workers in day-to-day decision-
making, and in union materials detailing strict procedures for dealing with the press and for 
giving prescribed answers to anti-union arguments during organizing campaigns.
194
 These 
elements within ACTWU’s organizational discourse are clearly problematic in that they 
provided fodder for the worst caricatures of unions as tyrannical organizations. They are 
problematic as well because they reproduced authoritarian order and failed to take advantage of 
the talents and creativity of the entire membership. As I explain next, despite these limitations, 
the union’s strategy of circulating credible, firsthand stories about safety and human rights issues 
in local, regional, and national venues made it more difficult for J. P. Stevens’ management to 
control how it was being perceived in the market place and the public sphere.  
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ACTWU’s organizational discourse in the Stevens campaign was, in a sense, divided 
against itself. On the one hand, by disseminating worker’s plurivocal stories in the public sphere 
they galvanized a large and diverse set of audiences to support their cause. On the other hand, by 
managing their campaign in a top-down manner and using confrontational strategies, they risked 
alienating management and animating conservative opposition. Any reasonable assessment of 
the long-term impact of the Stevens campaign on the market practices of corporations and 
activists must account for both developments: public enthusiasm and public alienation. Laclau 
provides a useful set of tools for analyzing both themes in his description of the formation of 
popular demands.  
In the first instance, one can get a sense of the natural strengths of the Stevens campaign 
as a popular movement by thinking more carefully about some of the real life experiences of 
Crystal Lee Sutton, the woman who inspired the film Norma Rae. The most famous scene in the 
film hews closely to an incident Sutton described in testimony to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1974.
195
 Frustrated and upset after being fired for attempting to 
copy down the words of an anti-union notice on a company bulletin board, Norma Rae walks 
onto the factory floor to gather her belongings. Instead of leaving peacefully, she decides on a 
whim to write the word “UNION” on a large piece of paper and jumps onto a table in the center 
of the shop holding the sign above her head. Inspired by her action, the other workers begin to 
shut off their noisy machines in support of her action.
196
 
In her court testimony Sutton does not mention other workers shutting down their 
machines. Otherwise the film scene aligns, point-by-point with the story she recounted in court 
testimony. Minor differences between the two versions aside, Sutton’s elevation of the signifier 
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“UNION” and the subsequent public circulation of her story along with those of other workers 
comports well with Laclau’s description of the formation of popular demands. He describes this 
process in reference to situations where a discursive system “fails to constitute itself as a closed 
order,” thereby opening a space for the articulation of popular demands197 In the Stevens 
campaign union protesters revealed this lack of closure by disseminating compelling stories that 
problematized the company’s advertising and public relations narratives. The public circulation 
of those stories, in other words, created a whole series of localized scandals as people 
representing a broad spectrum of J. P. Stevens’ consumer and investor base began to express 
concerns about how the company was treating its employees.  
The sorts of widely dispersed, low-level turbulence this engendered is consistent with 
Laclau’s description of the proliferation of “equivalential chains” in popular movements.198 As I 
explained earlier, in this process one stentorian demand can come to stand in for several others 
that become linked together via a metaphorical, equivalential process. Thus, in the Stevens 
campaign, the signifier “UNION” became the organizing term for a whole set of demands related 
to racism, sexism, workplace safety, and wage scales. As stories related to these demands 
circulated in centrifugal fashion on college campuses and other venues far removed from rural 
textile towns, they became metonymically linked with extant demands regarding matters such as 
race, gender, health and union solidarity. These developments, in turn, contributed to the further 
destabilization of the more abstract, transcendental components of J. P. Stevens’ discourse, 
including their relationship to national narratives about things like justice, liberty, and free 
enterprise. 
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In this way the elevation of the signifier “UNION” during the Stevens campaign 
eventually produced what Laclau calls “an antagonistic frontier” – the result of people who have 
been drawn together by an antagonistic difference in order to articulate a demand for substantive 
change in a discursive order. One can catch a glimpse of the boundary of this frontier in Crystal 
Lee Sutton’s observation that, “It makes me feel good to know the Union [sic] is interested in 
seeing that justice be done to the workers that JP continues to harass, even after the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America has said this will not be tolerated. Shit, if this happens 
again, someone will go to jail.”199 With these words, one gets the sense Sutton is articulating the 
sensibilities of a group of people (women, African-Americans, college students, and the poor) 
who had been drawn together by a demand, reached critical mass, and could now speak with 
considerable authority to the old guard of society. 
That the Stevens campaign helped to unite a diverse collection of people and interest 
groups suggests the campaign could have influenced the trajectory of a range of human rights 
interests. Indeed this was likely the case with the United Farm Workers, the African American 
Civil Rights Movement, and even the South African anti-Apartheid movement. In the first 
instance, this is because Rogers and Cesar Chavez discussed campaign strategies in the early 
1980s, and also because some members of the large J. P. Stevens boycott committee in 
California later worked in leadership positions in the UFW.
200
 Second, there can be no doubt the 
victory at J. P. Stevens was a watershed moment in the history of race relations in the U.S. South 
in that a labor union (the majority of whom were African American and/or female) won a 
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contract in communities where the schools and cafes had been segregated only a generation 
earlier.
201
 Finally, the South African ambassador to the United Nations, Dumisani S. Kumalo, 
claims that in the 1980s he and other anti-apartheid activists appropriated strategies developed by 
Ray Rogers and ACTWU against banking interests.
202
 Beyond that, as I explained earlier, the 
strategies ACTWU developed for the Stevens campaign were widely emulated by labor unions 
and groups representing other activist interests in the 1980s and 90s.
203
  
To be sure, this was not the entire story. ACTWU’s power on power strategies proved 
counterproductive in at least two ways. First, to the degree that they replicated the top-down 
decision-making practices of J. P. Stevens, the union undermined its own credibility as advocates 
for a humanitarian cause. Second, their use of martial style campaign strategies helped to 
animate a “rival hegemonic project” in the public sphere.204 In the first case, the distinctly 
instrumental orientation of the campaign – by which I mean their singular focus on signing a 
labor contract in Roanoke Rapids and the handful of other locales where ACTWU had won 
collective bargaining rights – lead the union to adopt a power on power model that mirrored and, 
to a degree, legitimized the authoritarian power structure of their corporate opponent. 
To cite the most obvious example, even while union organizers produced pamphlets 
featuring the stories of individual workers, they employed top-down decision-making practices 
in many ways resembling those of their corporate opponents. In 1976, for example, ACTWU put 
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in place a “Committee Educational Program” with detailed, standardized lesson plans.205 As part 
of these lessons, union members were expected to practice responding to anti-union objections 
with prescribed answers. Even more striking, union organizers developed a “Suggested Five 
Minute Speech to ACTWU Members” that could be read word for word at local meetings.206 
Whatever the intent of such lessons, they left the union more vulnerable to criticisms from 
opponents who claimed they used strong-armed tactics to manipulate workers.  
Moreover, ACTWU’s strategies in the Stevens campaign sometimes bore an uncanny 
resemblance to the investment strategies of their corporate target. J. P. Stevens made strategic 
investments in New York banks in order to secure profits and capitalize on future opportunities, 
and ACTWU mirrored those actions by shifting union funds in order to threaten corporate profits 
and limit the company’s economic options. Similarly, ACTWU mirrored J. P. Stevens’ public 
relations and advertising schemes by issuing press releases, publishing promotional pamphlets, 
and staging high profile public events to coincide with company meetings. The goal in each 
instance, of course, was to disclose corporate behaviors and relationships left out of J. P. 
Stevens’ official narratives. Or (to frame the situation in Nietzschean terms), one could say the 
union aimed to disclose the self-serving “monumental” dimensions of the organizational 
narratives by placing them in conversation with contradictory events in the “antiquarian” 
historical record.
207
  
Some level of discursive appropriation, of course, may be inevitable in anti-corporate 
activism. Still, there may be a point at which appropriation serves to reify status quo procedures. 
ACTWU may have tested that limit by deciding to match many of J. P. Stevens’ organizational 
                                                 
205 McIver, untitled memorandum and attached rough draft of a proposal for a “Committee Educational 
Program.” 
206 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Suggested Five-Minute Speech to ACTWU 
Members.” 
207 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 22. 
178 
gestures. In so doing, they also risked damaging their own credibility as an organization 
interested in advancing democratic initiatives. Top-down decision-making undercut the 
credibility of their egalitarian rhetoric, and, fair or not, in years to come, critics of the labor 
movement would point to the Stevens campaign as providing tacit confirmation of their claims 
regarding the authoritarian, self-serving nature of labor unions.
208
  
To be clear, union documents leave little doubt ACTWU’s leadership understood their 
strategies were controversial and ran a considerable risk of sparking a conservative backlash.
209
 
In the end they simply concluded that if they were to achieve their goal of winning labor 
contracts in the South, then they would need to run the risk. It was a kairotic, rhetorical wager 
that produced mixed results. ACTWU won labor contracts at ten Southern textile mills and, in so 
doing, inspired many emulators. Their actions also sparked an angry backlash against ACTWU 
in many communities in the South and contributed to a national backlash against labor unions in 
the U. S. in the 1980s and 90s. 
What can be said, then, is that the same strategies that enabled ACTWU to galvanize a 
range of disparate interests served to alienate other audiences and to animate competing projects 
in the public sphere. The crucial point at this juncture is that these interest groups competed, not 
only for the allegiances of people, but for the ownership of ideas. As Laclau explains, in the 
agonistic contest between hegemonic interests, some signifiers become “indeterminate between 
alternative equivalential frontiers.”210 Put another way, they have become “floating signifiers” 
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that can be claimed, at the same moment, by competing discursive alliances.
211
 Something like 
this happened in the Stevens campaign where both parties to the conflict appealed to similar 
abstract concepts in order to advance their arguments. In ACTWU’s campaign discourse, for 
example, “freedom” is related to freedom from coercion and to demands for safe working 
conditions and equal opportunity in the workplace. Moreover, union texts from the campaign are 
filled with scathing caricatures of management and reveal a fundamental distrust of elite 
corporate decision makers in faraway places. And, as I argued earlier, the word “union” is held 
out as a demand that captures both sentiments. That is, the right to be represented by a union is 
framed as a demand which, if accommodated, would serve the interests of freedom and curb the 
worst excesses of corporate power.  
Anti-union activists and their allies in management proffered competing understandings 
of these same concepts. In the campaign related texts of J. P. Stevens and the employee 
education committees, “freedom” was framed as the “right to work,” and labor activists (rather 
than management) were framed as authoritarian elitists. Finally, the word “union” was subverted 
and became a watchword for violence, thuggery, and interference in local affairs.  
An Ambivalent Legacy 
ACTWU’s campaign to unionize J. P. Stevens has left a decidedly ambivalent legacy. By 
employing a novel combination of instrumental and narrative direct action strategies, they were 
able to force a conclusion to what had become an intractable labor conflict. The Stevens 
campaign was one of the founding events in the contemporary anti-globalization movement and 
the strategies and tactics they used to bring reluctant executives to the bargaining table have been 
emulated by scores of other activist organizations. And yet, some of those strategies prompted an 
immediate, defiant backlash among opponents of labor and were at least partially responsible for 
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alienating management teams at other corporations as well as large sectors of the general public. 
In reviewing these two vectors of the Stevens campaign I have focused on narrative rhetoric – in 
particular on a pattern of prospective narrative disclosure featuring kairotic rhetorical disclosures 
and storytelling circulation. This process of prospective narrative disclosure served to leverage 
and amplify ACTWU’s better-known “corporate campaign” tactics. More to the point, my 
research suggests that had the union not disseminated credible first person accounts of harsh 
working conditions and discriminatory employment policies, their signature power on power 
campaign strategies in all likelihood would have failed. Storytelling worked where arm twisting 
could not.  
In practice this meant that through the centrifugal circulation of individual accounts of 
appalling workplace experiences, ACTWU was able to throw J. P. Stevens’ management off 
balance and prevent them from mounting a credible, consistent public defense. And because the 
stories the union was disseminating about daily work-life in Southern textile mills were 
consistently graphic and compelling, they became a constant source of embarrassment for the 
Stevens’ management team and even for executives in other corporations who had a stake in the 
company’s success. Moreover, advancements in global communication enabled the union to 
keep the campaign in public view, thus preventing management from defaulting to old practices 
and simply silencing dissenting voices. It was one thing to intimidate or fire dissenting mill-
worker in Roanoke Rapids. It proved considerably more difficult to defend such practices on 
remote college campuses and in the company’s annual meetings. The practical result of all this 
was that by 1980 the union’s accusations regarding J. P. Stevens being “the nation’s No. 1 labor 
law violator “had proven impossible to shake off.212 
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In that regard, the following passage from a story that appeared in The Economist shortly 
after J. P. Stevens announced it had agreed to terms with the union is telling: “The company has 
made these concessions after 17 years of intransigence partly because it would have had to flout 
the law openly to continue its resistance in those plants where the workers had freely voted for 
the union; and partly because the campaign by the union to turn Stevens into a corporate pariah 
was taking its toll. The company was becoming something of an embarrassment for the rest of 
big business.”213 Three years earlier, Representative Frank Thompson of New Jersey reached a 
similar conclusion, observing that “It might well be that the time is coming when the J.P. 
Stevenses in this town will have to bear the burden or the pressures of more enlightened 
examples in the South and become more enlightened or more reasonable or risk the disdain of 
the great number of lawful employers who do not use such tactics.”214 To put this all another 
way, consistent with Paul Turpin’s analysis of the importance of public decorum in market 
economies, at some point in the late stages of the Stevens campaign, management appears to 
have reached a tipping point when they realized public sentiment had turned against them and, 
profits aside, if they were going to be able to hold their heads up when facing their peers and 
investors they would need to find a way to end the campaign in the quietest and most dignified 
manner possible.
215
  
This should not be taken to mean that management had been convinced by ACTWU’s 
arguments. Given the very limited information we have regarding the thinking of the J. P. 
Stevens management team in relation to the ACTWU campaign, it is impossible to know 
whether they experienced a genuine change of heart regarding their labor practices or made a 
pragmatic decision based on how evolving attitudes toward CSR practices were likely to impact 
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things like their share price or future profitability. What we can say is that in the years following 
the Stevens campaign corporations developed sophisticated strategies of their own – some of 
them unsavory, others more overtly bureaucratic and professional – in order to manage “human 
resources,” respond to anti-corporate campaigns, and insure long-term profitability. In the three 
decades since the end of the Stevens campaign labor union membership has declined 
significantly and many corporations have either tested the limits of NLRB regulations by 
actively resisting union organizing efforts, or they have moved manufacturing operations 
overseas where they can hire workers for a fraction of what it costs in the U. S.  
The situation was not entirely bleak. This same era saw the emergence of CSR policies as 
a common-place feature of corporate discourse and a vibrant anti-globalization movement 
featuring more rhetorically sophisticated and democratically managed anti-corporate campaigns.  
As one international business scholar argued recently, that the anti-corporate globalization 
movement and the CSR movement would arise during the same period of history is hardly 
accidental.
216
 One of the primary reasons most multinational corporations developed 
sophisticated CSR policies in the closing decades of the twentieth century is that they served as a 
bulwark against the critiques of anti-corporate activists. The best defense proved to be a good 
offense. Whether most of these policies represent sincere attempts at addressing pressing social 
problems is yet to be determined. What is important in this context is that if we are to blame the 
architects of the Stevens campaign for being short-sighted regarding the risks of counter-
mobilization, so too must we give them credit for providing a powerful, heuristic example of 
anti-corporate activism. In that regard, their most enduring legacy may have more to do with 
                                                 
216 J. J. Asongu, Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in Practice (Lawrenceville, GA: Greenview 
Publishing Company, 2007), 37. 
183 
storytelling circulation and disclosure than with “power on power” strategies – unless of course 
we are speaking of the inherent limitation of the latter. 
I turn next to a case study of the CIW’s Taco Bell campaign. This more recent campaign 
exemplifies an alternative confrontation/alliance pattern that featured a more egalitarian 
decision-making structure that was less likely to prompt conservative blowback in the public 
sphere. These differences aside, the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns are identical in at least one 
respect. Activists in both campaigns assumed that, if they were to stand a chance of influencing 
the trajectory of corporate behavior in the global marketplace, then they had to speak the truth 
about the material constraints of daily work life.  
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Chapter 5: A Community of Witnesses: The CIW vs. Taco Bell 
When you look at the difference between us as farm workers and Taco Bell as a 
billion-dollar corporation, you may think we are crazy for taking them on. They 
have all the wealth and political power, and we have only one weapon. But that 
weapon – the truth – is the most powerful thing on earth, so we are certain that we 
will prevail. 
Romeo Ramirez, Coalition of Immokalee Workers
1
 
 
In the passage printed above, CIW member Romeo Ramirez provides a concise answer to 
a pair of questions of central concern to this chapter. How did a couple thousand agricultural day 
laborers convince a multinational corporation to accede to their demands? Beyond that, how did 
they convince management at that company and several others to endorse their campaign to 
improve wages and working conditions in commercial agriculture in Florida? Romero provides a 
forthright answer to both questions. The coalition believed they could challenge multinational 
corporations and win because they were armed with the truth. Some might view his argument as 
cliché or even naïve. Nevertheless, after an extensive review of documents related to the history 
of the Taco Bell campaign, I am convinced he was correct. The CIW persuaded management at 
the world’s largest fast food company (YUM! Brands, Taco Bell’s parent corporation) to comply 
with their demand to pay one-penny more per pound for tomatoes – in effect doubling the wages 
for workers who had not had a raise in pay since the 1970s. The company even went a step 
further by encouraging other fast food companies to adopt the penny per pound standard. The 
CIW succeeded, I contend, because they told true stories about the material conditions of daily 
labor in the farm fields of South Florida – deep within the Taco Bell/YUM! Brands corporate 
supply chain. 
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Just as ACTWU had done two and one-half decades earlier in its campaign against J. P. 
Stevens, the CIW made a rhetorical wager. They gambled that by providing compelling evidence 
of modern day slavery and carefully disseminating first person accounts of horrific working 
conditions they could wring important concessions from a more powerful foe. However, unlike 
their predecessors in ACTWU, the CIW employed distinctly egalitarian decision-making 
practices and made no claims regarding power on power campaigning. If Taco Bell and its parent 
company, YUM! Brands, were to cooperate with the CIW, then it would be because public 
audiences, and even management, came to accept what the farmworkers and their allies were 
saying about the need to eradicate human trafficking and improve working conditions in 
corporate agriculture.  
In this chapter I develop these claims regarding the CIW’s strategies in considerable 
detail in order to defend the Taco Bell campaign as a paradigm example of the 
confrontation/alliance pattern in prospective narrative disclosure. Toward that end I begin by 
locating the CIW in its historical context as a group of marginalized farmworkers who 
determined to challenge an intransigent status quo in Florida’s commercial farming industry. I 
open this section of the chapter by reviewing a harrowing incident that helped to convince 
farmworkers to take a stand against abusive working conditions. I then consider how they used 
cooperative decision-making practices to plan several early actions against local growers and, 
eventually, used these same methods at all stages of their ground-breaking Taco Bell campaign. I 
conclude this first half of the chapter by reviewing events from several subsequent campaigns 
sponsored by the CIW.  
In the second half of the chapter I conduct critical analyses of several pivotal moments in 
the Taco Bell campaign. This section begins with a brief consideration of how advancements in 
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global communication and commerce in the closing decades of the twentieth century worked to 
the advantage of the CIW. I then take up the three strands of prospective narrative disclosure. 
This section begins with a discussion of rhetorical disclosure focusing on the CIW’s 
groundbreaking investigations into human trafficking in commercial agriculture. An important 
lesson of these investigations, I will argue, is that disclosure of harsh working conditions is 
insufficient, in and of itself, to account for the CIW’s ability to convince management to endorse 
its cause. A thoroughgoing explanation of the coalition’s victory, I argue, must account for the 
roles of their theatrical protest performances, their egalitarian decision-making practices, and 
their kairotic strategies (especially in the last year of the campaign). I conclude by discussing 
YUM! executive Jonathan Blum’s remarkable visit to the CIW’s office in Immokalee, Florida 
and by considering how CIW-style storytelling practices could influence the trajectory of 
international CSR practices. 
The Taco Bell Campaign: A Brief History 
“The story of the Taco Bell boycott makes a case study that shows how a tiny group of 
seemingly powerless people can force a multinational corporation to take them seriously.” 
Danielle Zwerdling
2
   
 
The CIW was formed in the early 1990s, four decades after Edward R. Murrow’s 
documentary Harvest of Shame first drew national attention to oppressive working conditions 
and low wages in commercial agriculture.
3
 In the intervening years living conditions and wage 
scales in some regions had not substantially improved. In Florida’s tomato industry, in fact, 
wages had actually declined by about 20% from what they had been in the 1970s.
4
 When the 
                                                 
2 “Analysis: Strategy Used by Coalition of Immokalee Workers to Get the Attention of Yum! Brands,” 
National Public Radio: All Things Considered, June 16, 2005. 
3 Edward R. Murrow, Fred W. Friendly, and David Lowe, Harvest of Shame, DVD, CBS Broadcasting 
Company (New York: New Video Group, 2005). 
4 Donald P. Baker, “Florida Farm Workers Fast for Better Wages; Five Enter Day 24 of Hunger Strike to 
Fight Pay They Say Is Lower Than It Was 20 Years Ago,” Washington Post, January 13, 1998.  
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fledgling CIW (originally the “Southwest Florida Farmworkers Project”) began meeting in a 
borrowed room at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church in Immokalee, most growers were 
paying only forty cents per thirty-two pound bucket, ten cents less than they had been paying two 
decades earlier.
5
 Growers attributed the decline to improved staking practices that made it easier 
for pickers to reach tomatoes and to increased competition from Mexico and Central America.
6
 
Whatever the reasons, virtually all tomato pickers worked long hours doing back-breaking labor 
in the Florida sun for poverty level wages with no benefits.
7
 Every year during the fall and winter 
harvest seasons, migrant farmworkers would flood into Immokalee where many of them lived 
crowded into dilapidated, roach-infested mobile homes. Workers often complained of exorbitant 
rent payments, sporadic work, and truculent field supervisors.
8
 None of this did much to change 
the attitudes of most of the area’s commercial tomato farmers. When asked why he would not 
negotiate with the farmworkers of the CIW, one grower is said to have responded, “Because a 
tractor doesn’t tell the farmer how to run the farm.”9 
The CIW began as a group of a dozen or so migrant laborers working in collaboration 
with the Florida Rural Legal Services, a foundation that provides pro bono legal assistance to the 
needy.
10
 The group quickly gained credibility in the community and momentum for its cause as a 
                                                 
5 Baker, “Florida Farm Workers Fast for Better Wages;” Lucas Benitez, “Conversation, Bio: Lucas 
Benitez,” interview with American Bar Association in relation to Law Day, May 1, 2000, 
http://abapubliceducation.org/publiced/lawday/convo/00/benitezbio.html (accessed August 1, 2011). 
6 Baker, “Florida Farm Workers Fast for Better Wages.” 
7 For a compelling description of living conditions for farmworkers in Southwest Florida during this time, 
see the first chapter of John Bowe’s Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor.  
8 In an interview on National Public Radio Benitez explained how field supervisors verbally abused 
workers on a daily basis: “The verbal abuse was, like–well, you might have to put a beep on this on the radio—’You 
sons of bitches, you assholes, move it! You came here to work. Move it!’” “Analysis,” National Public Radio; Lucas 
Benitez, “Because a Tractor Doesn’t Tell the Farmer How to Run the Farm: Testimony by Lucas Benitez, Coalition 
of Immokalee Workers to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions: Hearing on Ending 
Abuses and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers,” Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions: United States Senate, S. Hrg. 110-889, 110
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., April 15 2008. 
9 Benitez, “Because a Tractor.” 
10 John Bowe, “Nobodies: Does Slavery Exist in America?” The New Yorker, April 21, 2003, 106; Florida 
Rural Legal Services, “Florida Rural Legal Services,” December 10, 2006, www.frls.org/ (accessed June 1, 2011). 
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result of two incidents. The first involved a young farmworker who was beaten nearly to death 
after asking his field boss if he could leave a hot farm field to get a drink of water.
11
 The CIW 
responded by rallying hundreds of people to protest at the perpetrator’s home. The coalition 
saved the young man’s blood-soaked shirt as a tangible reminder of the sort of violence many 
field workers faced on a daily basis.
12
  
The second incident involved a chance meeting with a young migrant worker named Julia 
Gabriel when several members of the CIW traveled north to harvest crops in South Carolina.
13
 
Gabriel confided that her bosses (who operated out of a small town near Immokalee) paid her 
and the other workers on her picking crew little or nothing and threatened to kill anyone who 
complained or tried to leave. The coalition decided to investigate Gabriel’s claims, and, as a 
result of their efforts, the two owners of the operation were each eventually sentenced to fifteen 
years in federal prison on human trafficking charges.
14
  
These events helped to establish the CIW’s reputation as a human rights organization 
dedicated to eradicating violence and human trafficking in commercial agriculture. They also 
helped to establish an important rhetorical pattern that has persisted across their national boycott 
of Taco Bell and several subsequent anti-corporate campaigns. They used negative demands 
(e.g., ending violence and slavery in agriculture) to obtain positive concessions from their 
corporate opponents (e.g., raising wages or paying a surcharge on tomatoes). From the very 
beginning the coalition has also demonstrated a sincere commitment to community decision-
making practices. This commitment is reflected in their early choice of an organizational motto: 
                                                 
11 Evelyn Nieves, “Fla. Tomato Pickers Still Reap ‘Harvest of Shame’: Boycott Helps Raise Awareness of 
Plight,” Washington Post, February 28, 2005.  
12 See Appendix E for a photograph of the shirt. Ibid.  
13 Benitez, “Because a Tractor;” “Migrant Workers’ Exploitation Still Exists,” Naples Daily News, May 
12, 1997. 
14 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 44; “Migrant Workers Exploitation Still Exists,” 
Naples Daily News, May 12, 1997. 
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“We are all leaders.” 15 The phrase reflected the influence of several early members in the CIW 
who had been exposed to the writings of the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire while working as 
community organizers in their native countries of Mexico, Haiti, and Guatemala.
16
 It also 
reflected the cultural sensibilities of the many indigenous people in the coalition, and it marked a 
conscious rejection of the “top-down” decision-making practices of most labor unions.17 Early 
on, they fended off overtures from both the United Farm Workers (UFW) and the Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee (FLOC), opting instead to become an independent farmworkers 
cooperative.
18
 As things turned out, the decisions to foreground negative demands and operate as 
a cooperative helped to insure the success of the Taco Bell campaign and the coalition’s larger 
campaign to improve working conditions in commercial farming. Companies could not very well 
dismiss them as a shill for labor unions (though some tried), and not even their most ardent 
opponents wanted to be seen as defending slavery.
19
  
In their early years the coalition also tested several rhetorical strategies on the local level 
that they would eventually use on the national-stage in the Taco Bell campaign. Understandably 
enough, the targets of their first actions were large commercial tomato growers based in 
Southwest Florida including 6L’s, Gargiulo, and the Pacific Land Company.20 The CIW’s first 
major protest action was a 1995 general strike involving 3,000 workers.
21
 They followed this in 
                                                 
15 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 33. 
16 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 25; Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco 
Bell.” 
17 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 11; Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco 
Bell.” 
18 Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell.” 
19 According to newspaper columnist Bill Maxwell, Florida’s Commissioner of Agriculture Robert 
Crawford viewed the CIW as “a shill for a labor union and for what he calls the Mexican lobby.” Leary, 
“Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell;” Bill Maxwell, “Young Farm Worker’s Labor Yields Fruit,” St. 
Petersburg Times, November 14, 1999.  
20 Benitez, “Because a Tractor;” “Farmworkers Coalition Gains Validation,” Naples Daily News, February 
12, 1996; “Pickers Deserve More,” Fort Myers News-Press, November 16, 1995. 
21 Benitez, “Because a Tractor;” Hector Tobar, “A Growing Voice for Fla. Farm Workers; Lucas Benitez, 
Others, Champion Plight of Tomato Pickers,” Los Angeles Times, Mar 28, 2000. 
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1997 with a more focused and long-term campaign around the theme “Awareness + 
Commitment = Change.”22 As part of this effort, they staged two more general strikes and a 
prominent hunger strike over the next two years.
23
 The hunger strike ended after 30 days, 
following the intervention of Cardinal W. H. Keeler of Baltimore and former president Jimmy 
Carter.
24
 These efforts served as an impetus for a deal brokered in December of 1999 by Florida 
Governor Jeb Bush in which some growers agreed to raise the per bucket price they were paying 
from forty to forty-five cents.
25
 This amounted to an average 13% increase for most workers and 
up to twenty-five percent for those who had been working at an even lower rate.
26
 The wage 
increase was not mandatory and, at any rate, only returned pay levels to what they had been in 
the 1970s. 
The following spring, the CIW worked with several church and human rights groups to 
sponsor a 230 mile “March for Dignity, Dialogue, and a Fair Wages for Florida Farmworkers” 
from Fort Myers to the offices of the Florida Tomato Growers Exchange (FTGE) near Orlando.
27
 
About that time, they also became more active in conducting slavery investigations. Since some 
members of the coalition were former slaves, they understood how to infiltrate human trafficking 
organizations in order to gather information they could turn over to authorities.
28
  
                                                 
22 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Who We Are,” www.ciw-online.org/1-aboutciw.html (accessed July 
1, 2011).  
23 Benitez, “Because a Tractor.” 
24 Baker, “Florida Farm Workers Fast for Better Wages.” 
25 “Tomato Pickers Call Holiday Ceasefire in Labor Protests,” Associated Press, December 19, 1999. 
26 “Arriving at the Settlement,” Fort Myers News-Press, July 5, 2008; Bill Maxwell, “Bush Acts on Behalf 
of Farm Workers,” St. Petersburg Times, November 22, 1998. 
27 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Coalition of Immokalee Workers Announces “March for Dignity, 
Dialogue, and a Fair Wage for Florida Farm Workers,” February 17, 2000. www.ciw-online.org/4-flmarch.html 
(accessed July 1, 2011). 
28 See Appendix F for more information on the CIW’s slavery investigations. See as well, John Bowe’s 
account of the role played by former slave Romeo Romero in the CIW investigations that led to the break up and 
prosecution of the violent trafficking operation run by Ramiro and Juan Ramos. Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American 
Slave Labor, 61-64. 
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By 2005, when Taco Bell finally agreed to terms with the coalition, their investigations 
had produced five sets of federal convictions for human trafficking.
29
 The first of these cases was 
the one first brought to the attention of the CIW by Julia Gabriel, and it exemplified the shocking 
violence of cases that would follow. Miguel Flores and Sebastian Gomez maintained a work 
force of 400 people, most of whom had been trafficked illegally into the United States by coyote 
traffickers who promised lucrative pay for nominal effort.
30
 When they arrived, people were 
forced to work ten to twelve hour days, six days per week, and often paid less than the cost of 
room and board. In at least one instance, enslaved workers were “paid” with beer and crack 
cocaine.
31
 Anyone who complained or attempted to escape was summarily pistol whipped or 
shot. Flores and Gomez were eventually convicted under laws based on the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude. The case is said to have helped pave 
the way for passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2001.
32
 
By 2000 the CIW had concluded that it was multinational corporations (not the 
commercial growers in Southwest Florida) that actually controlled how people were paid in 
commercial farming. They responded by learning more about which prominent companies 
bought tomatoes from their region and by holding a series of encuentras (radically open 
community discussions) where they explored strategic options.
33
 As part of this process they 
eventually ran across an article in the industry publication The Packer describing Taco Bell 
                                                 
29 Taken in order, the federal cases were: U.S. vs. Flores (1997), U.S. vs. Cuello (1999), U.S. vs. Tecum 
(2001), U.S. vs. Lee (2001), and U.S. vs. Ramos (2004). Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “CIW Anti-Slavery 
Campaign. For more information on these cases, see Appendix F. 
30 See Appendix F for a summary of the case posted to the CIW website; Benitez, “Because a Tractor;” 
Amy Bennett Williams, “Immokalee Anti-Trafficking Hero Gets Honor for Fighting Slavery,” Fort Myers News 
Press, June 11, 2010. 
31 In 2006 the CIW helped expose a human trafficking ring operating in North Florida and North Carolina. 
Michael Lee, the labor contractor who ran the operation was found to have been practicing involuntary servitude and 
paying workers with crack cocaine and beer. Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 42; Janine Zeitlin, 
“Labor Camps Kept Workers in Servitude with Crack Cocaine: Coalition of Immokalee Workers was Instrumental 
in Helping Expose Abuse in North Florida and North Carolina,” Naples Daily News, September 23, 2006. 
32 Benitez, “Because a Tractor.” 
33 Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor, 24-25. 
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Corporation as a major purchaser of tomatoes from commercial farms in the Immokalee area.
34
 
The workers were struck by the irony of Mexican laborers picking vegetables for a company 
trading on Mexican culture, and soon settled on a plan for a national boycott. Lucas Benitez later 
recalled the pivotal discussion:  
I remember this very clearly. It was one of the members in the meeting. I can’t really 
remember his name, but he said, “Well, if Taco Bell’s one of the companies that buys the 
most tomatoes from Immokalee, then maybe they’re the ones who are keeping most of 
the money that we’re not making here. Maybe we could boycott them and do that to 
pressure them to answer us.” “All right, well, let’s do a boycott against Taco Bell.”35 
 
From the workers’ perspective, in other words, the decision to pursue a campaign against Taco 
Bell was a simple matter of fairness. Whatever their motivation, from a legal perspective it was a 
savvy move that took advantage of a long-standing loophole in American labor law. The 
loophole dated back to 1935 when Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
extending significant legal protection to the activities of unions.
36
 Sadly, the legislation excluded 
agricultural laborers and domestic workers, occupations that at the time were dominated by 
African-Americans.
37
 Cruel as it was, this racist restriction provided a group like the CIW with 
an important tactical advantage. This is because, although the NLRA precluded most labor 
unions from engaging in “secondary boycotts” of companies that do business with their 
employers, it placed no such restrictions on farmworkers. Even if the courts were to rule the CIW 
was a labor union, as agricultural workers they would be free to sponsor boycotts against any 
corporation they wished.
38
  
                                                 
34 Ibid, 51. 
35 “Analysis: Strategy Used by Coalition of Immokalee Workers to Get the Attention of Yum! Brands.” 
36 Julie Yates Rivchin, “Colloquium: Building Power among Low-Wage Immigrant Workers: Some Legal 
Considerations for Organizing Structures and strategies,” Review of Law and Social Change 28 (2004). 
37 Ibid. 
38 The UFW exploited this same loophole to sponsor national boycotts of table grapes in the 1960s and 
70s. Rivchin, “Colloquium.” 
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In the end, the coalition and their allies developed a long-shot strategy involving a series 
of cross-country journeys to Taco Bell’s corporate headquarters in Irvine, California where they 
hoped to present their case to company executives in person. Their demands were seemingly 
modest. They asked the company to pay one penny more per pound for tomatoes with the extra 
money bypassing the supply chain and being paid directly to tomato pickers.
39
 The CIW 
proposal would, in effect, double the wages of workers when they picked tomatoes bound for 
Taco Bell. 
Meanwhile, the CIW continued its aggressive investigations of human trafficking 
operations in commercial farming. By adopting a two-part strategy of pairing modest demands 
with jarring stories about slavery convictions, the CIW encouraged many people (especially 
within one of the company’s key demographic groups: college students) to associate Taco Bell 
with modern day slavery.
40
 Company executives felt blindsided by the strategy and mystified by 
the CIW’s claims regarding modern day slavery.41 In fact, Jonathan Blum, Vice President of 
Public Affairs for Taco Bell at the start of the campaign, has never wavered on his claim that 
management was entirely unaware of human trafficking activities in Florida agriculture.
42
 Of 
course, to say management was ignorant is not the same as saying they had no ethical 
responsibility. Nevertheless, Blum’s claim is credible. The slavery operations in question were 
located on remote farms in the Florida Everglades, nearly 2,000 miles distant from the corporate 
offices. Management was insulated from the situation by multiple layers of contractual 
agreements and legal precedents. Viewed from these remote distances, the slaves of South 
                                                 
39 Brett Barrouquere, “Yum, Farm Workers Reach Agreement on Pay,” Associated Press, March 8, 2005; 
Frank J. Bove, “In Rich Southern Fields, Migrants Reap Abuse, Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 3, 2004; Eric 
Schlosser, “A Side Order of Human Rights,” New York Times, April 6, 2005. 
40 Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell;” Dan Moffett, “Sell Living Wage, Not Talking 
Dog,” Palm Beach Post, March 22, 2002. 
41 Blum, “Testimony of Jonathan Blum.” 
42 Ibid.  
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Florida became little more than ciphers on the corporate ledgers – embodied representations of 
the corporation’s “terministic screen.”43  
The CIW was unfazed by the company’s initial rejection of their claims, and on April 1, 
2001 it announced a national boycott of Taco Bell. Over the next four years it worked 
frenetically to rally public support for their cause by engaging in a wide range of activities 
including a series of national “Truth Tours,” a hunger strike, proxy strategies at the company’s 
annual meetings, and protests on college campuses.
44
 The Truth Tours became annual affairs in 
which farmworkers and their supporters piled into tour buses and headed off to the Taco Bell 
corporate headquarters in California where large crowds of sympathetic supporters participated 
in colorful marches, rock concerts, and theatrical protest events.
45
 The coalition also scheduled 
stops in major cities along the way where they would hold protests at local Taco Bell restaurants 
and/or give presentations to interested groups to explain their cause. In 2002, for example, the 
CIW made sixteen such stops on their way to and from California.
46
  
The 2003 Truth Tour included a hunger strike in Irvine that ended after ten days when 
Cardinal Roger Mahoney of Los Angeles intervened, and after it had become clear that company 
executives would not agree to meet with representatives from the coalition.
47
 The following year 
the workers scheduled an even more ambitious tour featuring a forty-four mile march from East 
                                                 
43 Burke coined the phrase “terministic screen” to describe how the symbols one uses come to form a sort 
of linguistic grid or screen that “necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another,” and serves to 
shape one’s “range of observations.” Kenneth Burke, “Terministic Screens,” in Language as Symbolic Action: 
Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 50. 
44 Brett Barrouquere, “Farm Workers Protest Wages, Conditions in Cross-Country Demonstrations,” 
Associated Press, February 27, 2004; Leary, “Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell;” Evelyn Nieves, “Accord 
with Tomato Pickers Ends Boycott of Taco Bell,” Washington Post, March 9, 2005; Paul Holmes, “Yum May Face 
Unsavory Consequences,” PR Week, July 22, 2002. 
45 “Analysis,” National Public Radio; Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Let Freedom Ring… Boycott the 
Bell!;” “The New Woody Guthries,” OC Weekly, March 12, 2004. 
46 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “CIW Cross-Country Truth Tour,” www.ciw-online.org /tz_site-
revision/home/home.html (accessed July 1, 2011); Jerry Hicks and Marc Ballon, “Protest Trip Ends at Taco Bell” 
Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2002. 
47 Duncan Campbell, “Taco’s Tomato Pickers on Slave Wages,” The Guardian, March 17, 2003. 
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Los Angeles to Irvine and an eight mile march through Louisville, Kentucky to YUM! Brands’ 
corporate offices. The Irvine protest included a large-scale music concert featuring Tom Morello 
(of Rage Against the Machine), hip hop artist Boots Riley, and Mexican/American singer Lila 
Downs.
48
 
During this same time period the CIW also worked with church groups to sponsor activist 
resolutions at YUM! Brands’ annual stockholder meetings.49 These actions enabled the CIW and 
their allies to interact more directly with management and shareholders. Some of that interaction 
was marked by sharp exchanges as when, at the 2004 YUM! Brands shareholder meeting in 
Louisville, CEO David Novak told the coalition they would not cooperate with them until they 
called off their boycott and stopped using Taco Bell as a “stalking horse” in their dispute with 
growers.
50
 Despite Novak’s objections, a resolution endorsing the CIW’s campaign earned the 
support of 36% of YUM! shareholders, a much larger percentage of the vote than activist 
resolutions typically receive.
51
 The vote was said to have “spooked” company executives and 
became one of the deciding factors in the company’s decision to seek an end to the conflict.52  
In addition to these large scale efforts, the CIW and their sister organization the 
Student/Farmworker Cooperative helped to coordinate protests on college campuses across the 
nation. Protests on college campuses, in fact, began before the boycott began and soon grew to 
include largely independent actions on campuses across the nation. Early protests took place at 
                                                 
48 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Florida Farmworkers Cross Country to Take Fight for Rights to Fast-
Food Giant Taco Bell,” www.ciw-online.org/tz_site-revision/breaking_news/2004mediaadvisory.shtml (accessed 
August 1, 2011); “Tomato Marchers,” City News Service, March 1, 2004. 
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Florida State University, the University of Miami, and New College in Sarasota.
53
 Over the next 
three years students staged protest actions on dozens of other campuses including the University 
of Michigan, the University of Texas, the University of San Francisco, and Boise State.
54
 By the 
end of the campaign twenty two college and high school campuses including Notre Dame, 
UCLA and the University of Chicago had cut their contracts with Taco Bell.
55
 
A primary reason the coalition was able to gain a large national following in such a short 
period of time was that they had expended considerable effort in building horizontal alliances 
with groups that were advocating related causes. One of the ways they accomplished this was by 
scheduling “community forums” whenever possible, typically as “add on” events at major CIW 
protest rallies. They used the forums to discuss issues and coordinate protest actions with 
community volunteers and allied organizations.
56
 The sessions were used to schedule the CIW’s 
participation in events directly related to the Taco Bell campaign and some that were not, such as 
the protests against the Free Trade Area of the Americas meetings in Miami in 2003.
57
 By 
sponsoring community forums and participating in activist “side events,” the coalition was able 
to form important alliances with a large network of almost 100 supporting organizations, 
including church groups (e.g., the National Council of Churches and the United Methodist 
Church), student groups (e.g., the United Students Against Sweatshops, and the Chicana/o group 
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Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan [MEChA]), as well as the National Family Farm 
Coalition, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN).
58
 
The more obvious reason why the Taco Bell campaign was garnering national attention 
was that journalists across the nation, and even internationally, had begun to write stories about 
the coalition’s investigations into human trafficking in Florida agriculture.59 In 2001, ABC 
Nightly News featured the investigations in a story about the Taco Bell campaign.
60
 Two years 
later The Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom ran a similar story focusing on the CIW’s 
efforts to expose slavery in the commercial tomato industry.
61
 Shortly after that, freelance writer 
John Bowe published a story in The New Yorker magazine entitled “Nobodies: Does Slavery 
Exist in America?” that provided the most in-depth profile to date of the CIW and its anti-slavery 
investigations.
62
  
Some writers singled out Taco Bell management for what they saw as their inept handing 
of the CIW campaign. Public Relations columnist Paul Holmes called Taco Bell executive 
Jonathan Blum’s statement that his company would “not now nor ever” get involved in a labor 
dispute between the CIW and commercial growers “one of the dumbest things I’ve heard a 
corporate spokesperson say in quite some time” (on the grounds that, like it or not, the company 
                                                 
58 See Appendix G for a complete list that was posted to the CIW website. 
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was already embroiled in the conflict).
63
 Bill Maxwell, a columnist with the St. Petersburg Times 
(and a former migrant farmworker) observed that “Besides supporting human misery, Taco Bell 
should worry that the 18-to-24-year-old age group (college-age students) is its target market.”64 
And Eric Schlosser (author of Fast Food Nation) argued “Taco Bell sells more Mexican food 
than any other company in the United States. It shouldn’t profit from the exploitation of poor 
Mexican farmworkers.”65 
No doubt this sort of press coverage helps to explain how the CIW came to the attention 
of some of the world’s best known human rights groups and why these organizations began to 
honor them with numerous awards. In 1998 Lucas Benitez received the U.S. Bishops’ 
Conference Cardinal Bernardin Award for New Leadership (related to anti-poverty initiatives).
66
 
The following year Benitez was honored again, this time receiving the $100,000 “Brick Award” 
for “America’s Best Young Community Leader” from Rolling Stone magazine and the Do 
Something youth foundation.
67
 In 2000 the National Organization for Women presented Julia 
Gabriel with a “Women of Courage” award.68 And in 2003, the Robert F. Kennedy Center 
awarded their annual “Human Rights Award” to Julia Gabriel, Romeo Ramirez, and Lucas 
Benitez of the CIW.
69
 
Despite all of these developments (the press coverage, the campus protests, the national 
Truth Tours, etc.), the CIW boycott appears to have had little to no effect on Taco Bell’s sales 
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figures.
70
 Nevertheless, as time wore on, management began to look for a way to end the 
campaign while at the same time limiting any residual damage to the company’s public 
reputation. Their first efforts in this regard were low key. In 2002, Blum sent a letter to Six L’s 
Farms (the largest tomato grower in Southwest Florida) to inform them that while they had no 
plans for intervening in the company’s contractual relationships with tomato pickers that they 
would be monitoring all future developments.
71
 Two years later Taco Bell rewrote its supplier 
code of conduct to state that it would not tolerate the intimidation of workers or forced labor.
72
  
About that same time the Carter Center in Atlanta intervened into the conflict and 
sponsored confidential negotiation sessions between representatives of the company and the 
CIW.
73
 Given the nature of the discussions, there are no publically available records of the 
meetings or the topics they discussed. What is known is that the CIW accused CEO David 
Novak of violating the terms of the negotiations by going public with an offer to pay an extra 
penny per pound if the entire fast food industry would do the same.
74
 The CIW summarily 
rejected Novak’s offer as “not serious.”75 A month or two later the company followed up by 
sending the coalition a check for $110,000, an amount they claimed was equivalent to one 
percent of what it had spent on Florida tomatoes the previous year.
76
 The CIW refused the check, 
claiming the offer amounted to little more than a “public relations stunt.”77  Indeed, although the 
latter two gestures might strike some observers as naïve or even callous, they represented a 
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significant step forward in what had become a bruising contest of wills between company 
management and the farmworkers of the coalition. 
By the spring of 2005, with the CIW poised to stage yet another massive protest, the 
company decided to heed a recommendation Lucas Benitez had put forward three years earlier. 
Taco Bell would cooperate fully with the CIW and “market itself as the socially responsible 
company in the fast-food industry.”78 At the signing ceremony in 2005, Blum announced Taco 
Bell and YUM! would cooperate with the CIW in efforts to reform working conditions in 
Florida. He added that “human rights are universal and we hope other [fast food restaurants] will 
follow our company’s lead.”79 In the years since, the company has held true to its word by 
publically encouraging other fast food companies to follow their lead by paying the penny per 
pound surcharge.
80
 Two years after the end of the Taco Bell campaign, YUM! Brands announced 
that all of its subsidiaries (including its Pizza Hut, Long John Silver’s and A&W restaurants) 
would comply with the agreement.
81
  
Having gained the endorsement of the world’s largest fast food company, the CIW then 
set about pursuing other major players in the industry on the assumption that if they could 
persuade the likes of Yum! Brands and McDonald’s to pay a penny more per pound for 
tomatoes, then other companies in the fast food industry and other market sectors would follow. 
In brief, the strategy worked, and six years later the CIW has racked up an impressive series of 
hard-won campaign victories. 
In April of 2007, after a two-year campaign in which it was forced to back away from a 
botched research report on working conditions in Florida agriculture, McDonald’s followed the 
                                                 
78 Prewitt, “Wage War Continues. 
79 “Coalition of Immokalee Workers, Taco Bell Reach Groundbreaking Agreement; CIW to End Taco Bell 
Boycott ,” U.S. Newswire, March 8, 2005. 
80 Blum, “Testimony of Jonathan Blum.” 
81 “Yum! Brands Expanding Deal with Florida Farmworkers,” Associated Press, May 18, 2007. 
201 
example of Taco Bell by agreeing to pay the penny per pound surcharge.
82
 Just over one year 
later, Burger King did the same.
83
 The latter campaign drew international scrutiny when the 
company was found to have hired private investigators to infiltrate the coalition, and a company 
vice-president was fired for having used his daughters e-mail account to post scathing remarks 
about the CIW.
84
 Over the next two years the coalition continued on to secure agreements with 
one more fast food company (Subway), one grocery store chain (Whole Foods) and four 
companies that provide food services on college campuses (Bon Appétit, Aramark, Sodexo, and 
the Compass Group).
85
 Most remarkable of all, in the spring of 2011 they signed an agreement to 
cooperate with an old nemesis, the FTGE (a group which only three years earlier had threatened 
to bring suit against the CIW for supposedly violating federal RICO statutes).
86
 Currently, the 
CIW is sponsoring multiple campaigns against Chipotle Grill, Quiznos, and the supermarket 
companies Publix, Kroger’s, Trader Joe’s, Stop & Shop, and Ahold (a European grocery 
conglomerate that owns Stop & Shop).
87
 
None of the subsequent campaigns has included a national boycott. Otherwise, the CIW 
has not deviated in any significant way from the rhetorical template of the Taco Bell campaign. 
                                                 
82 Laura Wides-Munoz, “Upping the Ante: McDonald’s to Pay More for Salad Tomatoes,” Chicago 
Tribune, April 10, 2007. 
83 “At Last, Burger King Does the Right Thing,” St. Petersburg Times, June 2, 2008. 
84 Eric Schlosser, “Do You Want Spies with That?; Burger King Undercover,” International Herald 
Tribune, May 8, 2008; Laura Wides-Munoz, Burger King Fires 2 Over Executive’s Secret Blog Criticizing Farm 
Worker’s Group,” Associated Press, May 13, 2008. 
85 “Compass Group and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) Announce Sweeping Changes to 
Benefit Tomato Harvesters,” PR Newswire, September 25, 2009; Sodexo and Coalition of Immokalee Workers Sign 
Fair Food Agreement,” Business Wire, August 24, 2010; “Students Call on Sodexo to Follow Suit as Aramark 
Agrees to Work With CIW,” PR Newswire, April 1, 2010.  
86 Reginald L. Brown, “Testimony of Reginald L. Brown – Executive Vice President, Florida Tomato 
Growers Exchange to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions: Hearing on Ending Abuses 
and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers,” Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions: 
United States Senate, S. Hrg. 110-889, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 15 2008. 
87 Brett Ader, “UF Senate Passes Resolution Calling on Publix to Meet with Tomato Pickers,” Florida 
Independent, February 1, 2011; Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Quiznos: The World is Changing. When Will 
You?” www.ciw-online.org/now_is_the_time.html (accessed July 1, 2011); Sean Sellers, “Slavery in Your Salsa? 
To Establish ‘Integrity,’ Chipotle Grill Needs to Stand against Farmworker Abuse,” Grist.com, September 10, 2010, 
www.grist.org/article/food-9-10-2010chipotles-ongoing-farmworker-problem (accessed July 1, 2011); Jeff Wells, 
“A Penny Per Pound,” Supermarket News, December 1, 2010. 
202 
In each instance, once they have targeted a company or market sector they have pursued them in 
an unrelenting manner by staging numerous protest events and Truth Tours featuring graphic 
accounts of human trafficking and harsh working conditions in commercial agriculture. In doing 
so, they have gone after the best known companies first in hope of convincing a whole string of 
companies in the same market sector to accept the penny per pound initiative and endorse their 
campaign to improve working conditions for migrant farmworkers.
88
  
 
 
Rhetorical Disclosure in Commercial Agriculture  
At the start of the Taco Bell campaign the CIW had few material resources, but they were 
in a position to use new communication technologies to highlight the dramatic contradictions 
between their experiences with violence and deprivation and the fictive narratives being spun by 
advertising and public relations specialists. For one thing, as immigrants laboring deep within a 
complex network of supply chains they possessed a detailed, intimate knowledge of the most 
unsavory aspects of U.S. commercial agriculture. They knew where the slaves were kept. Some 
members of the coalition, in fact, had been slaves themselves.
89
  
However, if they were to use any of this information to their own advantage, they would 
have to overcome significant barriers. The farmworkers who came together in the 1990’s to form 
the CIW were, in a sense, invisible people in U.S society. Few of them spoke English as their 
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first language. Many of them lacked formal education and official visas, and the majority hailed 
from indigenous communities in rural Mexico and Guatemala. They were day laborers working 
on the extreme margins of U.S. society, only rarely interacting in any significant way with the 
predominantly upper class, Anglo populations in nearby communities such as Fort Myers or 
Naples, Florida.
90
 
These barriers turned out to be less important than one might expect, especially since the 
members of the CIW were able to draw upon a set of indigenous cultural traditions that were 
well-suited to their moment in history.  As an activist organization operating at the start of the 
new millennium the CIW was well-positioned to borrow techniques from earlier campaigns, 
adapt them to suit their own indigenous sensibilities, and sponsor a ground-breaking campaign. 
So, for example, by making a radical commitment to community decision-making practices, the 
CIW made it difficult for Taco Bell to do what J. P. Stevens’ management had done a generation 
earlier: issue scathing caricatures of dictatorial, self-serving union leaders. The CIW simply had 
no high profile authority figures who could be parodied in that way. The farmworkers of the CIW 
spoke with many voices and they spoke from first-hand experience, and because of this they 
defied caricature. In the Taco Bell campaign day laborers often spoke with considerable authority 
on matters such as the planning of slavery investigations or contradictions they recognized in 
corporate narratives. This was because leadership in the CIW arose at the local level (and has 
remained there), and because their disciplined emphasis on egalitarian decision-making and 
plurivocal storytelling practices lent their rhetorical strategies an undeniable sense of legitimacy. 
Beginning with the Taco Bell campaign, corporate executives have learned that when the CIW 
speaks on matters such as slavery and working conditions in commercial agriculture, sizeable 
percentages of important audiences (including consumers, college students, and investors) appear 
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willing to listen. 
The CIW’s cooperative sensibilities also proved a good fit for an age in which they could 
use Internet technologies to conduct research and plan strategies with other activist organizations 
while living and working in a remote farming community on the edge of the Florida Everglades. 
Unlike the Stevens campaign, where a handful of organizers on the union payroll conducted 
research and developed strategies, the Taco Bell campaign was planned by a diverse collection 
of Internet savvy farmworkers in consultation with a handful of graduate students, church 
workers, and pro bono attorneys.
91
 That this group was able to extract important concessions 
from a multinational corporation confirms Lyotard’s observation that in the age of satellites and 
global communication “the information used in decision-making (and therefore the means of 
control) [is rendered] even more mobile and subject to piracy” than it was in earlier times.92 By 
1999, when they launched their campaign against Taco Bell, the CIW clearly enjoyed faster and 
cheaper access to strategically valuable information on the corporation they chose to target than 
did their predecessors in ACTWU. The gradual democratization of information in the Internet 
age worked to the advantage of a democratically minded organization like the CIW and enabled 
them to plan and implement an anti-corporate campaign for a fraction of what a similar initiative 
would likely have cost in the 1970s.  
None of this should be taken to mean that geography was entirely irrelevant to the CIW’s 
campaign strategies. As residents of Southwest Florida the farmworkers of the CIW were ideally 
positioned to observe the lifestyles of a wealthy elite and the squalor of one of the nation’s 
poorest communities. Indeed, the short drive from the sprawling mansions and gleaming high 
rise condominiums of Naples, Florida, through the Everglades, to the squalor of migrant housing 
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in Immokalee can remind one of Homi Bhabha’s description of the “parallax” (a sense of 
dislocation and disorientation that occurs as a result of a radical shift in the perspective of the 
observer).
93
 Whether one views Southwest Florida as a land of tropical opulence or a blighted 
outpost for low income workers depends on whether it is observed from the perspective of the 
posh, gated communities of Naples or the bleak landscapes of Immokalee. On the two-lane road 
connecting the two towns, gated housing developments stand next to tomato fields and the two 
conflicting perspectives can blur together in disturbing ways.  
Immokalee, Florida is, by nearly all measures, one of the poorest communities in the 
nation.
94
 Despite the development, beginning in the 1970s, of tidy neighborhoods such as the 
HUD sponsored Farmworkers’ Village, most of the town’s agricultural workers still live in fetid, 
overcrowded apartments and mobile homes.
95
 They can afford little else. Farmworkers in 
Immokalee – and for that matter most of the rest of the nation – still make about what they did in 
the mid-1970s (less than $10,000 per year).
96
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The farmworkers of the CIW remain largely invisible to residents of Naples, who rarely 
venture east into the commercial farming region on the edge of the Everglades. But this is clearly 
a one-way arrangement. The people who pick tomatoes in the farm fields of Immokalee are 
keenly aware of the stark disparities between the places where they live and work and the 
wealthy enclaves just down the road. In the 1990s some of these agricultural workers began 
searching for ways to disclose the obvious inconsistencies they recognized between life in 
Naples and life in Immokalee – and between corporate narratives and the daily life experiences 
of farmworkers.  
The stories they eventually told about deprivation and violence in corporate supply chains 
proved undeniably gripping and garnered the attention of journalists and public audiences around 
the world.
 97
 Undoubtedly, one reason for this was that they presented an anachronistic moral 
conundrum. Never mind that there were likely more slaves being trafficked around the globe in 
2003 than there were in 1803, the presence of people laboring at gunpoint on commercial farms 
only a short drive from the million-dollar condominiums of Naples or Miami Beach disrupts 
popular narratives about human progress and freedom and raises important questions about the 
ethical relationship of management and periphery.
98
 To wit, were the slaves in Immokalee part of 
the Taco Bell “system”? Even if one concludes they were not, does this mean the company had 
no moral obligation to address their situation? 
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The CIW was able to raise these sorts of questions by conducting independent 
investigations into slavery in modern day corporate agriculture. The multiple sets of federal 
slavery convictions that resulted from the investigations lent credibility to the stories they were 
telling on their website and in public protest events about systematic deprivation and violence in 
commercial agriculture. They enabled them to articulate a damning critique of the public 
narratives of companies whose supply chains ended in the farm fields of Immokalee, and, for 
that matter, commercial farm fields in scores of other rural farming communities in the 
Southeastern United States. Rhetorical disclosure provided an opportunity for transformative 
rhetorical action.  
By way of clarification, as in previous chapters, I am using the word disclosure to refer to 
disclosure of egregious working conditions and to the disclosure of answerable individuals 
within the corporate matrix. One can recognize the natural connection between these two modes 
of action in events surrounding the most notorious of the federal court cases that resulted from 
the CIW investigations: U.S. vs. Ramos, 2004. The case concerned a particularly brutal human 
trafficking operation run by a licensed labor contractor named Ramiro Ramos (aka, el Diablo) 
who provided contract workers to commercial farming operations near Lake Placid, Florida, 
about an hour’s drive north of Immokalee.99 By the time of his arrest in 2001, Ramos had earned 
a reputation as someone willing to kill any farmworkers who defied his authority.
100
 
In 1997 Ramos was arrested on suspicion of having ordered the murder of Arisoto 
Roblero, a Guatemalan van driver responsible for shuttling workers in between Lake Placid and 
commercial farming operations in North Carolina.
101
 The shuttle operation represented a weak 
link in Ramos’ organization. So long as workers remained on isolated rural farms where they 
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could be closely supervised, Ramos and his small cadre of associates (primarily members of his 
own family) could prevent anyone from breaking “contract” and speaking to authorities. As with 
the Flores/Gomez operation I described earlier in this chapter, most of the people trapped in this 
system had been lured to the U. S. from Mexico or Guatemala by coyote traffickers who had 
promised to sneak them across the border and provide them with jobs that paid handsomely 
picking vegetables on commercial farms. Once across the border workers were trapped into 
indentured servitude. Ramos charged them inflated prices for housing and food, all the while 
monitoring their every move and threatening physical violence if they dared to question 
authority.
102
 Even before they set foot in a commercial farm field workers were hopelessly in 
debt to their employer.  
Authorities believed Roblero had been targeted for execution because he was suspected 
of having helped one of Ramos’ indentured workers escape. Whether or not he had actually done 
such a thing hardly mattered. His killing was to serve as an example for anyone else who might 
contemplate making a break for freedom. The murder took place on April 20, 1997. A group of 
Ramos’ associates are said to have surrounded the van Roblero was driving, hauled him out and 
put a bullet in the back of his head. Someone called 911, told the sheriff’s department of the 
murder, and provided a description of a truck belonging to Ramos. Unfortunately, all but one of 
the witnesses to the crime refused to cooperate with authorities. That witness told deputies that 
although he had witnessed the murder he could not name the killer. He believed, “If he told he 
would be killed by the Ramos family,” and, even if he managed to survive, the killers knew 
where his family lived in Mexico.
103
 Their hands tied, local authorities contacted the U. S. 
Department of Labor who subsequently raided Ramos’ home and recovered a cache of 
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unregistered weaponry including an AK-47, a Browning 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, and 
a Remington 700 7-millimeter rifle.
104
 Ramos was arrested and hauled in for questioning, but he 
escaped prosecution on all charges.  
In May of 2000, Ramos was arrested once again, this time charged with pistol whipping 
another van driver nearly to death.
105
 Prosecutors decided to ignore any possible connections to 
the murder three years earlier, and Ramos and his colleagues were each charged with 
misdemeanor assault and sentenced to one year of probation. When the CIW learned of the 
incident they decided to investigate. In their conversations with area farmworkers they quickly 
learned about the murder three years earlier and about the scale of the Ramos operation in the 
commercial orange groves near Lake Placid.
106
 
Nineteen year old Romeo Romero then volunteered to go undercover by working for 
Ramos picking oranges.
107
 In this way he was able to study the human trafficking operation from 
the inside and confirm that workers were being held against their will in decrepit housing and 
threatened with physical harm if they attempted to flee.
108
 On Palm Sunday, 2001, the coalition 
made a daring visit to the Ramos encampment, figuring their guards were likely to be in 
church.
109
 The gamble paid off, and they were able to spend twenty minutes or so speaking with 
enslaved workers and distributing literature explaining how the CIW could help them. The 
following week one of the indentured workers found a way to call the coalition office and they 
arranged an escape plan for three men. On a signal from a hotel window near the Ramos 
compound, the three men sprinted to a waiting car and were driven to safety.  
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Ramiro Ramos, his brothers Juan and their cousin José Luis were charged, among other 
things, with conspiracy to hold people in involuntary servitude and harboring illegal aliens for 
financial gain.
110
 In a trial held in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida in June of 2002 they were convicted on fifteen of sixteen counts.
111
 Ramiro and Juan 
were sentenced to twelve years in federal prison and their cousin José Luis to ten. Their defense 
attorneys, facing an uphill battle, had offered a novel defense, claiming the judge should dismiss 
all charges since commercial growers were clearly at fault. Their clients, they argued, were the 
victims of selective and arbitrary prosecution.  
Judge K. Michael Moore, a conservative jurist with a no-nonsense reputation, quickly 
dismissed the motion. Nevertheless, he revisited the defense argument in his closing remarks 
where he criticized the citrus industry for willfully ignoring indentured servitude in commercial 
orange groves. “Others at a higher level of the fruit picking industry,” he claimed, “seem 
complicit in one way or another with how these activities occur.”112 The CIW quickly seized 
upon Judge Moore’s comments and expanded upon them in an online editorial in which they 
claimed: “Until the corporations that profit from cheap Florida produce – corporations like Taco 
Bell – are obliged to acknowledge their role in keeping wages and working conditions in Florida 
fields as miserable as they are, farm labor conditions will not improve.”113 Later in the same 
article they continued on to argue that, by keeping food costs artificially low, Taco Bell and other 
fast food chains were able to “plow their profits back into advertising and expansion.”114 By 
disclosing compelling evidence of human trafficking, in other words, the CIW was able to raise 
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disturbing questions about the moral integrity of Taco Bell’s public relations and advertising 
narratives.  
The Ramos case represents but a single example of the CIW arguing for a connection 
between Taco Bell and incidents of violence and coercion in the remote farm fields of South 
Florida. Nevertheless, it demonstrates how, by disclosing a perdurable link between the human 
trafficking rings of South Florida and the tacos being sold in retail outlets across the country, the 
coalition was able to raise serious questions regarding the moral character of the company’s 
management team. Before I take up these themes in detail, I first want to consider how the CIW 
used the information it gathered in slavery operations to its advantage when staging public 
protest actions against Taco Bell. 
Throughout the Taco Bell campaign, the CIW attempted to contrast elements of the 
company’s public narratives (advertisements featuring a talking Chihuahua, for example) with 
material evidence of slavery. Put another way, by placing official narratives in close association 
with living stories, the coalition provided compelling examples of Burkean “planned 
incongruity.”115 In other words, by disclosing how slavery had become systematically 
incorporated into corporate supply chains they were simply “remoraliz[ing], by accurate naming, 
a situation already demoralized.”116 In this way, by disclosing a disturbing and little-known truth 
about corporate policy, the CIW was able to prompt a “casuistic stretching” (i.e., a modifying or 
refining) of public attitudes toward Taco Bell.
117
 This much noted, the coalition’s plurivocal 
rhetorical strategy deviates from Burke’s theoretical model in one respect. Burke’s description of 
planned incongruity is unapologetically dialectical; that is, it assumes a synthesis that evolves 
from the opposition of two opposing concepts. Read in historic context, the CIW’s campaign 
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discourse looks more complicated than this.  At any given moment in the campaign one can trace 
multiple examples of incongruity – incidents where the CIW intentionally contrasted their lived 
experience of the harsh discipline in commercial agriculture with fictive elements of corporate 
discourse. And yet, multiple voices speak at the same time with various audiences attending, 
making the interaction between corporate and activist discourses difficult to classify.  
For these reasons, I want to supplement Burke’s conception of planned incongruity by 
turning again to Bakhtin’s writings on dialogism and the carnivalesque, this time with an eye 
toward acknowledging how the CIW was influenced by a related set of Chicana/o oral 
performance traditions and, as a result, practiced a form of community storytelling. By using 
protest performances to tell “their” stories about slavery and deprivation the coalition exposed 
fictive aspects of corporate discourse and opened co-generative spaces where important aspects 
of daily work experience could be renegotiated. To support this claim, I begin by reviewing two 
well-known photographs (reprinted in Appendix E) from the Taco Bell campaign and explaining 
how elements of each might be viewed from the perspectives of the carnivalesque and Chicano/a 
performance traditions. Following that I review a series of representative images and texts from 
the Taco Bell campaign in order to demonstrate how the CIW was able to highlight disturbing 
contradictions in corporate discourse while at the same time side-stepping the sort of 
counterproductive blowback that occurred in the Stevens campaign. 
To begin, the first of the two photos is from a 2003 National Geographic magazine 
article on modern day slavery.
 118
 It features several farmworkers sitting on a curb, one of them 
hiding behind a green-faced caricature of Taco Bell president Emil Brolick.
119 
Other 
farmworkers are holding signs bearing campaign slogans including, most prominently, “STOP 
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SWEATSHOPS NOW!” The second photo appeared in the Washington Post in 2005 and shows 
CIW member Lucas Benitez holding the bloodied shirt of a teenage migrant worker who, though 
he was not a slave, had been beaten nearly to death by a supervisor when he asked permission to 
get a drink of water.
120
 
Primary elements of these two photos are consistent with many of the carnivalesque and 
grotesque themes I reviewed in the Stevens campaign. The first photo, for example, includes 
clear instances of parody and social inversion. By distorting the executive’s skin color and 
placing his face next to a slogan about sweatshop labor in the tomato fields, the coalition was 
making a not-so-subtle argument about Taco Bell profiting from modern day slavery. The CIW, 
in other words, used carnivalesque inversion to erase power differentials (albeit temporarily) 
between tomato pickers and executives and to articulate a scathing critique of corporate policy.  
In the second photo, the salience of the bloodied shirt recalls the use of grotesque realism 
in the Stevens campaign – especially the frequent references in ACTWU’s campaign literature to 
bodily injury in Southern textile mills. In the CIW’s campaign against Taco Bell, as in the earlier 
campaign, grotesque imagery (in the form of stories and images related to slavery and other 
types of oppression in commercial agriculture) disrupted corporate narratives and prompted calls 
for ethically answerable subjects within the corporate hierarchy. In other contexts they pressed 
this point by stressing how, despite the fact that in its CSR documents YUM! Brands boasted of 
its commitment to “humane procedures for caring for and handling animals,” they initially 
refused to meet with the CIW to discuss human slavery in their corporate supply chain.
 121
 By 
disclosing material violence, therefore, the CIW was arguing that Brolick and his fellow 
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executives at Taco Bell and YUM! Brands ought to be called to account for their role in 
perpetuating the systematic abuses farmworkers had witnessed and experienced in their daily 
work lives. 
In subtle ways the two photos also reflect the centrifugal heteroglossia of the CIW’s 
campaign discourse and the centripetal, discursive discipline of their corporate opponents. In the 
first photo, for instance, the garish caricature of the executive competes with other protest signs 
for the viewer’s attention. When read in a context in which several protestors are engaged in 
conversation, these competing signs signal a plurivocal and cooperative creative process. The 
slogans and art work that appeared on these sorts of handmade protests signs in the Taco Bell 
campaign varied widely, depending on who was available to make them at any given venue. As 
well, the status of the two people engaged in conversation is ambiguous. They are rank and file 
participants in an anti-corporate protest action. These same people may very well have been 
active participants in wide open, community planning sessions where the coalition hammered out 
their protest strategies and tactics. In the second photo, the bloodied shirt is a salient reminder of 
one young man’s violent experience and of a documented pattern of systematic oppression in 
commercial agriculture. The image serves to privilege a heterodox, communal demand that 
disrupts Taco Bell’s carefully crafted image as a company with a legitimate connection to 
Hispanic culture. As happened in the Stevens campaign, activists used disturbing images and 
caricatures to disrupt dominant conceptions of a quiescent, political order.  
The CIW’s rhetorical strategies resembled those employed by ACTWU in the Stevens 
campaign in at least one more important respect. By launching satirical critiques from locations 
far removed from the “humorless terrain” of their daily work experience, the coalition was able 
to gain rhetorical leverage against a powerful opponent. Truculent crew leaders in the tomato 
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fields of Immokalee surely looked imposing from the perspective of the day laborers and 
esclavos they supervised. And yet, to public audiences in Los Angeles, New York, or even 
Miami, these provincial tyrants seemed more like petty criminals who belonged in federal prison. 
In effect, by circulating bruising critiques of corporate practices in locations far removed from 
the tomato fields of Southwest Florida, the CIW underscored the importance of 
deterritorialization to modern day anti-corporate movements. Under conditions of globalization 
the CIW was able to shift terrains and articulate arguments that would have been immediately 
suppressed in the humorless terrains of their daily work lives. 
What can be said then, is that in the Taco Bell campaign, as in the Stevens campaign two 
decades earlier, activists employed rhetorical techniques that conformed in striking ways to 
Burkean planned incongruity as well as Bakhtin’s accounts of dialogism and the carnivalesque.  
At the same time, a careful reading of the CIW’s theatrical protest actions in the Taco Bell 
campaign suggests that one must tread carefully when comparing their rhetorical practices to a 
performance tradition (the carnivalesque) with distinctly European roots. This is because the 
CIW’s protest performances and their overall campaign discourse reflect a deep familiarity with 
Chicana/o theatrical genres including carpa (traveling tent shows), actos (short scenes 
addressing issues of concern to the rural poor), and the Teatro Campesino of the United Farm 
Workers (UFW). The word “campesino,” in fact, is sometimes translated “farmworker,” and 
(particularly when they staged actos depicting farm labor) the CIW reflected the aesthetic 
sensibilities of their predecessors in the United Farm Workers (UFW). 
The public protest performances of both organizations, the CIW and the UFW, are 
representative of an indigenous oral performance tradition in Mexico and Central America 
identified with rasquachismo, a term Chicano scholar Tomás Ybarra-Frausto has defined as 
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referring to “a cultural sensibility of the poor and excluded.”122 The history of this performance 
tradition is thinly documented – hardly surprising given a dearth of published scripts and a long 
association with the pelado (the lower classes). What is known is that it is a highly 
improvisational tradition and that performers have tended to borrow freely from several available 
genres including Aztec religious ceremonies, Mexican el Dia de los Muertos (Day of the Dead) 
rituals, Italian commedia dell’arte, and the European carnival.123 In recent decades they have also 
been influenced by agitprop theatre (especially the works of Bertolt Brecht), the teatro mistico 
tradition (associated with the Brazilian peasant movement) and Augusto Boal’s “Theatre of the 
Oppressed.”124  
Until recently, scholars have tended to assume the Chicana/o oral performance tradition 
was largely derivative of the European carnival.
125
 In truth, although the two traditions intersect 
at various points in their histories and share a familial similarity (most notably, a plebian interest 
in social inversion and a distinct emphasis on embodied experience) they represent distinctive 
categories. In the present context, these distinctions suggest that anyone interested in 
understanding the CIW’s accomplishments in the Taco Bell campaign (specifically, how they 
were able to discover and exploit gaps and contradictions in their opponent’s corporate 
narratives) is obligated to attend to their performance style on its own terms. With this much in 
mind, I want to consider three themes in the CIW’s protest discourse as they relate to the 
Chicano/a oral performance tradition: the spirit of the underdog (rasquachismo), community 
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forensics or judgment, and a dual function of critiquing dominant order while opening space for 
the plurivocal articulation of traditional and oppositional values.  
Turning first to rasquachismo, the key word to attend to is “appropriation.” Artistic 
performances that count as rasquachismo are characterized by “strategies of appropriation, 
reversal, and inversion.”126 Thus, the spirit of rasquachismo is also the spirit of invention – a 
“capacity to hold life together with bits of string, old coffee cans, and broken mirrors in a 
dazzling gesture of aesthetic bravado.”127 The UFW’s Teatro Campesino, which operated on a 
minimal budget and often performed in farm fields or on the back-end of flat-bed trucks, 
exemplified rasquachismo.
128
 Despite minimal resources, they were able to reclaim geography 
and turn the tools of discipline to their own ends. The fields where they labored and the trucks 
used to haul the produce they picked were transformed into performance venues where they 
could subject field bosses and politicians alike to critical interrogation. In a similar way in the 
two photos reprinted in Appendix E depicting protest performances, the CIW appropriates 
tomato buckets, trash bags, and the well-known image of the talking Chihuahua for a protest 
staged near the Taco Bell corporate offices in Irvine, California. The tomato buckets in particular 
lend the performance a sense of somber authenticity. In the first photo a woman tosses a tomato 
bucket up to another worker, just as agricultural workers do scores of times in a typical workday 
in the farm fields of South Florida. The difference, of course, is that in real life the buckets 
contain thirty-five to forty pounds of green tomatoes.
129
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The appropriation of materials in these protests is consistent with the argument I 
advanced in chapter two about how anti-corporate activists frequently operate as bricoleurs who 
adapt a variety of materials at hand in order to critique corporate power and overcome resource 
disparities. However, when these appropriations are viewed in relation to the Chicano/a oral 
performance tradition they take on a deeper significance that serves to problematize Western, 
industrial notions of production. As Yolanda Broyles-González explains in relation to the UFW’s 
Teatro Campesino: “[The] spiritual ground of the UFW is the working-class Mexican belief 
system that contextualizes all human endeavor and creation as part of the greater creation. This 
could be described as a sacred conception of production as opposed to the dominant mainstream 
secular view of production, which is mechanistic and individualistic.”130 Similarly, the CIW 
appropriated mundane items such as tomato buckets and trash bags and used them to critique 
what they saw as a dehumanizing, soul-deadening model of human production according to 
which they were little more than fungible cogs in a corporate machine. The distinction recalls 
Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the difference between labor and action (the latter conceived as a 
mode of communal praxis).
131
 By reenacting mechanical gestures from their daily work lives, the 
CIW was able to disclose the Fordist nature of commercial agriculture and demonstrate how the 
vita activa (the realm of work) can become a locus of political action.
132
  
The didactic and political tone of these oral performance traditions becomes even more 
pronounced in relation to the second theme: community forensics or judgment. In that regard, 
consider the photo of Lucas Benitez holding the bloodied shirt. Although the image is not from a 
staged theatrical performance, it highlights a persistent interest in the Chicano/a oral 
performance tradition with staging tribunals where “actions [can be] intensely examined and 
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publically judged.”133 The photo is closely cropped, affording minimal information about the 
obscured background. Benitez stares off to the right in a thoughtful manner that recalls a witness 
presenting atechnical evidence to a court. This oblique stance lends salience to the blood soaked 
shirt and provides the reader with a story fragment rather than a complete story. As a result, the 
picture is invitational. To make sense of it the viewer must study the contents (e.g., the ambiguity 
of the object and the reason for the blood) and reflect on how such a thing might have happened. 
Absent the original news story, most observers would likely see an urgent image lacking a 
coherent hermeneutic context. As a rhetorical object, therefore, the photo constitutes an audience 
through both confrontation and invitation.  
Like the reenactment of field work in the photos from the Irvine protests discussed 
earlier, Benitez’ somber presentation of the bloodied shirt also serves to invoke the “physical 
socio-cultural memory of [a] community’s experience.”134 During the famous grape boycotts of 
the 1960s and 70s el Teatro Campesino’s graphic depictions of dehumanizing work conditions 
helped the UFW galvanize workers and present compelling arguments in the public sphere about 
the need to reform employment practices in commercial agriculture. Similarly, in their theatrical 
reenactments of field work, the CIW drew upon embodied memories to present explicit 
arguments about egregious contradictions and erasures in a set of corporate narratives. By 
providing atechnical evidence of violence and by reenacting the mechanics of daily work life, 
they disturbed the superficial cohesion of the homogenized Hispanic culture one encounters in 
Taco Bell’s corporate advertising narratives. 
Turning to the third theme, the CIW’s attempts at disturbing narratives is consistent with 
a defining double gesture of the Chicano/a protest tradition. As W. B. Worthen explains, by 
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drawing upon a wide variety of traditions performers have been able to [legitimate] aspects of 
Chicano/a culture (themselves often deeply hybridized) [while] at the same time … reframing 
the representation of Chicanos/as produced in dominant culture.”135 In their protest discourse, in 
other words, activists manage to freeze what they view as dehumanizing and stereotypical 
representations of Chicano/a culture in order to subject them to critical interrogation. Consider, 
for instance, the well-known Taco Bell advertisement reproduced in Appendix E featuring a 
Chihuahua dog that says “¡Yo Quiero Taco Bell!” (I Want Some Taco Bell!).136 The image and 
slogan invoke a tightly scripted, monovocal corporate narrative. Taco Bell is a multinational fast 
food company with thousands of restaurants worldwide.   
Even when the advertisement is read at a surface level the subtext is not difficult to 
understand: tiny dog; tiny prices; Mexican restaurant; harmless tongue-in-cheek fun. Never mind 
that many people of Mexican heritage found the image patronizing and demeaning.
137
 Certainly 
the members of the CIW felt this way and attempted to exploit the disparity they recognized 
between Taco Bell’s shallow, stereotypical presentation of Mexican culture and their own, lived 
experience as Hispanic and indigenous people laboring deep within the company’s supply chain. 
In that regard, the CIW campaign is replete with examples of the coalition appropriating the 
language of Taco Bell’s advertising themes. They smashed Chihuahua piñatas, carried signs with 
parodies of company slogans such as ¡No Quiero Taco Bell! (I don’t want Taco Bell!) and ¡Yo 
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Quiero Profits! (I want profits!), and talked about the hypocrisy of the company’s language 
frequently.
138
 By parodying Taco Bell’s advertising themes the CIW encouraged public 
audiences to set aside their cultural biases and take a fresh look at Mexican culture as dynamic, 
shifting, and, in many ways, unpredictable.  
The conception of the Chicana/o subject that emerges from this critical process in the 
CIW’s campaign discourse escapes tidy classifications. It is a subject in the process of becoming, 
capable of articulating cogent critiques of colonizing discourses and of its own cultural practices. 
In the first place, by critiquing monovocal corporate advertising narratives the CIW opened 
space for non-western modes of community narration. Consistent with this, they often spoke of 
the experiences of field workers, but only rarely referenced the experiences of individual 
workers. It is notable, for instance, that although one can find numerous accounts from various 
sources of the young man who was beaten for requesting a drink of water, he is never named. 
This emphasis on communal experience is evident as well on the CIW website, where articles are 
posted without attribution, and in protest performances, such as the ones depicted in the photos 
printed above, where they emphasize generic work practices.  
This communal mode of authorship is in keeping with indigenous values of 
Mesoamerican cultures, and it also conforms to Roland Barthes’ account of “middle voice” as a 
mode of narration in which the subject is recognized as “being effected and affected” by their 
own authorship.
139
 More to the point, in the communal storytelling practices of the CIW one 
encounters a mode of narration (middle voice) that came to be eclipsed in the West due to the 
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ascension of a “vocabulary of the will,” privileging “the human subject as agent, the source of 
actions.”140 There is no need to uncover emergent categories of community authorship in the 
campaign discourse of the CIW; it is their natural mode of narration – a reflection of their non-
Western, indigenous sensibilities. And in the Taco Bell campaign it proved a felicitous mode of 
action for disclosing systematic violence. In the photo of the bloodied shirt, for example, the shirt 
can be recognized more easily as a metonym for the experiences of an entire community. By 
speaking with a communal voice, the farmworkers made it difficult for critics to argue that any 
one person’s experiences were exceptional. 
At the same time, the CIW demonstrated a willingness to critique even its own cultural 
and organizational practices. On that point, the following quotation that has been posted for 
several years on the CIW website is instructive”: “Como trabajadores y mujeres, tenemos que 
luchar por nuestros derechos y contra la violencia tanto en la labor como en la casa. As women 
and as workers, we have to fight for our rights and against violence both in the fields and in our 
own homes.”141 The words appear next to a photo of Julia Gabriel, the woman who, as I 
mentioned earlier, was one of the recipients of the Robert F. Kennedy Center’s Human Rights 
Award. Gabriel’s statement, of course, is entirely consistent with the CIW’s commitment to 
Freirean style consciousness-raising, in that it signals an interest in honoring the dignity of all 
marginalized people.
142
  It also signals the willingness of an organization, the majority of whose 
members are male farmworkers, to interrogate its own critical assumptions about machismo 
attitudes in Chicano culture and even within their own ranks. As one observer has noted, the 
CIW also demonstrated an interest in interrogating their own practices through their participation 
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in the Root Cause alliance, where they worked in close cooperation with two Miami based 
human rights organizations (Power U and the Miami Workers Center), both of which have a high 
percentage of women in leadership positions.
143
 Taken together, these two examples provide 
clear evidence that the CIW was interested in avoiding the sorts of jarring contradictions between 
words and actions they recognized the discourse of many corporations. From the CIW’s 
perspective, if they were going to expect the public to accept their organization’s critiques of 
corporate practices, they had to be willing to challenge the persistence of violence and sexism in 
some corners of their own community. 
The CIW’s interest in interrogating their own situated practices is consistent with a larger 
interest in cultural self-reflection within the Chicano/a performance tradition, a situation that 
suggests an answer for a well-known limitation of the European carnivalesque tradition.  Despite 
the emphasis on bawdy excess and social inversion, carnivalesque performances can fold back 
upon themselves and reinscribe social norms.
144
 The spring carnival, after all, was a period of 
temporary, cathartic release in anticipation of the somber Lenten season. By appropriating 
aspects of this tradition, modern day activists risk falling prey to its traps. In a backhanded way, 
lampooning a Pope, a president, or a CEO can serve to confirm the legitimacy of a normative 
power. This is not to say carnivalesque protest is, of necessity, a self-defeating enterprise. As I 
argued earlier, ACTWU used carnivalesque and dialogic methods to critique the actions of the J. 
P. Stevens Corporation and to convince management to negotiate in good faith. The CIW 
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accomplished something similar in the Taco Bell campaign by drawing upon Chicano/a oral 
performance traditions. In so doing, they revealed a straightforward (albeit demanding) 
technique for acknowledging and addressing the risks of reinscription and commodification: the 
perpetual critique of their own organizational and cultural practices. Their activities in this regard 
are important in the context of this study because it is representative of a broader trend within the 
anti-corporate globalization movement toward cooperation among people representing a wide 
range of human rights initiatives. In that sense, the wide-ranging list of people and organizations 
who supported the Taco Bell campaign (reproduced in Appendix G) is telling. By signaling their 
interest in social justice broadly defined, the CIW set a high standard for their own 
organizational practices, while at the same time providing further evidence that confrontation-
alliance style campaigns are less likely to spark countermobilization by opposing forces.  
The importance of the coalition’s commitment to perpetual self-critique is important as 
well in light of later developments in the campaign when they focused even more intently 
egregious discrepancies between Taco Bell’s corporate narratives and the personal values of 
some members of its management team. If they were going to accuse executives of hypocrisy, 
the coalition needed to look in the mirror first to make sure they could not be accused of the 
same thing. At this point the themes I have reviewed so far (rhetorical disclosure and indigenous 
performance traditions) converge in a discussion of the kairotic dimensions of the CIW’s 
campaign strategies. It is at this point as well where the differences between the rhetorical 
strategies of the Taco Bell and Stevens campaigns become most pronounced and it becomes 
easier to recognize why the CIW was able to do what ACTWU could not: persuade its former 
opponent to become its committed ally.  
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When the CIW set about planning their first anti-corporate campaign they faced a more 
complex set of organizational barriers than did their predecessors at ACTWU. Ray Rogers and 
the J. P. Stevens boycott committee worked long hours ferreting out secretive financial 
relationships. But they also had an important advantage over the CIW in that they were on a 
union payroll, meaning that the lines of legal and ethical responsibility connecting corporate 
employers and union employees were unambiguous. By contrast, the CIW represented a group of 
day laborers on the remote edges of a corporate supply chain. Their status as contract employees 
with no direct legal connection to Taco Bell complicated their task enormously. In fact, when the 
CIW decided in 1999 to forgo local actions against growers and launch a full blown anti-
corporate campaign, their first task was to review a long list of companies that purchased 
tomatoes from Florida to decide which one they should target. As I explained previously, their 
choice of Taco Bell appears to have been partially the result of painstaking research and partially 
the result of cultural intuition.  The idea that a major purchaser of tomatoes from South Florida 
sold Mexican food struck them as painfully ironic. They followed that thin thread across the 
country to Southern California and began their first campaign to convince a multinational 
corporation to pay a penny more per pound for tomatoes. In the end, the coalition’s tenuous 
connection to the company appears to have worked to their advantage. They clearly caught 
management off guard and, as I will explain in more detail shortly, by the time the company’s 
public relations department began to take the campaign seriously the CIW had discovered 
several more points of vulnerability in YUM! Brands’ rhetorical armature. In the end, the 
conglomerate proved an especially suitable target for the coalition’s plurivocal storytelling 
strategies. This was true because of felicitous gaps and elisions in some of Taco Bell’s official 
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narratives and because company management proved especially vulnerable to charges of 
personal hypocrisy.  
On the first point, there can be no doubt that Taco Bell corporation was a formidable 
opponent, fully capable of rebuffing critiques from experienced activists, let alone a group of 
farmworkers with meager resources. More specifically, at the start of the campaign, Taco Bell 
was in a position to rebuff critiques of its supply chain policy because of the nature of its 
purchasing practices and because of certain rhetorical strategies embedded within its official 
narratives. As regards the former, Taco Bell was only one of several hundred large companies 
that purchased tomatoes and other fruits and vegetables from the commercial farms of South 
Florida every year. Moreover, it was embedded within a well-established supply system in which 
retailers contract with wholesalers, wholesalers contract with commercial farmers, commercial 
farmers hire labor contractors; and labor contractors hire day laborers to harvest the crops.
145
  
From a stylistic perspective, the supply chain connecting the CIW and Taco Bell 
resembles anadiplosis, the overlapping of wording in consecutive sentences, as in the statement: 
“Having power makes [authorities] isolated; isolation breeds insecurity; insecurity breeds 
suspicion and fear; suspicion and fear breed violence [italics added].”146 Each phrase in the 
passage connects to the one that follows, except that the last does not circle back and connect in 
any formal way to the first. A similar pattern occurs in modern day corporate supply chains 
where at each point of articulation there exists a set of legal agreements insuring a steady flow of 
products from the supplier to the corporate retailer but which, at the same time, affords the 
retailer significant legal protection from any difficulties arising from things like violations of 
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labor statutes or environmental policies further down the line. Like the metal plates on a suit of 
armor, each juncture marks a point of vulnerability but also a point of overlap affording extra 
security.  
In the years between the Taco Bell and J. P. Stevens campaigns, corporate supply chain 
policies matured considerably. During those years most multinational corporations developed 
increasingly complex supply chains and similarly complex discursive and legal frameworks for 
responding to anti-corporate campaigns.
147
 As a result, most multinational corporations now 
issue supplier codes of conduct.
148
 YUM! Brands and Taco Bell were no exception.
149
 In fact, as 
the Taco Bell campaign gained momentum, management used the corporate supplier code of 
conduct as a sort of rhetorical barricade against the arguments of the CIW. In a 2003 shareholder 
proxy statement, for example, they claimed, “Our suppliers are required to abide by strict 
standards, including not violating employment or wage and hour laws or regulations adopted by 
the governing body of any city, state, county or country in which they operate.”150  
When they read this statement, of course, the CIW recognized an opportunity for 
discussing indentured servitude in commercial agriculture and, more specifically, within Taco 
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Bell’s supply network. That the CIW would be able to disclose this vulnerability seems obvious 
only in retrospect. The coalition dedicated many hours to intensive research and discussion 
before they settled on a single target within a broad field of choices and developed a set of 
kairotic campaign strategies to exploit Taco Bell Corporation’s particular organizational 
weaknesses. 
On the second point, despite the fact that companies like Taco Bell and YUM! spend 
millions every year on marketing and public relations strategies, their executive teams may still 
be vulnerable to charges of personal hypocrisy. In the last chapter, I described how ACTWU was 
able to leverage gaps and erasures in J. P. Stevens’ corporate history in order to force resignations 
from the company’s board of directors. In the Taco Bell campaign, the CIW used a nearly 
identical strategy of identifying and leveraging moments of asyndeton (intentional erasures) in 
Taco Bell’s official corporate history. In a sense, their task was made easier because, with the 
advent of the Internet, most multinational corporations now post official histories online. The 
corporate history Taco Bell provided on its website in 2003 is a prototypical example of the sort 
of sanitized, PR-savvy auto-biography that has become de rigueur in the twenty-first century 
global marketplace.
151
 It is a brief (fewer than 2,000 words), all-American tale of business 
success salted with references to Mexican culture. Predictably, the protagonist of the narrative is 
Glen Bell, an ex-Marine who founded the company on a shoestring budget.  
When he left the military in 1946 Bell determined to start a business, and his first effort 
was a drive-up hot dog stand. Having been raised close to the Mexican border in “the sleepy 
agricultural town” of San Bernardino, California, Bell developed a taste for Mexican food.152 He 
soon began experimenting with methods for mass marketing tacos. His plan was to, “obtain a 
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location in a Mexican neighborhood. That way, if tacos were successful, potential competitors 
would write it off to the location and assume that the idea wouldn’t sell anywhere else.”153 The 
experiment succeeded; and in the balance of the narrative success follows upon success and Glen 
Bell emerges a smiling billionaire. By 1956 Bell owned three Mexican restaurants. And by the 
early 1960s he had coined the name Taco Bell and sold his first franchise (to a police officer who 
went on to make millions). By 2001, the company had become an international conglomerate 
“widely recognized for introducing [people from around the world to the] exciting tastes of 
Tacos, Burritos, Fajitas, and Wraps.”154  
It is a tidy, self-congratulatory history that brooks no controversies and includes nary a 
word about long-standing complaints from Mexican-Americans that the company’s advertising 
campaigns (most especially the advertisements I discussed earlier in this chapter featuring a 
talking Chihuahua) perpetuated demeaning stereotypes.
155
 Nor does it reference the CIW’s 
charges that the company had been profiting from the misery of Mexican farmworkers in South 
Florida (even though the history was posted in 2003, two years after the start of the CIW 
campaign).  
Taco Bell’s corporate history also conforms to the same pattern as the corporate histories 
I discussed in chapter two. Which is to say, it proceeds according to a predictable, metonymic 
logic in which intangible concepts are represented by tangible items, and the future often 
resembles the past. In this case, specific elements of Taco Bell’s corporate history (for example, 
the military man/entrepreneur, the police officer who bought the first franchise, and the 
proliferation of restaurants) operate as tangible representations of neo-liberal ideology. In reading 
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this web-based history, one enters a clean, efficient, multi-cultural terrain in which the merits of 
economic liberalism and the integrity of the company narrative are simply assumed. 
The metonymic logic of Taco Bell’s corporate history also helps to create a simulacral 
cultural topos – a thin, fictive cultural landscape in which Latino culture becomes inextricably 
entangled with the corporate narrative. The history contains numerous references to Mexican 
food and culture and is embedded in a website that includes photos of tacos and burritos 
alongside images of smiling employees (several of them Hispanic) as well as links to press 
releases touting the company’s commitment to cultural diversity.156 In this context, of course, 
cultural diversity does not stray beyond the tight parameters of Taco Bell’s founding narrative; it 
is a shallow diversity featuring skin color and ethnic labels, and affords no breathing space for a 
more vibrant diversity of perspectives that might challenge the steady trajectory of the 
corporation in the global marketplace. The tactical and defensive dimensions of such a history 
are not difficult to recognize. By embracing a (shallow) form of cultural diversity, Taco Bell 
placed itself in a position to deflect certain critiques of its corporate policies. Would a company 
with such a history be so insensitive as to perpetuate demeaning stereotypes of Mexican 
Americans or, worse, purchase tomatoes picked by Mexican esclavos? 
In 2000 the CIW set about developing strategies for exploiting the erasures and 
inconsistencies they recognized in Taco Bell and YUM! Brands corporate discourse. In doing so, 
they maintained a steady commitment to community decision-making and plurivocal narrative 
practices. As I have already explained, their actions in this regard were due in large part to their 
commitment to indigenous communication practices and Freirean consciousness raising. Taken 
together these factors may not sound obviously kairotic. Community decision-making, critical 
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pedagogy, and plurivocal storytelling sound potentially complex and anarchic, not swift and 
decisive. And yet, when one looks closely at certain moments in the Taco Bell campaign 
(especially the closing months when they took their stories to YUM! Brands’ home turf) the 
coalition seemed keenly aware of timing and decorum (classical components of rhetorical 
kairos).
157
 In effect, the CIW matched a powerful corporate strategy (anadiplosis) with a potent 
rhetorical gesture of their own: synecdoche, the substitution of a part for the whole.
158
 They used 
credible, first person stories to frame Taco Bell as a corporation that was willing to profit from 
the enslavement of indigenous farmworkers. 
The CIW’s kairotic strategies were a natural extension of their egalitarian, co-generative 
decision-making practices. A plurivocal process yielded plurivocal campaign strategies. One way 
to understand why this is so is to view key events in the Taco Bell campaign through the lens of 
Michel de Certeau’s work on storytelling resistance. In The Practice of Everyday Life de Certeau 
describes two types of tactical, storied resistance to sedimented narrative strategies. The first is a 
type of dispersed, plurivocal micro-resistance that serves to “introduce a Brownian [seemingly 
random] movement into the system.”159 This is the mode of action in the “walking rhetorics” he 
describes in the famous chapter “Walking in the City,” where pedestrians learn to improvise new 
paths as readily as “Charlie Chaplin multiplies the possibilities of his cane.”160 In this mode of 
tactical resistance, change occurs gradually over extended time as logics of resistance ‘insinuate’ 
themselves into dominant strategies in such a way that the powerful come to believe the new 
ideas were a result of their own reflection.
161
 One finds evidence of this sort of patient 
strategizing at several moments in the history of the CIW campaign, including their early 
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tenacity in a frustrating confrontation with growers and, as I will explain in more detail shortly, 
their plurivocal storytelling tactics in the closing weeks of the campaign. The CIW appeared to 
understand that if they were to convince Taco Bell management to address their concerns, then 
they would have to dedicate themselves to sticking with the task for as long as it would take in 
order to win over the consciences of their opponents. This, too, is a sort of timing.   
De Certeau labels the second set of tactics “Storytime,” a term which, as I explained in 
chapter two, refers to the tactical uses of accumulated memories to produce sudden interruptions 
in the ‘equilibria’ of time and space.162 It is in this context (that is, in the carefully planned 
disruptions of status quo strategies) where the CIW’s campaign strategies and tactics most 
closely resemble traditional notions of rhetorical kairos. More specifically, in kairotic storytime, 
narrators must often bide their time waiting for an appropriate moment when the accumulated 
force of memory stands the greatest chance of mounting a “coup.”163 Something like this 
happened in 2001 when the farmworkers of the CIW surprised Taco Bell management by 
demonstrating how a company that made millions selling Mexican food had been quietly 
profiting from the enslavement of Mexican workers.  
In the closing months of their campaign against Taco Bell, the CIW employed both of the 
kairotic actions de Certeau describes (one plodding and plurivocal and the other sudden and 
unexpected). To understand how this happened, requires a brief explanation of an important 
development in the Taco Bell campaign – a moment when management revealed some 
unexpected vulnerabilities.  As I explained earlier, midway through the Taco Bell campaign, the 
company was purchased by Yum! Brands. Soon after, Taco Bell moved its corporate offices to 
the YUM! Brands headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky. The move had several important 
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implications for the campaign, one of the most important, it turned out, was that they gained 
more direct access to YUM! Brands CEO David Novak.  In 2004 Novak, who is an evangelical 
Christian, was a featured participant in a panel discussion at a corporate leadership conference 
named, memorably, the “Lead Like Jesus Celebration.”164 The coalition and its allies did not 
have to do a great deal of research to figure out that Mr. Novak, whether he recognized it or not, 
was highly vulnerable to charges of religious hypocrisy.  
The theme of the Lead like Jesus conference provided the coalition with an opportunity to 
highlight a dramatic incongruity in ethical performance with great specificity. In the fall of 2004, 
political columnist Sarah Posner wrote a blog posting entitled Leading like Jesus that the CIW 
later featured on its website.
165
 In the posting, Posner highlights an apparent contradiction 
between Novak’s participation in the conference and YUM! Brands’ corporate policies. She 
begins by asking “so how, exactly, does Novak lead like Jesus? Let’s take a look.” She then goes 
on to contrast Novak’s $8.8 million annual salary with the “poverty level” wages of the 
farmworkers and asks why he would take an obdurate stand against an organization fighting 
slavery, but pull company ads immediately when he received complaints about their placement 
on the racy evening soap opera Desperate Housewives. “That leadership must be A-OK with 
Jesus,” Posner concluded, “just like involuntary servitude is good for the company’s bottom line. 
But fictional depictions of sex, murder, and dysfunctional families? Unacceptable.”166 In effect, 
Posner helped the CIW make an argument that Novak could not claim to be a devout Christian 
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business leader on the one hand and a profit-driven CEO willing even to overlook instances of 
modern day slavery on the other.  
Because Novak was participating in a religious event, he was fully exposed to criticism, 
and on one of the most pernicious and troubling of issues: chattel slavery. As I noted earlier, in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a group of pious abolitionists in England brought an end 
to the highly profitable slave trade in the British Empire by arguing the practice was 
fundamentally unchristian.
167
 Mr. Novak fared no better against the modern day abolitionists of 
the CIW. Posner built a case for Novak’s hypocrisy, but the coalition had been leveling the same 
sorts of accusations at public protest events.
168
 To Americans living in the twenty-first century, 
the contradictions between Novak’s evangelical Christianity and modern day agricultural slavery 
are likely to appear self-evident. But that is the point. The language of praise and blame requires 
a leverage point in popular sentiment, or, one could say, among those things that have come to 
pass for common sense. Moreover, if activists are to exploit contradictions between corporate 
practices and popular attitudes, they must be able to level an accusation at the proper time and in 
the proper manner so as to achieve maximum effect. Put another way, by identifying and 
exploiting Novak’s “Achilles’ heel” the farmworkers of the CIW demonstrated their mastery of 
time-honored kairotic tactics.  
Since Louisville, Kentucky is a deeply religious community and a hub of action for the 
Presbyterian Church USA, the coalition had little difficulty gaining the cooperation of a few 
progressively minded church leaders and seminarians in identifying local churches and schools 
where they could make presentations about working conditions in Florida agriculture. The great 
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benefit of the strategy was that it allowed the CIW to take their campaign to the very 
neighborhoods where company employees lived with their families. Executives of multinational 
corporations are not accustomed to fielding questions at the church fish fry, the family dinner 
table, or the local country club about their company’s stance on human slavery. No one can ever 
know how often these sorts of discomfiting conversations actually took place. Regardless, the 
strategy forced members of the YUM! Brands management team to shift their perspective on the 
Taco Bell campaign from the corporate “we” to the personal “I.” By the spring of 2005 the CIW 
was, in effect, asking executives to explain – before their friends and families – how they were 
not profiting from the misery of others. 
The coalition’s strategy took advantage of the plebian and unpredictable nature of 
storytelling circulation. Once told, stories can be wild, impious, dissonant, and difficult to 
control. This is not to say they cannot be useful in achieving strategic ends. As David Boje 
explains:  
The implication of the “story turn” is that the important interaction among storytellers is 
at the local level. At the local level, telling is communicative interaction in ways that are 
self-organizing emergent processes. However, there is still “story control” going on… 
There is a merger without the imposition of narrative control from the top (or center), 
such as by a managerial list group.
169
 
 
It was this sort of local, improvised but kairotic storytelling that was on display in the 
neighborhoods of Louisville in the closing months of the Taco Bell campaign. Obviously, the 
stories being told were embedded within a larger campaign strategy, but that strategy was 
plurivocal and participatory from beginning to end.  
The plurivocality of the CIW’s discursive practices is undeniable and stands in contrast to 
the predominantly monovocal discipline of their corporate opponents. My use of the word 
“predominantly” here is intentional in that, unlike the Stevens campaign where management 
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closed ranks and spoke with one voice, one executive at YUM! Brands eventually broke ranks 
and afforded a glimpse of plurivocality within the corporate board room. I conclude this chapter 
by discussing this unusual incident and its relationship to corporate answerability and the 
evolution of CSR standards.  
In April of 2008, Jonathan Blum, chief public affairs officer and senior vice president of 
Yum! Brands, offered testimony before the United States Senate Committee Hearing “On 
Ending Abuses and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers.”170 Blum’s testimony 
was important to the hearing because he was the executive charged with managing his 
company’s response to the CIW campaign. The senators were interested in hearing what Blum 
had to say about management’s perspective on the Taco Bell campaign and why his company 
eventually decided to cooperate with the CIW’s demands. The testimony he provided was 
remarkable in at least two respects: because Blum insisted that (appearances aside) the campaign 
had had no effect on sales and because of the story he told about a spontaneous visit he paid to 
Immokalee in the spring of 2004.
171
  
He set the context for his story by explaining that management had reached a sort of 
impasse in their efforts to understand working conditions in the tomato fields in the Immokalee 
region. Corporate growers claimed field workers earned an average wage of twelve to thirteen 
dollars per hour. The CIW disputed this claim, arguing that tomato pickers actually earned “sub-
minimal wage.”172 Management’s dilemma, he explained, was that neither side could provide 
them with compelling documentation for their claims. In an effort to resolve this conflict, Blum 
made a personal decision to take time off from a family vacation in Florida in order to visit 
                                                 
170 Blum, “Testimony of Jonathan Blum.” 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
237 
Immokalee “unannounced and without a guide – to go into the fields to see the conditions faced 
by these workers firsthand.”173 
The decision changed the course of the company’s negotiations with the CIW. As Blum 
told the Senate HELP Committee, after touring Immokalee and meeting with the CIW, he 
“recognized that our Taco Bell customers would want us to be part of the solution and help these 
workers if we could.  This was simply a matter of good CSR.”174 Consequently he pressed the 
issue with the rest of the management team, and YUM! Brands entered into confidential 
negotiations with the coalition. The two parties eventually “came to the mutual conclusion that 
the original penny per pound contribution would lead to the greatest long-term improvement in 
these workers lives.”175 As a result, Taco Bell and the CIW announced their ground breaking 
agreement in March of 2005.  
The pivotal moment in Blum’s testimony is his recognition that “our Taco Bell customers 
would want us to be part of the solution [emphasis added].”176 By using personal pronouns in 
this statement he acknowledges his own ethical accountability as a corporate manager and 
provides a memorable example of a corporate executive operating as an autonomous, answerable 
human subject. Put another way, by choosing to converse with people in Taco Bell’s corporate 
supply chain as human equals (as opposed to fungible “objects” in the company system) he 
entered consciously into the ethical realm. To be clear, this is not to say he had not been ethically 
responsible up to that point for the actions he had taken as a corporate executive. To the contrary, 
the various legal and functional machinations of the corporate system had merely occluded any 
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role he may have played (however unwittingly) in perpetuating oppressive working conditions in 
commercial agriculture. 
While Blum certainly deserves credit for acting to resolve the conflict with the CIW, it is 
difficult to imagine him reaching out to the coalition had they not sponsored an extended 
national campaign. He admitted as much in his Senate testimony, claiming that “the CIW was 
very good at generating publicity on this issue,” and adding that management had found the 
campaign, “a distraction … and an inappropriate tarnish to our Company’s public image.”177 For 
their part the many college students, church groups, and celebrities who spoke out in support of 
the CIW consistently argued consumers were answerable for their role in perpetuating egregious 
harms if they continued to purchase products from Taco Bell. So long as customers continued to 
queue up to buy burritos and taco salads, they argued, management would continue to ignore 
slavery in their supply chain.
178
 
These same disparate constituencies also recognized an affinity between their own 
activist demands and those being advanced by the CIW. More to the point, people interested in 
organic food, globalization, labor organizing, and a range of other causes came to recognize a 
similarity between the issues they were raising and the central demands of the Taco Bell 
campaign related to fair labor standards in commercial agriculture.
179
 Of course, this sort of 
cross-pollination of activist causes is hardly new. In the Stevens campaign two decades earlier, 
women and minorities recognized a kinship with black and female textile workers and, as a 
result, supported ACTWU in opposition to management. As I noted earlier, Laclau relates this 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
178 See for example the Student Farmworker Alliance’s brief history of the CIW’s campaigns as well as 
the statements from supportive people and organizations posted on the CIW website. Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers, “Boycott the Bell;” Student/Farmworker Alliance, “An Unfinished History…,” www.sfalliance.org 
/history.html (accessed August 1, 2011). 
179 For more information see Appendix G where I provide a list of celebrities, politicians, and activist 
organizations that endorsed the Taco Bell campaign. 
239 
sort of “equivalential logic” to the formation of “antagonistic frontiers” separating a popular 
demand from a locus of power.
180
 Crucial to the formation of any such frontier is a metonymic 
linkage of demands according to which people recognize visceral similarities between their 
demands and those articulated by others.  
 The organic relationship between public answerability and the formation of these sorts of 
popular demands can be recognized at several points in the Taco Bell campaign. For example, in 
a campaign rally at Taco Bell headquarters in 2003, journalist Eric Schlosser detailed the logic 
linking the organic food movement with the CIW’s cause: “We all eat. But we rarely stop to 
think about where our food comes from, how it was made -- and who makes it possible.”181 He 
then went on to emphasize how management and consumers were answerable for egregious 
working conditions in commercial farming. “In the same way that Nike has been held 
accountable for the mistreatment of the Asian workers,” he posited, “Taco Bell must be held 
accountable for the mistreatment of the American farmworkers.” Given this situation, he 
continued, consumers must understand, “Every one of our purchases is like a vote, a vote for a 
particular company and its business practices…. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers are trying 
to bring dignity and a decent wage to American farmworkers. Please give them your full 
support.”182 With these words Schlosser encouraged the public to recognize a natural affinity 
between the organic food movement and the CIW’s Taco Bell campaign. Just as people can be 
held answerable for the sorts of foods they choose to consume, so too can they be held 
answerable in some significant way for the conditions under which those foods have been grown. 
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 There is evidence of a similar metonymic logic in a posting on the CIW website in which 
they announced their decision to participate with the Root Cause alliance in protests at the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas conference in Miami in 2003.
183
 By doing so, the coalition 
acknowledged its close association with a range of progressive causes including “gender or 
sexual identity [as well as]”: 
 
 
Healthcare 
A living wage 
Fair working conditions 
Decent housing 
Equal access to education 
A clean living and working environment
184
 
 
In this posting the CIW first recognized a natural affinity among any groups working to advance 
human rights and improve the lot of the working poor in an age of globalized corporate power. 
They then went on to express their interest in holding the “trade ministers from throughout the 
hemisphere [who] were meeting to negotiate, in secret, the future of trade policy for 34 countries 
of the Americas” responsible for perpetuating an elitist system of “corporate-led free trade.”185 
The CIW was important to Root Cause in that they provided a signifier that could organize a 
whole field of demands and that conference participants could not simply shrug off: slavery. In 
other words, by marching alongside allies in the Miami protests the CIW was able to articulate a 
critique of corporate globalization while reinforcing its relationship with other progressive 
causes.  
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 When these last two examples are read alongside the earlier account of Jonathan Blum’s 
visit to Immokalee, they reveal a potential pitfall in a discussion of popular demands and 
antagonistic frontiers as they relate to the Taco Bell campaign. This is because the word 
“frontier” could be read as implying a bright line separating mutually exclusive discourse 
structures. More specifically, it could be interpreted as suggesting a clean dichotomy between 
noble activists and cold blooded, obdurate managers. Blum’s visit to Immokalee is important, if 
for no other reasons, because it exposes the limitations of such a reading by providing an 
example of a persuadable, three-dimensional executive in a multinational corporation and affords 
a brief look at a management team scrambling to respond to an anti-corporate campaign. On both 
counts, Blum’s testimony is concise and compelling. He sounds sincerely moved by what he saw 
in Immokalee and, by describing his personal response, he signaled a willingness to recognize 
how policies he had advocated helped to perpetuate human trafficking in commercial agriculture. 
He makes clear as well that management felt compelled to set aside other duties to respond to the 
campaign (e.g., they were “distracted” and took time to speak on the phone with growers and the 
CIW).
186
 As the campaign dragged on they became concerned it would tarnish their company’s 
reputation in the marketplace.  
 In at least one respect the scenario Blum describes is in keeping with the handful of 
publically available texts in which executives at other corporations have discussed their own 
experiences in dealing with anti-corporate campaigns.
187
 In these accounts managers tell of 
growing weary of responding to withering public criticism and of their concerns for the public 
reputations of their organizations and their brands. In all likelihood these managers, as well as 
the executives at Taco Bell and YUM! Brands were concerned about their personal reputations 
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
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as well. In Blum’s case this can be deduced from his unorthodox decision to visit Immokalee 
unannounced and from reports that YUM! Brands management felt “spooked” by the uncanny 
manner in which the CIW was able to highlight a potential conflict of interest between the 
Christian values of some executives and the presence of slaves in the YUM! Brands supply 
chain.
188
  
 That executives would become concerned with their own public reputations is consistent 
as well with Paul Turpin’s argument that public decorum has come to serve a constitutive 
function in market economies.
189
 Public decorum, in other words, is not merely an ancillary 
factor in the evolution of CSR standards. It plays an important role in shaping de facto standards 
for ethical behavior in market economies. Turpin’s analysis in this regard is in line with the 
arguments of those who credit the emergence of activist NGOs in the years following World War 
II with the development of “pro-social, pro-democratic,” international CSR regimes including 
The United Nations Global Compact (outlining global principles for human rights, labor and 
environmental sustainability), the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the FTSE4Good.
190
 
Because corporations are interested in avoiding the protracted distractions of anti-corporate 
campaigns and because they are concerned for their own reputations as well as those of their 
companies, they have invested considerable time and money into developing CSR regimes.  
 A clear implication of this analysis is that Jonathan Blum can hardly be viewed as an 
exceptional instance of a corporate executive with a sensitive conscience. Indeed the CIW’s 
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rhetorical strategies in the Taco Bell campaign make no sense at all if board rooms are not 
populated by three dimensional human beings. At every juncture in the campaign (in their 
disclosures of slavery, their targeting of a remote corporation, their hunger strikes and their 
neighborhood tactics in Louisville) the CIW assumed the presence of people like Jonathan Blum 
capable of responding not only strategically but compassionately. Bakhtin has described this sort 
of answerable subject as an “addressee… whose responsive understanding the author of the 
speech work seeks.”191 Even more important, to the degree that such a person “understands” a 
message he or she becomes “a participant in the dialogue.”192 Put another way, at the moment 
Blum acknowledged the merits of the CIW’s claims and responded to their “hail,” he became 
interpolated as an ethical agent who could be held answerable for his role in perpetuating 
egregious employment practices in commercial farming.
193
  
Because of this, because he decided to interact with the members of the coalition on their 
terms, he was ideally positioned to lobby other executives and, eventually, other corporations to 
attend to the farmworkers’ cause. Blum, of course, was but one person on the management team 
of a multinational corporation. If he was to convince other executives that settling with the CIW 
was in the best interests of the corporation and its investors, then he needed to argue a pragmatic 
case to people accustomed to viewing business decisions through the twin lenses of profitability 
and public relations. In that sense the CIW provided him with an appealing option. By agreeing 
to pay a mere one cent more per pound for tomatoes (a cost they could easily pass along to 
consumers), Taco Bell and YUM! Brands were able to situate themselves as market leaders for 
an important humanitarian cause.  That the management team at YUM! Brands and other 
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multinational corporations would be interested in being viewed in this way is understandable. In 
a globalized marketplace, corporate managers have come to understand their actions will be 
judged by what Bakhtin calls a “superaddressee:” an abstract, idealized observer that can be 
conceived as “the people, the court of history, and so forth.”194  
The CIW demonstrated an intuitive understanding of this situation by employing a 
bifurcated rhetoric that made it easier for management to say “yes” to their proposal. The first 
prong of their campaign rhetoric was confrontational. They did not hesitate to portray 
management as obdurate apparatchiks, answerable for their roles in perpetuating egregious 
harms. The second prong was the penny-per-pound initiative, which provided management with 
an elegant and efficient exit from what had become a bruising confrontation. The coalition was, 
in effect, providing Taco Bell with a made to order image repair strategy. By agreeing to 
cooperate with the penny-per-pound initiative, the company was also aligning itself with the 
CIW’s Campaign for Fair Food and, in so doing, positioning itself as a market leader in a highly 
visible CSR initiative. 
In a series of later campaigns against other well-known companies including 
McDonald’s, Burger King, and Whole Foods, the coalition has maintained a disciplined 
emphasis on cooperative decision-making practices, community storytelling, and indigenous 
performance practices. That several more companies have signed onto the penny per pound 
agreement and that commercial growers are being more cooperative suggests the possibility for 
noticeable improvement in working conditions in commercial agriculture in Florida in the 
coming years. Significantly, the CIW (an organization that includes a high percentage of 
undocumented immigrants) achieved these gains without sparking xenophobic backlash among 
political conservatives.  
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The differences from the Stevens campaign are inescapable. ACTWU’s strategies in the 
earlier campaign were perceived by many in corporate management as providing tacit 
justification for their decisions to “get tough” on union organizers and campaign activists. By 
contrast, in the Taco Bell campaign the CIW was able to develop positive momentum in one 
sector of the global marketplace (the fast food industry) that has carried over into other sectors, 
most prominently the food service and grocery industries. 
In the previous chapter I argued that in the Stevens campaign people aligned with either 
union or management had come to read the very same sets of circumstances in radically different 
ways. The union and its allies viewed the testimonies of workers about workplace injuries and 
discrimination as clear evidence of a systematic pattern of abuse and greed in the textile industry. 
Management responded by dismissing these workers’ experiences as exceptional stories 
circulated by greedy union organizers – interlopers who disrupted the otherwise quiescent 
relationship of a professionally run organization and its employees. No such thing happened in 
the Taco Bell campaign. This may be largely due to the nature of the charges the CIW leveled 
against its corporate opponent. In the Stevens campaign one could understand how even the best 
run multinational corporation might have occasional difficulties with things like workplace 
safety or discrimination. In an organization of their size, the company insisted, 
“misunderstandings” and “errors in judgment” were simply unavoidable. Management at Taco 
Bell and YUM! could not retreat to these sorts of stock arguments. They could hardly claim that 
an occasional misunderstanding about slavery was simply part of doing business in a global 
economy. The topic is too explosive. In the aftermath of the monumental abolitionist and Civil 
Rights movements in the West, slavery became a sort of zero tolerance offence. Neither, as it 
turns out, were Taco Bell and YUM! Brands management in a particularly strong position to use 
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the asyndeton strategy I discussed earlier in order to close down any critical interrogation of their 
organizational practices and distance themselves from controversial situations. The CIW’s 
kairotic storytelling strategies and the force of their argument regarding slavery in modern day 
corporate supply chains proved compelling – especially since the coalition had provided the 
company with an appealing alternative to the campaign in the form of the penny per pound 
agreement. In the end, the coalition’s strategy also helped to prevent the CIW and their allies 
from clinging to stereotypical and inflexible views of management. Unlike the Stevens 
campaign, in which union and management interests persisted in clinging to melodramatic 
caricatures of an enemy “other,” the Taco Bell campaign ended with both parties evincing 
tentative respect for their former opponents. 
The Taco Bell Campaign and the Future of Markets 
In its national campaign targeting Taco Bell and YUM! Brands, the CIW used 
prospective narrative disclosure to draw attention to egregious working conditions in commercial 
agriculture and answerable decision makers within a prominent multinational corporation. Their 
strategy was prospective in the sense that they targeted a corporation with an abiding, metaphoric 
connection to Hispanic culture and developed kairotic rhetorical strategies that pierced Taco Bell 
and YUM! Brands’ figurative armor in order to disclose disquieting contradictions between 
corporate discourse and executive values. In developing and implementing these campaign 
strategies, the CIW demonstrated its commitment to community decision practices and to a rich 
Chicano/a oral performance tradition which, like carnivalesque performances in the European 
tradition, place a premium on grotesque disclosure and social inversion. 
The CIW’s Taco Bell campaign conformed to the confrontation/alliance pattern in 
prospective narrative disclosure in three respects. First, it featured an initial storytelling 
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confrontation followed by attempts to convince management to change its practices and embrace 
activist demands as their own. Second, the CIW planned the campaign as the first stage of a 
long-term effort aimed at transforming labor standards in commercial farming in Florida. Third, 
several of the coalition’s practices served to decrease any risk of conservative backlash. They 
eschewed top-down decision-making in favor of egalitarian community discussions. They 
demonstrated a penchant for self-critique, especially in relation to their own potential for 
perpetuating sexism. They appropriated strategies from twentieth century civil rights campaigns 
(including hunger strikes and UFW style theatrical performances). And they conducted high 
profile investigations of a string of modern day slavery operations. Taken together, these actions 
made it difficult for their opponents in management and the public sphere to question either the 
legitimacy of the coalition’s claims or the integrity of their demands.    
The closing chapters of the Taco Bell campaign provide compelling evidence regarding 
the potential of confrontation/alliance strategies for influencing the attitudes and practices of 
market leaders. In his testimony to the U. S. Senate HELP  Committee Jonathan Blum claimed 
that in the years following the Taco Bell campaign his company and the CIW “have enjoyed 
good relations, maintain an active and open dialogue, and [we] genuinely want to help them with 
their cause.”195 In the five years since the conclusion of the Taco Bell campaign management 
appears to have remained true to their word. They have stepped in at crucial junctures in 
subsequent campaigns to defend the CIW and to speak to the workability and ethical importance 
of the penny per pound agreement. When the Florida Tomato Growers Exchange attempted to 
put an end to the agreement by refusing to cooperate with the new agreement, YUM! Brands 
announced it would place funds owed to farmworkers in an escrow account until growers 
decided to cooperate. And in 2007 they announced an agreement brokered with the CIW to 
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expand the penny per pound agreement to cover all of their brands, including Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, Long John Silvers, and A&W.
196
  
The CIW’s rhetorical project, to be sure, carries with it certain inherent risks. Anytime 
activists sign an agreement with a multinational corporation they provide the company with an 
opportunity for burnishing its public relations image. By endorsing one activist campaign, in 
other words, could position itself to shrug off other activist campaigns. This is because, as I 
argued in chapter two, once they have aligned themselves with an activist cause, it can be more 
difficult for future activists to frame them as heartless capitalists. Indeed, the risk of this sort of 
“recuperation” cannot be ignored.197 To cite an example close at hand, in recent years 
Greenpeace has accused YUM! Brands of bucking an environmentalist trend in the fast food 
industry by purchasing paper products from two companies with a well-established record of 
clear cutting Asian rainforests.
198
 Arguably, YUM Brands is in a stronger position to ignore 
Greenpeace’s claims given their company’s high profile cooperation with the CIW. While this 
development is discouraging, it hardly means that the Taco Bell campaign was a useless 
endeavor. We cannot afford to be naïve regarding the potential for corporations to appropriate 
oppositional projects in order to further their own ends. At the same time, it seems to me that 
anyone interested in embracing the CIW’s vision of “a better world, based on democratic 
participation” must guard against becoming overly jaded in regard to corporate CSR policy. This 
is true, if for no other reason, because there are now fewer slaves picking crops on commercial 
farms in Florida.  
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In the end, it is difficult to determine whether the management teams at Taco Bell, YUM! 
Brands, and the several other corporations that have cooperated with the CIW in recent years did 
so out of altruistic or pragmatic reasons. In all likelihood they were motivated by a complicated 
amalgam of both. Regardless, by employing a two-stage rhetorical strategy of confrontation and 
(proposed) alliance, the CIW made it easier for management to say yes to their proposal.  
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Chapter 6: Anti-Corporate Campaigns and Global Markets 
“You choose justice. Very good! We agree. But now we must be serious.”  
Jacques Ellul
1
    
 
Stanley Deetz has observed that “the price of the antidemocratic character of corporate 
control is more difficult for individuals to understand and respond to than excesses of the state.”2 
He attributes this situation to the fact that while state power tends to be explicitly restrictive, 
corporate power is “embodied in routines and techniques that appear enabling and apolitical.”3 If 
Deetz is correct about the seeming invisibility and banality of corporate power in daily life, and I 
believe he is, then this raises important questions about the transformative potential of anti-
corporate activism. First, what accounts for the ability of groups such as ACTWU and the CIW 
to extract concessions from powerful but seemingly banal and faceless institutions? And, why is 
it that some anti-corporate campaigns appear to be more effective than others in shifting the 
attitudes and practices of corporate actors in global markets? These two questions have served to 
guide my inquiry in this dissertation. In this last chapter I proceed by revisiting each question 
and then discussing some of the theoretical and practical implications of my conclusions.  
Kairotic Wagers and Corporate Responses 
In response to the first question, I have argued one can account for the ability of anti-
corporate activists to gain concessions from prominent companies by looking to their use of 
prospective narrative disclosure. The phrase refers to a kairotic wager on the part of an activist 
group that by disclosing disquieting corporate practices and answerable corporate actors they can 
rally public audiences to support their demands thereby putting pressure on a company to modify 
its market practices in some significant way. Two dimensions of this process are of special 
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importance. First, disclosure in this context typically involves the strategic dissemination of 
stories and texts featuring carnivalesque and grotesque themes. Second, as it is practiced in anti-
corporate campaigns, prospective narrative disclosure typically involves a three step process 
involving intensive research followed by a period of strategy development and culminating in 
one or more instances of carefully timed public disclosure. I borrowed a phrase from Kenneth 
Burke to describe this third stage as a moment of “planned incongruity” when activists place 
corporate fictions in dialogical tension with the actual conditions of industrial production.
 4
 
Corporations, I should add, have responded to this rhetoric of disclosure by practicing a 
compensatory rhetoric of closure featuring strategic (and sometimes controversial) research and 
public relations strategies.  
I arrived at these answers after conducting case studies of the Stevens and Taco Bell 
campaigns and reviewing events from more than 170 other anti-corporate campaigns in recent 
decades. I found clear evidence in both case studies of a pattern of rhetorical practices in keeping 
with the three stages of prospective narrative disclosure I just described. In both campaigns 
activists conducted intensive research of a company in an effort to identify vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited through kairotic action. Union strategists in the Stevens campaign hired 
professional labor consultants who specialized in the “power analysis” of corporations and 
management. In the Taco Bell campaign, by contrast, the CIW held marathon research sessions 
in which rank and file members of the coalition worked alongside graduate school interns and 
pro bono attorneys. Both groups then used what they learned to develop detailed sets of 
campaign strategies and tactics. In the Stevens campaign this meant the same small group of 
labor leaders laid out a multi-faceted power on power strategy aimed at convincing one 
company, J. P. Stevens, to recognize a labor agreement at several of its factories across the rural 
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South. In the Taco Bell campaign the CIW used wide-ranging community discussions to craft a 
“campaign for fair food” aimed at changing wages and working conditions for commercial 
farmworkers in Florida. Finally, the culminating stage of the Stevens campaign featured a wide 
ranging set of strategies and tactics including disclosures of financial relationships, the 
maneuvering of bank funds, a national boycott, theatrical street protests, and the public 
circulation of texts featuring graphic accounts of injury and discrimination. The Taco Bell 
campaign, by comparison, was an even more theatrical event that included slavery 
investigations, a national boycott, street theatre, and a demand for a penny per pound increase in 
wages.  
My review of scores of campaigns suggests that the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns are 
not isolated examples and that prospective narrative disclosure constitutes a ubiquitous rhetorical 
strategy in contemporary anti-corporate activism.5 As I explained previously, as early as 1960s 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee was staging sit-ins at Woolworth’s lunch 
counters, and the United Farm Workers was sponsoring national boycotts of corporate grown 
table grapes. In 1990s, the United Food and Commercial Workers leaked information to the ABC 
news magazine Prime Time Live, which subsequently broadcast a controversial episode on a 
pattern of unsafe food handling practices at grocery stores owned by the Food Lion Corporation.6 
And in recent years delegations of indigenous people from the Ecuador working in cooperation 
with the Rain Forest Action Network have staged large scale protests at the Chevron 
Corporation’s annual meeting to present evidence the oil company has been dumping billions of 
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gallons of toxic waste into rivers in the Amazon rainforest.7 In these few examples, and in the 
scores of other campaigns I reviewed for this study, activists wagered time and again that 
through the strategic disclosure of egregious practices and answerable people they could 
ultimately convince companies to make substantive changes in how they do business. 
The most obvious implication of the pattern of prospective narrative disclosure I have 
traced through these campaigns (and more than 170 others listed in Appendix A) is that 
persuasion in anti-corporate campaigns results from the leveraging of popular opinion. While it 
may seem as if I am stating the obvious as regards the Taco Bell campaign, the same cannot be 
said for ACTWU’s campaign against J. P. Stevens which, more often than not, has been framed 
as a distinctly instrumental event – a sort of “lunge at the company’s financial throat.”8 My 
reading of the Stevens campaign follows that of Minchin by treating it as a complex, public 
sector action that included secondary, instrumental components. It assumes, in other words, that 
in all likelihood J. P. Stevens eventually cooperated with the union, not because of financial and 
legal pressures, but because of the valance of popular opinions within its market sector and the 
public sphere.  
Moreover, a careful reading of both campaigns demonstrates how activists were able to 
produce these shifts in popular reasoning through the circulation of stories and texts featuring 
carnivalesque and grotesque themes. In adopting these modes of rhetorical disclosure, I have 
argued, activists have appropriated ancient rhetorics of disclosure as well as social protest 
strategies pioneered during the Industrial Revolution and adapted them for use in an age of 
global media. The manner in which this happened in each campaign reflected the exigencies of 
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the day. The Stevens campaign played out in the twin shadows of the African American Civil 
Rights Movement and second wave feminism. ACTWU was able to leverage this situation to its 
advantage by featuring the first person stories of women and minorities who had endured 
discrimination and violence in J. P. Stevens’ textile mills.  
Two decades later the CIW was forced to negotiate a vastly different economic and 
political landscape in which illegal immigration had become a tendentious and sometimes 
explosive issue. Given this backdrop, one might have expected that a campaign sponsored by a 
group of predominantly Mexican and Haitian farmworkers would prompt significant 
countermobilization on the political right. It did not. In all likelihood this was because slavery 
trumped illegal immigration. Even in a time of resurgent nativism it was difficult for opposing 
interest groups to impugn the motivations of people who were being lauded as modern day 
abolitionists. This development, of course, highlights the signal importance of slavery in 
American public memory. In the aftermath of the Civil War and of the great Civil Rights 
Movements of the twentieth century, the issue had become one of the enduring “third rails” of 
public discourse. If the Stevens campaign gained persuasive force by forging a metonymic link 
between labor rights and demands for the equal treatment of women and minorities, the Taco 
Bell campaign accomplished something similar by linking the Campaign for Fair Food to the 
global campaign to expose and eradicate the modern slave trade. 
Of course, the difficulty with arguments about using public opinion to pressure 
corporations to change is that, as Deetz has pointed out, a corporation is “a special type of 
fiction.”9 A corporation is a citizen of no nation and literally does not care about things like 
workers’ rights, environmental pollution, or national values. It is a legal fiction; and as such it is 
designed to deflect torts and erase lines of legal liability so that it can deliver a dependable return 
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on investment to shareholders. Given this situation, who is the target of an activist campaign? 
And, even more troubling, by what standards are they to be critiqued? ACTWU and the CIW, I 
have argued, worked around these difficulties by highlighting contradictions between words and 
deeds. That is, both groups demonstrated a willingness to ask straightforward questions about 
how a company’s actions measured up to their own organizational discourse. Furthermore, both 
singled out specific members of management they deemed vulnerable and critiqued them 
according to the ethical standards of their home communities. In the Stevens campaign, this 
involved asking how an executive from Avon Corporation, a company that made millions selling 
cosmetics to women, could sit on the board of a company that discriminated against its female 
workers. In the Taco Bell campaign it involved asking how church going executives could justify 
profiting from modern slavery. These last two incidents, in turn, illustrate the power and 
importance of public storytelling disclosure and suggest that not all modes of corporate power 
are likely to strike public audiences as subtle, enabling, or apolitical  
Comparing Typologies 
In response to the second question regarding the relative effectiveness of campaigns, I 
have argued that the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns represent overlapping typologies of 
practice within prospective narrative disclosure in contemporary anti-corporate campaigns. More 
specifically, the Stevens campaign counts as a “martial” campaign where, intermingled with the 
basic rhetorical elements I just described, one finds instrumental strategies and tactics including 
political lobbying, civil suits, and labor strikes that are focused on forcing management’s hand 
on some pressing, short term issue. Activists in these types of campaigns are more concerned 
with changing behaviors than attitudes and are more likely to view controversial practices as 
justified given the need to address some urgent issue. As happened in the Stevens campaign, they 
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are often willing to risk alienating management and animating public sector opposition, so long 
as the company eventually agrees to change some specific business practice. The risks inherent 
to such an approach became apparent in the 1980s and 90s when other groups struggled to 
replicate the initial success of the Stevens campaign.  
The Taco Bell campaign, by contrast, can be viewed as a paradigmatic example of a 
“confrontation/alliance” campaign in which activists focus from the beginning on changing the 
attitudes of corporate management toward some contentious issue and on gradually shifting the 
CSR standards of entire market sectors. Beyond that, they assume that if they can convince a few 
industry leaders to cooperate, then they will be able to build momentum for long-lasting change 
that can spill over into other markets. This is precisely what the CIW has been attempting to do 
by sponsoring campaigns against YUM! Brands, McDonald’s, and Burger King and then moving 
on to smaller players such as Subway, Chipotle Grill, and Quiznos.
10
 The success they 
experienced in the fast food industry enabled them to stage similar long-range campaigns 
targeting grocery retailers (Kroger, Publix, and Trader Joes) and college food service providers 
(Sodexho and Aramark).  
Once again, the CIW is not an isolated example. As I explained earlier, I found dozens of 
examples of other campaigns in which activist groups have determined to influence the business 
practices of entire market sectors, one company at a time.
11
 Prominent examples include the 
“Victoria’s Dirty Secret” campaign sponsored by ForestEthics (part of a larger effort to reduce 
mailings by catalog retailers), the “Ten Campaign” sponsored by the U.K. group Stop the Traffik 
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(aimed at chocolate manufacturers that purchase cocoa beans picked by child slaves), and 
PETA’s Murder King campaign (one in a series of campaigns aimed at convincing fast food 
companies to improve animal welfare standards).
12
  
As these brief reviews of the two typologies suggest, the two case studies provide clear 
evidence that confrontation/alliance campaigns are more likely than martial campaigns to yield 
progressive and enduring changes in the CSR standards of global markets. This is true for two 
reasons: because the former type of campaign is conceived from the start as a long range 
campaign focused on shifting attitudes, and because activists who sponsor them are less likely to 
employ instrumental strategies that carry a greater risk of alienating the opposition. 
This is not to say that there were no other important, intervening factors. In truth, a 
careful review of the case studies suggests at least three factors (in addition to the typology of 
practice I have advocated) that may help to account for the differing outcomes of the two 
campaigns. The first strikes me as mundane, but crucially important. Campaigns evolve; by 
which I mean that activists have learned from the mistakes of the past and have worked to 
implement the best practices of what they viewed as the most effective campaigns. By the 1990s 
labor unions were already absorbing the lessons of the Stevens campaign by forming alliances 
with community-based human rights initiatives in the planning of campaign strategies. During 
this same time period, other activists (most notably environmental groups such as Greenpeace, 
the Rainforest Action Network, and Earth Justice) began to adopt martial style strategies 
including civil suits, political lobbying, and even occupations of facilities for the anti-corporate 
campaigns they sponsored.
13
 Over the years, in other words, anti-corporate activists have learned 
                                                 
12 Amy Merrick, “Victoria’s Secret Goes Green on Paper for Catalogs,” Wall Street Journal, December 7, 
2006; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, “Victory;” Stop the Traffik, “The Ten Campaign.”  
13 I provide brief descriptions of 42 such campaigns in Appendix A, 31 of them focused on environmental 
causes.  
258 
to appropriate the best elements of earlier campaigns in order to address the exigencies at hand 
while at the same time reducing the chances of countermobilization.  
Second, the Stevens campaign was planned and run by a small group of professional 
labor leaders with only modest input from rank and file employees. This prompted some of their 
opponents in management and on the political right to argue that the campaign was not a 
legitimate reflection of the attitudes of the vast majority of workers. By contrast, from its 
inception the CIW has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to community decision-making 
practices. This has made it more difficult for adversaries to dismiss them as professional 
organizers or as a front group for a liberal cabal. 
Third, the global diffusion of communication technologies accelerated in the years 
between the Stevens and Taco Bell campaigns, opening new channels for the distribution of 
stories and providing new opportunities for exploiting contradictions between corporate 
discourse and corporate practices. Consider, for example, that ACTWU rented office space in 
major cities across the U. S. to coordinate protest activities, film screenings, and the distribution 
of literature for the Stevens campaign. Two decades later the CIW was able to use Internet 
technologies to coordinate a similarly complex set of national and even international campaign 
activities from a single office in rural Florida. Even more important, the new technologies 
provided the coalition with more channels for the public circulation of stories and texts. The 
opening of these networks has made it more difficult for multinational corporations to exert 
precise control over organizational communications while at the same time creating a more 
fertile atmosphere for the public circulation of stories, the cross-pollination of issues, and the 
formation of popular demands. 
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From Disclosure to Transformation 
This study has several important implications for future research and practice. First, even 
as we learn more about the rhetorical strategies of anti-corporate activists, we need to know more 
about the nature and practice of corporate resistance strategies. Beyond that, the answers I have 
posited for the two research questions underscore the importance of anti-corporate activism as a 
category of academic inquiry and of studying best practices in anti-corporate protest.  
On the first point, my research confirms Boje’s observation that corporations have 
become students of storytelling and are constantly refining ways to spin the public, dialogic 
circulation of stories and texts to their advantage.
14
 Consider, for instance, the situation of Taco 
Bell and YUM! Brands. By forming a partnership with the CIW, YUM! Brands likely enhanced 
the credibility of a whole range of CSR initiatives pertaining to matters such as their paper 
purchasing practices and their international marketing initiatives. While I am certainly not 
claiming that the Taco Bell and YUM! Brands management team agreed to cooperate with the 
coalition for purely cynical reasons, it is important to note that the penny per pound agreement 
has done nothing to slow the pace of the company’s advertising campaigns or their expansion 
into new corners of the global market.
15
  
The implication of this situation is that, although prospective narrative disclosure may be 
a useful tool for convincing individual corporations and even entire market sectors to address 
their most egregious practices, it remains to be seen whether these gains can check the steady 
progress of the corporate commodification of daily life in any significant and lasting way. For 
that to happen, activists must find ways of disclosing not only heinous practices in remote places 
                                                 
14 Boje, “Spin,” 203. 
15 The most dramatic example is China. In 1987, the company operated one Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet 
in the country. By 2011 it operated 3,200 restaurants in 650 cities. William Mellor, “The Secret to KFC’s Success in 
China,” Washington Post, February 20, 2011. 
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but also the more subtle, coercive intrusions of corporate control into the mundane routines of 
daily life. 
On the second point pertaining to the importance of studying anti-corporate activism, as I 
argued earlier, de Certeau claimed the academy had (for good reason) spent enough time 
mapping networks of discipline. He believed the time had come for a second grand project 
concerned with antidiscipline – that is, for understanding the myriad ways in which people 
negotiate disciplinary terrains in order to open spaces where civil society might flourish.
16
 In the 
present context, de Certeau’s argument points to the need for understanding the possibilities for 
and limitations of anti-corporate activism. In the opening chapter, for instance, I explained that 
rhetoricians have not typically treated anti-corporate campaigns as a distinct category of analysis. 
The same cannot be said for other disciplines including critical management studies, labor 
relations, sociology and critical public relations. At various points in the present study I have 
engaged debates in these literatures, in part to encourage inter-disciplinary dialogues that might 
advance theoretical inquiry and civic practice.  
Beyond that, one way the academy can heed de Certeau’s advice about attending more 
carefully to antidiscipline is by tracking best practices in anti-corporate activism. In that regard, 
the findings of this research project problematize certain longstanding assumptions about 
disciplinary resistance and suggest several practical techniques for advancing praxis. Most 
importantly, my review of the two case studies suggests that the surest route to shifting the CSR 
standards of global markets runs through the ancient territory of plebian, storytelling resistance. 
The accomplishments of the CIW in particular stand in confirmation of arguments put forward 
by writers like Jacques Rancière, Victor Turner, and Michele de Certeau about the creative, 
                                                 
16 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xv. 
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rhetorical capacity of marginalized people.
17
 Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating a 
naïve faith in the capabilities of the masses. Rather, my argument is that marginalized people 
often possess sufficient resources within the traditional storytelling practices of their own 
cultures for identifying and leveraging performative contradictions in discourses of power. This 
assumes that the people who inhabit the humorless terrains on the margins of the global 
marketplace are often forced to become patient students of the daily discourse and practices of 
corporations. Their very invisibility, in fact, works to their advantage, enabling them to 
recognize erasures and incongruities in corporate practice that others would miss. 
What is more, in the digital age activists can leverage their efforts through the use of new 
communication technologies. More to the point, prospective narrative disclosure assumes that 
activists have adapted ancient, iconoclastic, rhetorical tactics (kairos, storytelling, and mētis to be 
specific) for use in a digital age. Telephones, televisions, and computers have provided new 
routes for plebian storytelling circulation and for the articulation of popular demands. This 
popular orientation confirms the emphasis in contemporary anti-corporate activism on egalitarian 
decision-making practices and of the metonymic linking of related causes in the formation of 
political demands. The confrontation/alliance typology extends this logic by singling out 
answerable corporate executives and then using carnivalesque inversion to erase power 
differentials and appeal to them, as errant peers, to mend their ways. It extends it as well by 
assuming that corporate managers are susceptible to peer pressure and by assuming that if the 
                                                 
17 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xiv; Jacques Ranciere, The Philosopher and His Poor, trans. 
Andrew Parker, Corinne Oster and John Drury (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 3; Victor W. Turner, 
The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 93. 
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biggest players in any given market endorse a cause, then smaller companies are likely to 
follow.
18
 
Beyond that, both case studies suggest the global diffusion of news media and personal 
communication technologies has increased opportunities for world-wide dialogic interaction and 
cooperation among activist groups that sponsor anti-corporate campaigns. Not even 
multinational corporations can check the sheer plurivocality of the new global communication 
networks. As new technologies for global communication have become available, activists have 
used them with increasing frequency to conduct research and coordinate strategies in remarkably 
efficient ways. As a direct result of these developments, things that have happened deep within 
company supply chains have sometimes boomeranged back on companies at inopportune times 
and created major public relations disasters.
19
  
The implication is that a complex age has provided activists with new opportunities for 
practicing the arts of narrative disclosure. As they take advantage of these new opportunities by 
crafting new campaigns, anti-corporate activists would be wise to remember that, from the 
earliest times, these traditions have always stressed the importance of intimate knowledge born 
of extended interaction with those in positions of power. In the present context this means that 
(discursive typologies not withstanding) there can never be any such thing as a “one-size-fits-all” 
model of anti-corporate activism. No two anti-corporate campaigns can ever address the same 
exigencies.  
                                                 
18 Forrest Briscoe and Sean Safford describe this sort of practice as an illustration of the “Nixon in China 
effect” according to which “contentious practices spread from initial [highly visible] targets of activism to become 
accepted by organizations in the mainstream.” Forrest Briscoe and Sean Safford, “The Nixon-in-China Effect: 
Activism, Imitation, and the Institutionalization of Contentious Practices,” Administrative Science Quarterly 53 
(2008), 460. 
19 In using the term “boomerang” here, I am thinking of Keck and Sikkink’s description of the 
“boomerang effect” in global activism. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) 12. 
 
263 
For this reason, those who plan anti-corporate campaigns should be wary of stereotypes 
of management behavior. Everyone understands, for example, the potential for cynicism in CSR 
strategies. Still, they dare not fall prey to these stereotypes by becoming cynical themselves. If 
activists are to make any progress in shifting the behavioral trajectories of corporations, they 
must recognize that they are negotiating with people, not stereotypes. Corporations may be 
fictive entities devoid of consciences, but managers and investors are not. Most CSR documents 
have to be accepted at face value as sincere efforts to position a company as a responsible (albeit 
fictive) participant in civil society willing to conduct business in a fair, above board manner. As 
the economist Joseph Stiglitz has explained, that a company would attempt to frame itself this 
way in the public consciousness makes economic sense. So-called “asymmetries in information” 
(better known as lack of organizational transparency) may provide a company or governing 
institution with some short term advantages, but they also destabilize markets and can cost 
corporations and economies a good deal of money over the long haul.
20
  
I want to close by highlighting the tension Stiglitz identifies between a reflexive instinct 
on the part of many corporate decision makers to maintain confidentiality and an emergent 
consensus among economists and business scholars that lack of transparency is often a very bad 
idea. As Stiglitz explains, many prominent corporations assume unnecessary risks by 
underestimating the risks of confidentiality and the benefits of organizational transparency. 
These sorts of miscalculations have often resulted in serious discrepancies between what 
companies say in public and how they actually conduct business on a daily basis in remote 
corners of the global marketplace. In the closing decades of the twentieth century anti-corporate 
activists discovered ways of exploiting this situation in order to challenge the business policies of 
                                                 
20 Michael Hirsh, “The Most Misunderstood Man in America; Joseph Stiglitz Predicted the Global 
Financial Meltdown. So Why Can’t He Get Any Respect Here at Home?” Newsweek 154, no. 4 (2009), 44; Joseph 
Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), xi. 
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individual companies and the de facto social responsibility standards of entire market sectors. In 
a sense, the world has seen this scenario before. In the nineteenth century, abolitionists 
succeeded in ending the slave trade in the British Empire by contrasting the high sounding words 
of English business people against their actual practices.
21
 The anti-corporate activists of the 
twenty-first century can provide an important service to civil society by continuing to follow the 
example of their abolitionist predecessors. 
  
                                                 
21 Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics, 159-200 passim.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: A Listing of Anti-Corporate Campaigns 
C = confrontation/alliance typology 
M = martial typology 
Total =173 campaigns (77 C; 96 M) 
 
Type Target Title Sponsor Dates Cause Notes 
M 
Adam’s 
Mark Hotels   NAACP 
 1999-
2001 
racial 
discrim-
ination 
boycott in response to 
flap over room rentals for 
the 1999 Black College 
Reunion; company sued 
NAACP, then apologized 
M 
Albertson’s 
Super 
Markets   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 1984 
union 
contract 
sponsored by Kamber 
Group; media campaign 
w/character attacks on 
company founder; 
campaign stalled 
M 
American 
Airlines   
APFA 
(Assoc. of 
Professional 
Flight 
Attendants) 1986-87 
union 
contract 
Ray Rogers worked as 
consultant; battle over 
two-tier wage scheme; 
multiple fronts; company 
conceded 
M 
American 
Airlines  
APFA 
(Assoc. of 
Professional 
Flight 
Attendants) 1990-91 
gender 
discrim-
ination 
campaign resulted in 
changes to weight 
standards for female 
flight attendants; Rogers 
consulted 
C Aramark   CIW ongoing 
wages & 
slavery 
Aramark is nation’s 
largest food service 
company serving colleges 
C ARCO   
Free Burma 
Coalition 1995-98 
cooperation 
w/corrupt 
regime 
company ceased 
operations in Burma 
C 
ASHTA 
Chemicals 
Stop Seafood 
Contamination Oceana ongoing 
chemical 
contaminatio
n of seafood 
chemicals in seafood; 
internet petition 
campaign; signed 
agreement with Costco, 
2008 
M 
Bank of 
America   
CORE 
(Congress of 
Racial 
Equality) 1963 
racial 
discrim-
ination 
only 1.9% Black 
employees; pioneering 
push for transparent 
hiring policies; state 
government pressured the 
company 
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M BASF   
OCAW (Oil, 
Chemical 
and Atomic 
Workers 
Union) 1985-89 
union 
contract; 
environment; 
racism 
US and South African 
unions, environmentalists 
cooperated to win 
campaign against 
German company; 
dubbed “Bhopal on the 
Bayou” 
C 
Baxter 
International   
Interfaith 
Center on 
Corporate 
Responsibilit
y, 
Greenpeace, 
SEIU 1998-99 
reduce use of 
PVC 
company agreed to end 
practice 
C Bayer Group   
Coalition 
against 
Bayer-
Dangers ongoing 
pesticides; 
industrial 
chemicals; 
GMO food 
series of campaigns; 
based in Germany 
M Bayou Steel   USWA 1993-96 
union 
contract; 
NLRB 
violations 
company settled; agreed 
to address NLRB issues 
M 
BE&K 
Building 
Group   
UBC (United 
Brotherhood 
of 
Carpenters) 1984-93 
hiring of 
non-union 
workers 
nationwide campaign; 
OSHA complaints; video 
“BE&K: The Workers’ 
Enemy”; community 
meetings 
M 
Beverly 
Enterprises   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers); 
SEIU 
(Service 
Employees 
International 
Union) 1982-83 
union 
contract 
union recognized; intense 
financial, shareholder 
pressure; media 
campaign re: quality of 
care 
C Blockbuster 
Blockbuster 
Victims 
Online   ongoing 
unfair 
business 
practices monitoring site 
C 
Blue 
Diamond 
Growers   
International 
Longshore & 
Warehouse 
Union 
(ILWU) ongoing 
union 
contract 
campaign was featured 
along w/Resurrection 
Health Care and Verizon 
campaigns in AFL/CIO 
presentation at the United 
States Social Forum in 
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Atlanta in 2007 
C 
book and 
magazine 
publishers 
Book and 
Magazine 
Paper 
Campaign 
Markets 
Initiative 
(now, 
CANOPY) ongoing 
Protect 
forests, 
environment 
Canadian campaign; one 
of a series of campaigns; 
Harry Potter books 
targeted (now the 
“greenest books in 
history”) 
C Bowater, Inc. 
Bowater 
Campaign 
Dogwood 
Alliance & 
NRDC 
(Natural 
Resources 
Defense 
Council) 2005 
sustainable 
forest 
management 
practices 
Internet petition 
campaign; media events; 
nation’s largest news 
print producer concedes 
M 
BP (British 
Petroleum)   Greenpeace ongoing 
halt offshore 
oil drilling; 
Alaska 
North Slope 
shareholder activism; 
cooperated with Inuit 
peoples 
M 
BP and other 
oil corps. 
Canadian 
Indigenous 
Tar Sands 
Campaign 
Indigenous 
Environment
al Network ongoing 
tar sands 
mining; 
health; 
indigenous 
rights 
Canadian IEN vs. BP et 
al; BP did an about face 
on its “Beyond 
Petroleum” strategy and 
pursued oil profits via tar 
sands 
M 
Bridgestone/
Firestone   
URW 
(United 
Rubber 
Workers) & 
IBT 
(Teamsters) 1995 
union 
contract 
Union set up “Camp 
Justice” @ US corporate 
headquarters; faxed 
family photos to 
executives in Japan; 
heavy media coverage 
M 
Brooklyn 
Union Gas  
TWU 
(Transport 
Workers 
Union) 1995 
union 
contract 
1,800 workers earn 
contract over company 
demands for steep pay 
cuts; Rogers consulted 
M 
Brown and 
Root   
Texas 
Building and 
Trades 
Council 1983 
union 
contract 
Rogers was hired, but 
campaign was cut short 
due to public backlash 
M 
Browne and 
Sharpe   
International 
Association 
of 
Machinists) 1982 
union 
contract 
IAM papers @ GSU; 
Rogers was hired & fired; 
company was 
aggressively anti-union; 
union filed unfair labor 
practices lawsuit; 
company settled 
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C Burger King Murder King PETA 2001 
humane 
slaughter company conceded, 2001 
C Burger King   CIW 2008 
wages & 
slavery 
company conceded after 
firing corporate VP for 
bungling campaign 
M Cairn Energy Cairn Energy Greenpeace ongoing 
environ-
mental: 
prevent oil 
wells near 
Greenland 
courts ordered 
Greenpeace to stop 
“Tweeting” photos from 
protest site, supporters re-
sent the photos. 
M 
Campbell’s 
Soup   
FLOC (Farm 
Labor 
Organizing 
Committee) 1984 
labor 
contract 
Rogers was consultant; 
contrasting style w/CIW, 
strong leadership @ 
FLOC vs. shared 
leadership @ CIW 
C 
catalog 
retailers 
Catalog 
Cutdown Forest Ethics ongoing 
endangered 
forests 
series of campaigns 
w/long list of companies 
signing on 
M 
Caterpillar 
Tractor   UAW 1991-98 
union 
contract; 
NLRB 
violations; 
non-union 
workers 
media emphasis w/rank 
and file talking points; 
record 441 NLRB 
violations; company 
made modest concessions 
M 
Cement 
industry 
Don’t Trash 
Our Lungs Earth Justice 
2004-
2010 
halt mercury 
pollution 
from cement 
kilns 
claimed victory in 2010 
when EPA announced 
new guidelines for air 
pollution from kilns 
M Chevron 
Chevron vs. 
Sierra Club 
Sierra 
Club/Gulf 
Restoration 
Network 2009 
environ-
mental: oil 
wells in Gulf 
of Mexico; 
LA Bayou 
featured congressional 
lobbying 
M Chevron   
Human 
Rights Watch 1998 
human 
rights; halt 
drilling in 
Nigeria 
featured lawsuit and 
Congressional lobbying 
M 
Chevron 
(formerly 
Texaco) 
Chevron-
Toxico 
Amazon 
Watch ongoing 
Amazon 
environment; 
health; 
indigenous 
rights 
dubbed “Amazon 
Chernobyl,” dumping of 
waste in Ecuador; 
Internet petition; federal 
court case 
C 
Chipotle 
Grill Chipocracy CIW ongoing 
wages & 
slavery 
protracted campaign; 
company claims to serve 
“food with integrity” 
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M 
Citicorp and 
other 
international 
banks 
Global 
Finance 
Campaign 
Rainforest 
Action 
Network ongoing 
funding of 
environment
ally 
destructive 
projects 
featured shareholder 
activism 
M Coal industry 
Stop Mountain 
Top Removal 
Mining Earth Justice ongoing 
stop 
mountain top 
removal 
mining in 
coal industry 
Earth Justice motto is: 
“Because the earth needs 
a good lawyer.” 
C Coca-Cola 
Campaign to 
Hold Coca-
Cola 
Accountable 
India 
Resource 
Center ongoing 
water 
shortages; 
toxic waste 
groups claims company is 
damaging water tables 
and distributing fertilizer 
containing toxic waste 
C Coca-Cola Killer Coke 
Corporate 
Campaigns, 
Inc. ongoing 
union 
contract; 
criminal 
prosecution 
Rogers serves as pro 
bono consultant; claims 
of execution of union 
leaders in Colombia; 
several federal law suits 
under alien tort statutes 
C Coca-Cola   As You Sow 2007 recycling 
company agreed to reuse 
bottles made of PET and 
build recycling plant 
C 
Coca-Cola, 
et. al. 
Caring 
Consumer PETA 2007 
animal 
testing & 
cruelty 
series of campaigns 
(PepsiCo, OceanSpray, 
POM Wonderful); 
companies agreed to halt 
animal testing 
C 
companies & 
industries 
using 
astroturf 
campaigns 
bermanexpose
d.com 
Center for 
Responsibil-
ity and Ethics 
in 
Washington ongoing 
expose 
astroturf 
campaigns 
criticizes Richard 
Berman’s anti-activist 
websites 
M Conoco   
Rainforest 
Action 
Network 1991 
drilling in 
Amazon 
rainforest 
company abandoned 
project to drill in Yasuni 
National Park in Ecuador; 
featured shareholder 
activism 
M 
Consolidated 
Edison  
UWUA 
(Utility 
Workers 
Union of 
America) 1988-89 
union 
contract 
campaign featured mile-
long “human billboard” 
in Manhattan; resulted in 
union contract; Rogers 
consulted 
M 
Consolidated 
Foods (Sarah 
Lee) &   ACTWU 1982-83 
union 
contract; 
EEOC & 
Rogers was consultant; 
media emphasis; 
endorsed by religious 
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Hanes 
Hosiery 
NLRB 
violations 
organizations, NOW, 
celebrities, SCLC; 
company cooperated w/ 
EEOC 
M 
Continental 
Airlines   
ALPA 
(Airline 
Pilots 
Association) 1983-84 
labor 
contract 
crushing loss when 
corporation filed Chapter 
11 
M 
Continental 
Tire   
USW & 
ICEM 1998-99 
union 
contract; 
NLRB 
violations; 
non-union 
workers 
strike @ plant in NC; 
protests and sympathy 
strikes across Europe and 
South Africa; company 
settled 
M 
corporate 
farms  
California 
Strawberry 
Workers 
UFW 
(United Farm 
Workers) 1996 
union 
contract 
campaign ended when 
workers voted for 
independent union 
M 
Dell 
Computer Dellception 
CREW 
(Citizens for 
Responsi-
bility and 
Ethics in 
Washington) ongoing 
next day 
warranties 
and lack of 
service 
follow up campaign to 34 
state settlement on 
service plans 
M 
Delta Pride 
Catfish   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 1990 
labor 
contract; 
racism 
charges of racism, OSHA 
dispute 
M 
Detroit 
Edison 
Merchants of 
Shame 
NOW 
(National 
Organization 
of Women) 1998 
sexual 
harassment 
featured class action 
lawsuits; company agreed 
to terms 
M 
DirecTech 
(DirecTV 
installer)  
IBEW 
(International 
Brotherhood 
of Electrical 
Workers) 2008 
union 
contract 
company hired law firm 
Jackson Lewis (widely 
viewed as anti-union) to 
negotiate with union after 
successful election; 
campaign featured 
protests at DirectTV 
annual meeting; Rogers 
consulted 
C 
Dow 
Chemical   
SDS 
(Students for 
a Democratic 
Society) and 
other 60s 1966-69 Napalm 
protests have no effect on 
profits; management 
complained campaign 
was stressful and hurt 
company image; 
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protest 
groups 
company conceded 
nothing 
M 
DuPont and 
other 
chemical 
corps 
Ozone 
Campaign Greenpeace 1992-97 
ozone 
destroying 
chemicals 
Ray Rogers helped plan; 
companies disputed 
science claims; resulted 
in worldwide regulatory 
changes 
M 
Eastern 
Airlines  
TWU 
(Transportati
on Workers 
Union) 1989 
union 
contract 
CEO Frank Lorenzo 
demanded steep pay cuts; 
union strike and 
campaign shut down air 
service; campaign ended 
when Lorenzo sold off 
airline in pieces; Rogers 
consulted 
M 
Eastman 
Kodak   
FIGHT 
(Freedom, 
Integration, 
God, Honor, 
Today) 1964-67 
jobs; racial 
discriminatio
n 
annual meeting 
strategies; threat of 
farting en masse at 
concert hall; company 
concedes 
C Electrolux 
Jobkiller 
Electrolux 
Social Forum 
Nuremberg ongoing 
prevent 
factory 
closings; job 
flight 
based in Germany; being 
fought out plant by plant 
in Germany; international 
petition campaign 
C Exxon Mobil 
Exxpose-
Exxon 
18 groups 
(Greenpeace, 
MoveOn.org, 
& Sierra 
Club, et al) ongoing 
environment
al issues & 
global 
warming 
complaints include: pay 
for Valdez spill, funding 
front groups & junk 
science 
C 
F. W. 
Woolworth   
SNCC 
(Student 
Non-Violent 
Coordinating 
Committee) 1960 
racial 
discrimi-
nation 
Woolworth’s targeted 
due to national stature; 
highlighted complicity of 
a national corporation in 
regional segregation 
practices 
M 
Farah 
Manufactur-
ing   
ACWU 
(Amalgamat-
ed Clothes 
Workers’ 
Union) 1972-74 
union 
contract 
organized by Ray Rogers, 
et. al.; company settled; 
church, college 
involvement; company 
moved manufacturing to 
Mexico in 80s 
M 
Federal 
Express   
ALPA 
(Airlines 
Pilots 
Association) 1996 
union 
contract 
featured work slowdown; 
allegations of OSHA 
safety violations; 
company settled 
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M Food Lion   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 1992-95 
labor 
contract; 
food safety 
campaign featured in 
ABC PrimeTime Live 
news documentary; 
company filed suit 
against ABC and 
ultimately lost 
M Ford, et. al. 
Global 
Warming 
Shareholder 
Campaign Ceres ongoing 
environ-
mental 
sustainability 
featured shareholder 
activism 
C 
forestry 
companies 
and 
consumers Don’t Buy SFI 
Dogwood 
Alliance and 
the Alliance 
for Credible 
Forest 
Certification ongoing 
ban 
Sustainable 
Forestry 
Initiative 
claims SFI is industry 
front (greenwashing) 
M 
Freeport-
McMoRan   
Rainforest 
Action 
Network 1990s 
Indonesian 
mining 
operation; 
indigenous 
rights 
large mining corps; 
payments to local 
military; company 
endowed environmental 
chairs @ US colleges 
C GAP GAP Sucks 
Forest 
Stewardship 
Council 2004 
CA 
redwoods; 
old growth 
lumber 
amateurish site; but 
appears to have sizeable 
following; claims family 
that owns GAP owns 
logging company 
C GAP 
GAP 
Sweatshops 
Campaign 
Wetlands 
Preserve 1999 
sweatshop 
labor 
campaign announced, but 
no apparent follow 
through 
M 
Gardenburge
r   
Oregon Food 
Workers 
Union 
(PCUN, 
Pineros y 
Campesinos 
Unidos del 
Noroeste) 1997-99 
union 
contract; 
human 
rights; child 
labor 
company was secondary 
target in NORPAC 
campaign; settled and 
broke ties w/NORPAC 
C 
Georgia 
Pacific 
Boycott 
Georgia 
Pacific   ongoing 
pollution of 
St. John’s 
River in FL 
company has agreed to 
spend millions on 
environmental 
technology; lobbying of 
state/local governments 
M 
Georgia-
Pacific   
Rainforest 
Action 
Network ongoing 
harvesting 
endangered 
timber, 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is world’s 
leading plywood 
supplier; charges of clear 
cutting & environmental 
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devastation 
M 
Giumarra 
Vineyards 
Corp. & 
other grape 
growers   
UFW 
(United Farm 
Workers) 1967-78 
union 
contract 
national boycott resulted 
in union contracts & 
1975 California 
Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act 
M Guess? Jeans   UNITE 1997 
payment of 
minimum 
wage 
union sued the company 
over failure to pay 
minimum wage; 
company lost court case, 
moved operations to 
Mexico 
C 
Hoescht/Rho
ne Poulenc   
Fund for the 
Feminist 
majority 1992 
speed up 
availability 
of RU-486 
Ray Rogers was 
consulted; prolife 
backlash 
M Home Depot   
Rainforest 
Action 
Network 1998-99 
sale of 
lumber from 
old growth 
trees 
featured “rescue” of 
lumber from local stores; 
company agreed to phase 
out sales of lumber from 
old growth trees 
M 
Hormel 
Foods   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 1985-86 
labor 
contract; 
NLRB 
violations 
Rogers worked as 
consultant and was jailed; 
widely studied failure; 
union was thrown out; 
Governor called in 
National Guard 
C 
Iam’s pet 
food Iam’s Cruelty PETA 
on-
going 
animal 
cruelty 
undercover operation; 
claims dogs suffer in 
Iam’s lab experiments  
C 
industrial 
agriculture”   Primal Seeds 
on-
going 
biodiversity; 
local food 
security 
active in global 
environmental protests; 
advocate “guerilla 
gardening” 
C 
industrial 
paper 
companies 
and their 
customers 
Packaging 
Campaign 
Dogwood 
Alliance 
on-
going 
paper 
packaging 
focused on packaging of 
recorded music, 
cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, fast 
food 
M 
International 
Paper  
United 
Paperworkers 
International 
Union 1987 
union 
contract 
management was 
emboldened by  union 
busting strategies of J. P. 
Stevens and locked out 
union workers; Rogers 
consulted; union lost 
several contracts 
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M 
Iowa Beef 
Processors   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 1986-88 
union 
contract; 
workplace 
safety 
union claimed company 
had mafia connections; 
Congressional hearings; 
parent company 
(Occidental Petroleum) 
pressured union; 
company settled out of 
court 
M J P Stevens   ACTWU 1976-80 
union 
contract 
Rogers chaired the 
national boycott 
committee; campaign 
was featured in the film 
Norma Rae; ten textile 
plants unionized 
C 
Johnson & 
Johnson, et 
al. 
PVC: 
Recycling 
Killer 
Grass Roots 
Recycling 
Network & 
Center for 
Health 
Environment 
& Justice 
on-
going 
PVC 
packaging 
and products 
cooperative effort 
w/Center for Health and 
Environmental Justice; 
resulted in pledges from 
dozens of companies 
C 
Kimberly-
Clark   Greenpeace 
on-
going 
old growth 
forests 
activists locked down the 
company’s Canadian 
national offices; spread 
wood chips in hall ways 
C 
Manchester 
Hotels, Corp. 
Boycott 
Manchester 
Hotels 
Californians 
Against Hate 
campaign 2008 gay marriage Prop 8 protest 
C MasterFoods 
MasterFoods 
Boycott 
Operation 
Black Vote 2004 
racist 
advertising 
UK campaign; concluded 
successfully in 2004 
C Mattel   Greenpeace 1999 
reduce use of 
PVC 
company agreed to end 
practice; EU banned toys 
w/PVC 
M McDonald’s 
McLibel 
Support 
Campaign 
McLibel 
Support 
Campaign 1997 
support UK 
“McLibel” 
case 
company sued 
environmental activists 
for libel; McDonald’s 
won (after 10 years); lost 
PR war; conflict featured 
in documentary film 
C McDonald’s   CIW 2007 
wages & 
slavery 
company was 
embarrassed by bad 
research and conceded all 
terms 
C 
McDonald’s 
and other fast 
food chains 
Value the 
Meal 
Corporate 
Accounta-
bility 
on-
going 
advertising 
to children; 
nutrition info 
CAI lobbied corporate 
and governmental actors 
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International 
(formerly 
ACA) 
C Metro Group   
NLC 
(National 
Labor 
Committee) 2009 
sweatshops; 
union 
contracts 
NLC accused German 
corporation (world’s 5th 
largest retailer) of selling 
goods made in 
sweatshops in 
Bangladesh 
M Microsoft 
Consumer 
Choice 
Campaign Net Action 
on-
going 
FCC 
enforcement 
of anti-trust 
laws 
the campaign lives on, 
but made the most noise 
in early 90s; CCC 
monitors Microsoft 
M Mitsubishi   
Rainforest 
Action 
Network 1989 
harvesting of 
old growth 
timber 
pressured banks owned in 
US; publicity stunts at 
auto shows; company 
settled 
M Mitsubishi 
Merchants of 
Shame 
NOW; 
Operation 
PUSH 1996-98 
sexual 
harassment 
& racial 
discrim-
ination 
class action suit against 
company & UAW; 
settled for $34 million 
and contract changes 
C Mitsubishi   
Natural 
Resources 
Defense 
Council 
1999-
2000 
salt 
extraction in 
Baja 
California 
US based campaign 
against Japanese 
corporation; re: operation 
in Mexico; company ends 
project 
C Monsanto 
Millions 
Against 
Monsanto OCA 2007 
hormones in 
milk 
ten year campaign 
resulted in Monsanto 
putting milk hormone 
division up for sale 
M Monsanto   Greenpeace ongoing GMO foods 
1999 class action suit & 
lobbying UN; 
Greenpeace lost on both 
fronts; efforts continue 
M 
Mosaic 
Phosphate   Earth Justice 2008 
Phosphate 
mining in FL 
featured federal law suit; 
ended w/ Army Corps of 
Engineers refusing mine 
permit 
M 
Mount Olive 
Pickles 
Mount Olive 
Boycott FLOC 
1998-
2004 wage dispute 
company paid more for 
cucumbers; first union to 
represent guest workers; 
sued growers. 
C Multiple 
Computer 
TakeBack 
Campaign 
Electronics 
TakeBack 
Coalition ongoing 
responsible 
recycling 
Internet petition; looks at 
all stages of manufacture, 
sale, and disposal 
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C 
music 
industry 
Greening the 
Music 
Industry 
Dogwood 
Alliance ongoing 
paper 
packaging 
part of larger campaign to 
encourage less 
packaging, more 
recycling in retail 
M Nestle 
International 
Nestlé Boycott 
Baby Milk 
Action ongoing 
sale of infant 
formula in 
Third World 
monitors Nestlé’s 
compliance 
w/international accords 
M Nestle Tell Nestle 
Food and 
Water Watch ongoing 
prevent use 
of Miami-
Dade public 
drinking 
water 
sponsor campaigns 
nationwide based on local 
environmental issues 
M Nestle   
Action for 
Corporate 
Accountabilit
y (now CAI) 1984-88 
sale of infant 
formula in 
Third World 
claimed Nestlé was not 
abiding by international 
agreements 
C 
Nestle, 
Cadbury, et 
al. Ten Campaign 
Stop the 
Traffik ongoing 
slavery/hum
an 
trafficking 
originally named the 
“Chocolate Campaign;” 
Changed name after “ten” 
years; Nestlé & other 
companies have 
cooperated; 70% of world 
chocolate supply comes 
from W Africa where 
15,000 child slaves are 
reported to work in cocoa 
farming 
C 
Nestle, Wal-
Mart, et.al. 
E Waste 
Shareholder 
Campaign As You Sow ongoing 
responsible 
recycling 
Dell and Apple are 
among the companies 
that have signed on 
C Nike   UNITE 1990s 
sweatshop 
labor; job 
flight 
unclear when the 
campaign ended; UNITE 
cooperated w/NOW & 
Campaign for Fair Labor 
C Nike   
Oxfam 
Australia ongoing 
sweatshop 
labor 
exchanged series of 
public letters w/company; 
monitors corporate 
practices in SE Asia 
C Nike Just Pay It 
USAS 
(United 
Students 
Against 
Sweatshops) 2010 
sweatshop 
labor; back 
wages 
claimed that as of 
January, 2010 company 
owed $2.1 million in 
back wages to Honduran 
workers 
C Nike   
USAS 
(United 
Students ongoing 
sweatshop 
labor 
has sponsored a series of 
campaigns starting in 
1990s 
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Against 
Sweatshops) 
M 
NORPAC 
Food Sales   
Oregon Food 
Workers 
Union 
(PCUN, 
Pineros y 
Campesinos 
Unidos del 
Noroeste) ongoing 
union 
contract; 
human 
rights; child 
labor 
began in 1997; almost 
settled 2002; Has 
featured legislative battle; 
boycott; campus activity; 
worker tours 
M 
Northern 
Indiana 
Public 
Service 
Company 
(NIPSCO) NIPSCO USW 1997 
union 
contract 
See Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate, 
and Tom Juravich, “The 
Evolution of Strategic 
and Coordinated 
Bargaining Campaigns in 
The 1990s” 
M 
Northwest 
Airlines   
ALPA 
(Airlines 
Pilots 
Association) 1978 
union 
contract 
Rogers worked as 
consultant; brought 
pressure on corporate 
financiers; settled 
contract 
M 
Obayashi 
Construction 
& Toyota   
Kentucky 
Building and 
Construction 
Trades 
Council 1986 
hiring of 
non-union 
workers 
Kamber Group was 
consulted; company 
agreed to unions for US 
construction projects; 
protests @ dealerships 
C Office Depot 
Office Depot 
Campaign 
Dogwood 
Alliance 2007 
endangered 
forests concluded successfully 
C Office Max 
Office Max 
Campaign 
Dogwood 
Alliance 2007 
endangered 
forests concluded successfully 
M Ogden/Danly   USW 1984 
union 
contract 
Kamber Group consulted; 
contract settled 
C 
Oil 
companies 
Boston Oil 
Party 
People’s 
Bicentennial 
Action 
Center 1973 
hold oil 
companies 
accountable 
for “energy 
crisis” 
group was led by Jeremy 
Rifkin; dumped oil cans 
into Boston Harbor 
M 
Pacifica 
Radio 
Grand Theft: 
Radio 
alliance of 
radio 
producers 
and audience 
members 2001-2 
stop 
censorship 
of politically 
progressive 
program-
ming 
Rogers helped plan 
successful effort to oust 
certain members of the 
radio network’s board of 
directors 
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M 
pharmaceu-
tical industry 
Campaign to 
Stop Biotech 
Looting 
International 
Brotherhood 
of Electrical 
Workers 2008-10 
labor 
conditions & 
corporate 
welfare 
Rogers helped plan 
campaign to expose 
union-busting efforts and 
excessive profits among 
pharmaceutical 
companies based in 
Massachusetts 
C Philip Morris 
Crashing 
Philip Morris 
Art Party 
Global 
Partnerships 
for Tobacco 
Control 2006 tobacco 
featured student protests; 
sponsored ASEAN Art 
Awards in Thailand 
M  Portland, OR   
SweatFree 
Communities 2007 
sweatshop 
labor 
City of Portland agreed 
not to buy clothing made 
in sweatshops 
C Publix   CIW ongoing 
wages & 
slavery 
as with McDonald’s and 
Burger King, company 
has made costly PR 
missteps; controversial 
filming incident; 
controversial statements 
from management 
C 
PVC 
products 
retailers PVC Products 
Center for 
Health, 
Environment, 
and Justice ongoing 
eradicating 
use of PVC 
group claims more than 
100 corporations have 
agreed to go PVC free 
M Ravenswood 
Ravenswood 
Aluminum 
Company USWA 1990 
union 
contract 
strong rank and file 
participation; seen as 
turning point in union 
activism 
M 
Resurrection 
Health Care 
(RHC) 
Resurrection 
Healthcare 
American 
Federation of 
State, County 
and 
Municipal 
Employees, 
AFL-CIO 2003 
union 
contract 
aims to return Catholic 
organization to original 
mission to serve poor 
M 
Rio Tinto 
Mining   
ICEM 
(International 
Federation of 
Chemical, 
Energy, Mine 
and General 
Workers’ 
Unions) ongoing 
indigenous 
rights; 
protect 
environment 
campaign started in 1998; 
features shareholder 
activism 
M 
R. J. 
Reynolds  
FLOC (Farm 
Labor 
2008- 
present 
union 
contract/safe 
FLOC currently 
represents 7,000 workers 
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Tobacco Organizing 
Committee) 
working 
conditions 
and aims to represent 
entire workforce of 
30,000; claims  workers 
suffer from exposure to 
nicotine and pesticides; 
Rogers serves as 
consultant 
C 
Royal 
Caribbean 
Cruise Lines 
Royal 
Caribbean 
Campaign Oceana 2004 
wastewater 
treatment 
concluded successfully; 
Oceana sponsors many 
campaigns 
M salmon farms 
Farmed and 
Dangerous 
Coastal 
Alliance for 
Aquaculture 
Reform 
(CAAR) ongoing 
environment
al threat of 
ocean 
salmon 
farming 
supported by indigenous 
“First Nations” & 
commercial fishing 
industry; lobbying of US 
& Canadian governments 
M 
Sawyer 
Lumber   
PACE (Paper 
Allied-
Industrial 
Chemical 
and Energy 
Workers) 
1999-
2000 
union 
contract 
company refused to 
recognize union vote & 
court decision; 
Louisiana-Pacific bought 
the company and honored 
union contract 
M 
Scott Printing 
Company  
Jersey City 
Typographic
al No. 94 1983 
union 
contract 
long-term, small scale 
labor strike (27 workers) 
ends shortly after start of 
campaign organized by 
Ray Rogers 
M 
SeaFirst 
Bank   
UFCW 
(United Food 
and 
Commercial 
Workers) 
1978-
1996 
union 
contract 
Rogers served as 
consultant; protracted 
court fight re: union 
jurisdiction; settled in 
1996; union membership 
declined 
M Shell Oil Boycott Shell 
Essential 
Action ongoing 
Nigerian oil 
wells; 
human rights 
claims company is 
complicit in destruction 
of wetlands and 
execution of activists 
M Shell Oil 
Brent Spar 
Campaign Green Peace 1995 
planned 
sinking of oil 
storage 
facility 
activists occupied 
facility; protest actions @ 
Shell service stations; 
company agreed to 
dismantle facility on 
shore 
M Shell Oil Shell Oil 
Gulf 
Restoration 
Network ongoing 
environment
al: Gulf of 
Mexico; LA 
Bayou 
related to Chevron 
campaign 
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C Sinar Mas 
Pulping the 
Planet Greenpeace ongoing 
Environ-
mental: 
deforestation 
of Indonesia 
by paper 
manufacturer 
several corps have agreed 
not to buy from Sinar 
Mas until it changes its 
environmental policy 
M Siemens 
Siemens-
Boykott 
International 
Physicians 
for 
Prevention of 
Nuclear War ongoing 
nuclear 
power plants 
group won 1985 Nobel 
Peace Prize; features 
corporate and 
governmental lobbying 
M Smith Barney 
Merchants of 
Shame NOW 1997-98 
Sexual 
harassment company settled 
C Staples 
Staples 
Campaign 
Dogwood 
Alliance 2002 
Endangered 
forests concluded successfully 
C Starbucks 
Frankenbucks 
Campaign 
Organic 
Consumers 
Association 2007 
hormones in 
milk 
featured 
independent/spontaneous 
protests at local stores 
worldwide; carnivalesque 
themes; internet petition 
C Starbucks   
US & 
Guatemala 
Labor 
Education 
Project 2000 
fair trade 
coffee 
company agreed to terms 
quickly 
M 
Statoil, 
Mobil, and 
Enterprise oil 
Atlantic 
Frontier Greenpeace 1998 
prevent oil 
drilling in 
pristine area 
of N Sea 
activists blockaded 
drilling site; partial 
victory; company was 
allowed to drill in limited 
area 
C Subway   CIW 2008 
wages & 
slavery 
corporation signed onto 
the penny per pound 
standard after a brief 
campaign 
C Swatch 
Swatch 
Boycott   1999 
illegal use of 
radio 
frequency 
group went after most 
visible company in a 
conglomerate; European 
campaign 
C Taco Bell Boot the Bell CIW 2005 
wages & 
slavery 
CIW’s first national 
campaign; company 
endorsed penny per 
pound initiative and 
encouraged other fast 
food companies to do the 
same 
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M 
Texas 
International 
Airlines Bad Apple 
ALPA 
(Airline 
Pilots 
Association) 1981 
union 
contract 
short campaign against 
company owned by 
airline magnate Frank 
Lorenzo; resulted in labor 
contract 
M 
Tobacco 
industry 
Challenging 
Big Tobacco 
Corporate 
Accounta-
bility 
International ongoing Tobacco 
supports Global Tobacco 
Treaty (UN initiative); 
targeted governmental 
and corporate actors 
C 
Toy and 
jewelry 
manufac-
turers 
Eliminating 
Lead in 
Children’s 
Products 
Center for 
Environment
al Health ongoing 
lead in water 
and paint 
CEH is considered a 
leader in the 
environmental justice 
movement 
C Trader Joe’s 
Trader Joe’s 
Campaign CIW ongoing 
wages & 
slavery 
company has admitted 
need to improve wages 
and working conditions, 
but refuses to sign 
agreement. 
M 
Transamerica 
Airlines  
ALPA 
(Airline 
Pilots 
Association) 1984-85 
union 
contract 
company had sought 
wage cuts of up to 60%; 
campaign failed to 
produce contract; 
company dissolved in 
1986; Rogers consulted 
M 
TWA 
Airlines  
IFFA 
(International 
Federation of 
Flight 
Attendants) 1986-87 
union 
contract 
union launched campaign 
after Carl Icahn 
purchased company and 
demanded steep wage 
cuts; Icahn hired 
replacements, but union 
eventually reinstated; 
Rogers consulted 
M 
Union 
Carbide and 
Dow 
Chemical 
International 
Campaign for 
Justice in 
Bhopal 
International 
Campaign 
for Justice in 
Bhopal 2007 
justice for 
victims of 
chemical 
spill 
convinced government of 
India to take legal action 
in response to Bhopal 
chemical disaster 
M 
United Parcel 
Service   
IBT 
(International 
Brotherhood 
of 
Teamsters) 1996-97 
union 
contract 
dramatic campaign 
victory tainted by Carey 
funding scandal 
C 
universities 
& clothing 
manufac-
turers 
Sweat Free 
Campus 
United 
Students 
Against 
Sweatshops ongoing 
sweatshop 
labor 
group cooperates with 
Killer Coke campaign 
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C universities 
Campus 
Community 
Solidarity 
United 
Students 
Against 
Sweatshops ongoing 
fair wages 
for campus 
workers 
links local/international 
campaigns 
M USX 
USX 
campaign USWA 1986 
union 
contract 
demanded corporate 
transparency; showdown 
over steel delivery 
practices; partial victory; 
union reinstated 
C various 
Forest 
Management 
for the 21st 
Century 
Dogwood 
Alliance, et. 
al. ongoing 
old growth 
forests 
lobbies companies to 
adopt responsible 
harvesting practices 
M various 
Justice for 
Janitors 
Service 
Employees 
International 
Union ongoing 
union 
contracts; 
human rights 
has targeted several 
companies; one aim is to 
prevent harassment of 
immigrant workers 
M Verizon 
Verizon 
Communi-
cations 
CWA and 
IBEW 2009 
union 
contract 
won a union contract, 
now focusing on other 
companies like AT&T 
and T-Mobile 
C 
Victoria’s 
Secret 
Victoria’s 
Dirty Secret ForestEthics 2005 
old growth 
forests 
concluded successfully; 
part of Catalog Cutdown 
campaign 
M Wal-Mart 
Merchant of 
Shame 
National 
Organization 
of Women ongoing 
Sexual 
discriminatio
n 
campaign began in 2002; 
US Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the company 
in 2011 
C Wal-Mart 
Wal-Mart 
Watch 
Wal-Mart 
Watch ongoing 
ethical 
business 
practices monitoring site 
C 
Wal-Mart, 
National 
Association 
of Christian 
Retail 
Sweat Shop 
Crucifixes 
NLC 
(National 
Labor 
Committee) 2007 
sweatshop 
labor 
dramatic revelation re: 
sweatshop labor on steps 
of St. Patrick’s Cathedral 
just before start of 
holiday shopping season 
C 
Walt Disney 
Corp 
Disney Go 
Green 
CHEJ 
(Center for 
Health, 
Environment, 
and Justice) ongoing 
cleaning 
products 
w/toxic 
chemicals 
group sponsors many 
environmental 
campaigns; founded by 
“Love Canal” families 
M 
Washington 
Gas & Light 
Co.  
IGUW 
(International 
Union of Gas 
Workers) & 
Teamsters 1995-96 
union 
contract 
1,000 member local wins 
union contract after it 
affiliates with Teamsters; 
Rogers consulted 
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International 
M 
whaling 
industry Whaling Greenpeace ongoing 
denormalize 
whaling 
began in 1975; 
international campaign; 
featured boat blockades; 
whalers shot harpoons at 
activists 
M 
Wheeling 
Pittsburgh 
Steel 
Corporation 
Wheeling 
Pittsburgh 
Steel 
Corporation USWA 1996 
union 
contract 
classic “corporate 
campaign,” but Rogers 
did not consult; intensive 
media events; company 
settled 
C Whole Foods   CIW 2009 
wages & 
slavery 
company signed onto the 
penny per pound standard 
after brief campaign 
C 
Yoplait 
Yogurt   OCA 2009 
hormones in 
milk 
company agreed to 
cooperate 
C 
YUM! and 
10 other fast 
food chains 
No Free 
Refills 
Dogwood 
Alliance ongoing 
reduce use of 
non-recycled 
paper 
clever, professional 
looking website w/parody 
of drive up window; 
features internet petition 
C  various 
POPs 
Campaign 
Indigenous 
Environment
al Network ongoing 
children’s 
health; toxic 
waste on 
tribal lands 
POP = Persistent Organic 
Pollutants; fought 
corporate toxic waste 
dumping, especially in 
Arizona & Canada 
C  various 
Other 
Campaign/ La 
Otra Campana EZLN ongoing 
 
“neoliberalis
m;” 
privatization 
of public 
resources 
based in Mexico; lobbies 
national government, but 
has international 
emphasis; has cooperated 
with CIW, FLOC, and 
other activist groups with 
indigenous roots 
M  Portland, OR   
SweatFree 
Communities 2007 
sweatshop 
labor 
City of Portland agreed 
not to buy clothing made 
in sweatshops 
C  various 
Cocoa 
Campaign 
International 
Labor Rights 
Fund ongoing 
slavery/hum
an 
trafficking 
protests use of child 
slavery in West African 
chocolate trade 
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Appendix B: “Power on Power” Strategies 
 
 
 
 
Illustrations are from a brochure distributed by Corporate Campaigns, Inc.
22
 
 
 
  
                                                 
22 Ray Rogers, “When Labor Needs a Powerful Friend...” (New York: Corporate Campaign, Incorporated, 
2009). 
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Appendix C: Activist Resources  
Activist Training Materials 
Title Author(s) Pub City Year Notes 
Action Planning 
Training Manual 
  
The 
Ruckus 
Society 
Oakland, 
CA 
2003 
Eight page manual; basically a 
brief explanation and apologia 
for direct action campaigns 
The Activist’s Ally: 
Contemplative Tools 
for Social Change 
  
The 
Center for 
Contempl
ative 
Mind in 
Society 
Northamp
ton, MA 
2007 
105 page manual w/section on 
business; comes w/companion 
CD 
Activist Research 
Manual: Volume 1: 
Sources of 
Information on 
Corporations 
Draffan, 
George 
Public 
Informati
on 
Network 
Seattle, 
WA 
1999 
91 page manual focused 100% 
on activist research of 
corporations 
Activist Research? 
Glocal 
Research 
Space 
    2004 
Very short, but includes list of 
18 organizations (most based 
at universities worldwide) 
“developing social action 
research” 
An Activist’s Guide to 
Helping People 
Protect America’s 
Wild Places: Stand 
By Your Land 
  
Wildernes
s Support 
Center 
Durango, 
CO 
2005 
76 page manual; includes long 
list of links to similar 
resources 
An Activist’s Manual 
on the International 
Covenant on 
Economic, Cultural, 
and Social Rights 
King, Jeff 
Center for 
Economic 
and 
Social 
Rights 
Brooklyn, 
NY 
2003 
286 page manual; focuses on 
human rights under ICESCR, 
adopted by UN Gen Assembly 
in 1966 
An Activists Guide to 
Research and 
Advocacy: Core 
Manual, Research 
and Analysis Skills 
Strengthening 
Programme 
Civil 
Society 
Research 
and Support 
Collective 
Center for 
Civil 
Society, 
Universit
y of Natal 
Durban, 
South 
Africa 
2003 
150 pages; specific 
discussions of challenging 
corporate lobbying power 
Campus Organizing: 
Guide for Social 
Justice Groups 
 
Center for 
Campus 
Organizin
g 
Cambridg
e, MA 
2002 
Sixteen pages; focused on 
challenging corporate 
influence on college 
campuses; Organization 
merged into new group, 
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website: 
www.campusactivism.org 
Celebrating the 40th 
Anniversary of the 
Wilderness Act– 
WITH ACTION!: An 
Outreach Guide for 
Advocates 
  
Campaign 
for 
America’
s 
Wildernes
s 
Washingt
on, DC 
2004 
43 page manual; primary 
focus is on lobbying 
governmental actors, but 
includes discussion of 
protesting corporate policies 
The Corporate Watch 
DIY Guide to How to 
Research Companies 
  
Corporate 
Watch 
(UK) 
Oxford, 
UK 
2002 
Sixteen pages; appears to be 
widely distributed; includes 
numerous web links 
Demystifying 
Economics: A 
Scoping of Economic 
Education Resources 
  
Institute 
of 
Develop
ment 
Studies 
Brighton, 
UK 
2004 
27 pages; a listing of practical 
resources to help activists and 
non-intellectuals grasp 
actionable economics; co-
produced w/Just Associates in 
Washington, DC 
A DigiActive 
Introduction to 
Facebook Activism 
Schultz, Dan 
DigiActiv
e 
  2008 
Fifteen pages; organization 
claims to exist on the web 
w/no central office 
GarmentReport   
Women 
Working 
Worldwid
e 
Manchest
er, UK 
2003 
256 pages; detailed study of 
working conditions in EU/UK 
garment supply chains; 
focuses on possibilities for 
organizing female workers 
Grassroots and 
Nonprofit 
Leadership: A Guide 
for Organizing in 
Changing Times 
Lakey, Berit 
M.; Lakey, 
George, 
Napier, Rod; 
Robinson, 
Janice M. 
New 
Society 
Gabriola 
Island, BC 
1995 Full length book, 210 pages; 
Grass Roots 
Organizing 
  
Sierra 
Club 
Washingt
on, DC 
2006 
113 pages; several editions; 
appears highly influential. 
Grass Roots 
Organizing On Texas 
Water Issues 
  
Lone Star 
Sierra 
Cub 
 San 
Antonio 
2004 
Eleven page manual; material 
adapted from Sierra Club’s 
main manual 
Guide to Confronting 
a Factory Farm 
  
Socially 
Responsi
ble 
Agricultu
re Project 
Idaho 
Falls, ID 
2007 143 pages 
High School 
Organizing Manual 
  
United 
Students 
Against 
Sweatsho
ps 
Washingt
on, DC 
2007 
156 pages; attempts to bring 
university activism to high 
schools 
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An Introduction to 
Nonviolent Direct 
Action 
  
Rainfores
t Action 
Network 
San 
Francisco 
No date 
Three page flier w/links to 
organizations providing more 
detailed info (e.g., RANT and 
Ruckus Soc.) 
Justice For All: A 
Guide to Worker 
Rights in a Global 
Economy 
  AFL-CIO 
Washingt
on, DC 
2008 
349 page guide to 
international labor agreements 
No More Secret 
Candy Store: A 
Grassroots Guide to 
Investigating 
Development 
Subsidies 
LeRoy, 
Greg & 
Hinkley, 
Sara 
Good 
Jobs First 
Washingt
on, DC 
2002 
28 page “how to” research 
manual 
Organizing for Social 
Change 
Bobo, Kim; 
Kendall, 
Jackie; & 
Max, Steve 
Seven 
Locks 
Press 
Santa 
Ana, CA 
2010 
Fourth edition of the most 
widely read book of its kind; 
focuses on lobbying 
governmental actors, but 
includes discussions of 
market-based activism as well; 
published by the Midwest 
Academy 
Re-Energizing Your 
City: The Cool Cities 
Campaign Activist 
Manual 
  
Sierra 
Club 
San 
Francisco 
2005 
Sixteen pages; focuses on 
limiting corporate greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Research for 
Radicals: A How to 
Manual for Activists 
of All Kinds 
“Megan” 
TAO 
Communi
cations 
Vancouve
r, BC 
2000 
TAO Communications is an 
“anarchist cooperative”; the 
manual is based on an anti-
corporate research manual 
produced by CorpWatch in the 
UK 
Strategy: Knowledge 
for a Better World 
  
Institute 
of 
Develop
ment 
Studies 
Brighton, 
UK 
2010 
Four pages; primarily and 
overview of the organization’s 
goals and resources 
Organizations Providing Training or Research Services 
Organization Note 
AFL-CIO 
Corporate 
Watch 
Provides a variety of online resources and links for researching corporations 
CARP Corporate Agriculture Research Project; monitors corporate agriculture w/goal 
of serving “economic and social justice”; provides an online “fact miners” guide 
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Corporate 
Accountability 
International 
 Has been sponsoring anti-corporate campaigns for more than thirty years; 
publishes an annual “Corporate Hall of Shame” 
Corporate 
Campaigns, Inc. 
Founded by Ray Rogers; provides research and consulting services for anti-
corporate activists 
Corporate 
Information 
Similar to Hoover’s 
Corporate 
Research 
Project 
“A non-profit center that assists community, environmental and labor 
organizations in researching and analyzing companies and industries.” 
Corporate 
Watch 
Research group based in UK; provides info on corporations to activist groups 
CorpWatch Research group based in US; advocates for corporate transparency and 
accountability 
DigiActive Helps grassroots activists around the world leverage their influence by using 
computers and phones 
Essential 
Information 
Founded by Ralph Nader in 1982; sponsors campaigns, conducts research, and 
publishes Multinational Monitor 
Good Jobs First Parent organization for the Corporate Research Project 
Hoover’s Largest and best known corporate profile service; intended for investors, but 
popular w/activists as well 
Institute of 
Development 
Studies 
Large organization founded in 1966: focuses on international development 
Midwest 
Academy 
Highly influential organization; trains activists and publishes Organizing for 
Social Change 
Muckety Provides profiles and relationship maps of corporations, officers, et al; also 
maps relationships between/among politicians, celebrities, activists, et al. 
Multinational 
Monitor 
Founded by Ralph Nader; dedicated to monitoring corporate behavior; 
publishes annual “Top Ten Worst Corporations” 
Notable Names 
Database 
Like Muckety, this site provides relationship maps of high profile people 
Public 
Information 
Network 
Also known as Endgame Research; may be a one man show 
Rant Collective RANT (Root Activist Network of Trainers) collective formed in 2001. Targets 
governmental and corporate actors 
Sierra Club  Founded in 1892 by John Muir; largest environmental activism group in the US 
Socially 
Responsible 
Agriculture 
Project 
Opposes factory farming 
Sourcewatch Wiki site sponsored by the Center for Media and Democracy; provides 
information on corporations, PR firms, and political actors 
The Data Oldest organization of its kind; 30+ years in activist research 
320 
 
 
 
  
Center 
United Students 
Against 
Sweatshops 
Claims to have student chapters on more than 25 college campuses in US and 
Canada 
US-SEC All corporations must file information periodically w/SEC; all information is 
publicly available 
Women 
Working 
Worldwide 
Researches EU/UK supply chains and working conditions of women 
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Appendix D: Stevens Campaign: Photographs and Pamphlets 
 
23
       
The text to the right of the photograph of the injured worker reads, “Listen to 18-year-old Kathy 
Peace: ‘I was runnin’ a tufting machine in the Riverine plant at J. P. Stevens.’ Was she trained to 
run the machine? ‘No sir.’ How long had she been working when she lost two fingers? ‘About an 
hour and 45 minutes…’” 
 
 
                                                 
23 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “What’s Under the Covers? Danger on the Job at J. 
P. Stevens.” 
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”J. P. Stevens Today” brochure24 
 
 
The narrow, neatly made beds in this image, (an enlargement of the photo in the upper right 
corner of the brochure printed above) bear a close resemblance to the image that appeared on the 
front covers of ACTWU’S “What’s Under the Covers?” pamphlets.25 
  
                                                 
24 J. P. Stevens and Company, “J. P. Stevens Today,” undated company pamphlet, J. P. Stevens folder, box 
31, pamphlets collection, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta, 7. 
25 Ibid. 
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26
 
 
 
27
 
                                                 
26 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “J. P. Stevens, 1979: ‘Further Harm is Done.’” 
Campaign pamphlet dated March, 1980, J. P. Stevens folder, box 61, pamphlets collection, Southern Labor 
Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
27 Ibid. 
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28
 
Page from the “Testimony” pamphlet. ACTWU produced a documentary film by the same 
name.
29
  
 
                                                 
28 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Testimony,” 6. 
29 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Testimony: Justice V. J.P. Stevens, documentary 
film, ACTWU Executive Vice-President’s Office Files, Collection Number: 5619/006, Box 3, Folder 22, Kheel 
Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, M.P. Catherwood Library, Cornell University.  
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By placing Whitley’s face and story next to an image of the Stevens Tower in Manhattan, 
ACTWU provided a paradigm example of planned incongruity
30
 
                                                 
30 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Testimony,” 2; Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 
309. 
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31
 
                                                 
31 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Testimony,” 10. 
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32
 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 11. 
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33
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “There’s a Hole in Willie Brice’s Christmas 
Stocking.” 
329 
 
These two illustrations are from hand-made pamphlets distributed to textile workers during the 
Stevens campaign. Both illustrate the CIW’s use of carnivalesque inversion. 34 
 
35
 
                                                 
34 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “Welcome to the Scene, Mr. Greene!” 
35 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “J. P. Stevens Talks Out of Both Sides of Their 
Mouth.”  
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36
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “My J. P. Stevens Coloring Book.” 
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37
  
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
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Appendix E: Images from the Taco Bell Campaign 
38
 
  Photo courtesy of Jodi Cobb/National Geographic Magazine 
 
 
39
 
Photo courtesy of Miami Herald/McClatchy-Tribune/Getty Images 
                                                 
38 Jodi Cobb, photograph of CIW protestors, in Andrew Cockburn, “21st Century Slaves,” National 
Geographic, September 1, 2003, 2. 
39 Evelyn Nieves, “Fla. Tomato Pickers Still Reap ‘Harvest of Shame.” 
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Photo courtesy of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers.  
 
According to the CIW website, in this scene protestors are using “powerful, silent theater – 
inspired by the Brazilian peasant movement’s traditional ‘mistica’ form of popular theater [in 
order to tell] … the story of Mexican and Guatemalan peasants uprooted from their communities 
by poverty, forced into a desperate migration to Florida’s tomato fields.”40   
 
 
Photo courtesy of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers.  
 
The caption for this photograph from the CIW website reads: “The theater drew the clear 
connection between farmworker poverty and fast-food profits, as consumers brought Taco Bell 
executives piles of money while the workers picked bucket after bucket of tomatoes. But the 
theater ended when the workers and consumers united in a hunger strike and forced the Taco 
Bell executives to the table. As the theater came to a close, workers and allies distributed cups of 
water to the crowd in a symbolic joining with the hunger strikers.” 41 
  
                                                 
40 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Let Freedom Ring… Boycott the Bell!” 
41 Ibid. 
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Appendix F: CIW’s Anti-Slavery Campaign 
Information is from the CIW Website
42
 
 
U.S. vs. Flores – In 1997, Miguel Flores and Sebastian Gomez were sentenced to 15 years each 
in federal prison on slavery, extortion, and firearms charges, amongst others. Flores and Gomez 
had a workforce of over 400 men and women in Florida and South Carolina, harvesting 
vegetables and citrus. The workers, mostly indigenous Mexicans and Guatemalans, were forced 
to work 10-12 hour days, 6 days per week, for as little as $20 per week, under the watch of 
armed guards. Those who attempted escape were assaulted, pistol-whipped, and even shot. The 
case was brought to federal authorities after five years of investigation by escaped workers and 
CIW members. 
 
U.S. vs. Cuello – In 1999, Abel Cuello was sentenced to 33 months in federal prison on slavery 
charges. He had held more than 30 tomato pickers in two trailers in the isolated swampland west 
of Immokalee, keeping them under constant watch. Three workers escaped the camp, only to 
have their boss track them down a few weeks later. The employer ran one of them down with his 
car, stating that he owned them. The workers sought help from the CIW and the police, and the 
CIW worked with the DOJ on the ensuing investigation. Cuello worked for Manley Farms North 
Inc., a major Bonita Springs tomato supplier. Once out of prison, Cuello supplied labor to Ag-
Mart Farms, a tomato company operating in Florida and North Carolina. 
 
U.S. vs. Tecum – In 2001, Jose Tecum was sentenced to 9 years in federal prison on slavery and 
kidnapping charges. He forced a young woman to work against her will both in the tomato fields 
around Immokalee, and in his home. The CIW assisted the DOJ with the prosecution, including 
victim and witness assistance. 
 
U.S. vs. Lee – In 2001, Michael Lee was sentenced to 4 years in federal prison and 3 years 
supervised release on a slavery conspiracy charge. He pled guilty to using crack cocaine, threats, 
and violence to enslave his workers. Lee held his workers in forced labor, recruiting homeless 
U.S. citizens for his operation, creating a “company store” debt through loans for rent, food, 
cigarettes, and cocaine. He abducted and beat one of his workers to prevent him from leaving his 
employ. Lee harvested for orange growers in the Fort Pierce, FL area. 
 
U.S. vs. Ramos – In 2004, Ramiro and Juan Ramos were sentenced to 15 years each in federal 
prison on slavery and firearms charges, and the forfeiture of over $3 million in assets. The men, 
who had a workforce of over 700 farmworkers in the citrus groves of Florida, as well as the 
fields of North Carolina, threatened workers with death if they were to try to leave, and pistol-
whipped and assaulted – at gunpoint – passenger van service drivers who gave rides to 
farmworkers leaving the area. The case was brought to trial by the DOJ after two years of 
investigation by the CIW. The Ramoses harvested for Consolidated Citrus and Lykes Brothers, 
among others. 
 
                                                 
42 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “CIW Anti-Slavery Campaign,” www.ciw-online.org/slavery.html 
(accessed November 7, 2010). 
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U.S. vs. Ronald Evans – In 2007, Florida employer Ron Evans was sentenced to 30 years in 
federal prison on drug conspiracy, financial re-structuring, and witness tampering charges, 
among others. Jequita Evans was also sentenced to 20 years, and Ron Evans Jr. to 10 years. 
Operating in Florida and North Carolina, Ron Evans recruited homeless U.S. citizens from 
shelters across the Southeast, including New Orleans, Tampa, and Miami, with promises of good 
jobs and housing. At Palatka, FL and Newton Grove, NC area labor camps, the Evans’ deducted 
rent, food, crack cocaine and alcohol from workers’ pay, holding them “perpetually indebted” in 
what the DOJ called “a form of servitude morally and legally reprehensible.” The Palatka labor 
camp was surrounded by a chain link fence topped with barbed wire, with a No Trespassing sign. 
The CIW and a Miami-based homeless outreach organization (Touching Miami with Love) 
began the investigation and reported the case to federal authorities in 2003. In Florida, Ron 
Evans worked for grower Frank Johns. Johns was 2004 Chairman of the Florida Fruit and 
Vegetable Association, the powerful lobbying arm of the Florida agricultural industry. As of 
2007, he remained the Chairman of the FFVA’s Budget and Finance Committee. 
 
U.S. vs. Navarrete – In December 2008, employers Cesar and Geovanni Navarrete were 
sentenced to 12 years each in federal prison on charges of conspiracy, holding workers in 
involuntary servitude, and peonage. They had employed dozens of tomato pickers in Florida and 
South Carolina. As stated in the DOJ press release on their sentencing, “[the employers] pleaded 
guilty to beating, threatening, restraining, and locking workers in trucks to force them to work as 
agricultural laborers... [They] were accused of paying the workers minimal wages and driving 
the workers into debt, while simultaneously threatening physical harm if the workers left their 
employment before their debts had been repaid to the Navarrete family.” Workers first reported 
the abuse to Collier County police, and additional workers sought help from the CIW. The CIW 
collaborated with the DOJ and the police on the year-long investigation and prosecution. 
 
U.S. vs. Bontemps – In July 2010, Cabioch Bontemps, Carline Ceneus, and Willy Edouard were 
indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiracy to commit forced labor. DOJ officials 
accuse the three of holding over 50 guest workers from Haiti against their will in the bean fields 
of Alachua County, Florida. The indictment states that Bontemps raped one of the workers in his 
employ and threatened her if she were to report it. The employers held the workers’ passports 
and visas, and forced them to work in fields recently sprayed with harsh pesticides, causing 
permanent scarring. The grower, Steven Davis, asked the judge during the court hearing to 
release Bontemps since he was key to the harvesting operation. “All these people [the workers] 
look up to him,” Davis said. “All these people respect him. All these people worship him.” As of 
September 2010, the prosecution is ongoing. The CIW trained local law enforcement and church 
groups shortly before the workers were rescued, and assisted in referring the case to the DOJ. 
[As of the date of this dissertation, case is still in the courts.] 
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Appendix G: Taco Bell Campaign Endorsements as of September, 2004 
This information is from the CIW website.
1
 
 
Individuals 
* Tom Morello, Audioslave (formerly, Rage Against the Machine) 
* Susan Sarandon 
* Noam Chomsky, professor, MIT 
* Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, D-CA 
* CA State Senator Joe Dunn, D-District 34 
* Edward James Olmos 
* The Indigo Girls 
* Chumbawamba  
* Eric Schlosser (author, “Fast Food Nation”) 
* Barbara Ehrenreich (author, “Nickel and Dimed”) 
* David Korten (author, “When Corporations Rule the World”) 
* Naomi Klein (author, “No Logo”) 
* Dolores Huerta 
* Julia Butterfly Hill 
* Howard Zinn (author, “A People’s History of the United States) 
* Lalo Alcaraz, cartoonist 
* Louis Andriessen, composer 
* Paul Loeb (author, “Soul of a Citizen”) 
 
Labor 
* American Postal Workers Union (APWU) 
* Los Angeles County Federation of Labor 
* United Farm Workers (UFW) 
* Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noreste (PCUN) 
* Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) 
* United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, UE District 10  
* San Francisco Labor Council (SFLC) 
* Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union Local 2850 (HERE) 
* Coalition of University Employees Local 3 (CUE - Berkeley, CA) 
* Oakland Education Association (OEA - Oakland, CA) 
* Laborers International Union, District Council (Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota) 
* South Florida Jobs with Justice 
* The Garment Workers Center 
* United Campus Workers (Communication Workers of America, Local 3865, Knoxville, TN) * 
Workers Solidarity Alliance (WSA National Office, NY, NY) 
 
Global Justice 
* United for Peace and Justice 
* Mexico Solidarity Network 
* Global Exchange 
                                                 
1 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, “Endorsements.”  
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* Campaign for Labor Rights 
* United for a Fair Economy 
* Food First 
* Anti-Slavery International (London) 
 
Student 
* Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan, National (MEChA) 
* MEChA de Palomar College 
* United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) 
* United States Student Association (USSA) 
* Student Labor Action Project (SLAP) 
* Student Environmental Action Coalition (SEAC) 
* Student/Farmworker Alliance 
* Campus Greens 
* Student Peace Action Network (SPAN) 
* Students Transforming and Resisting Corporations (STARC) 
* Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC) 
* University of California Student Association (UCSA) 
* Purdue Organization for Labor Equality (POLE)  
* The Movement for Democracy for Education 180 
* San Diego State University, Student Government 
* Harvard Divinity School, Anti-Poverty Campaign and Equitas 
Religious 
* National Council of Churches 
* United Methodist Church 
* Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)  
* Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) 
* United Church of Christ 
* California Council of Churches 
* Pax Christi USA 
* American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
* New Orleans Province of the Jesuits 
* Bishop John Nevins, DD, Diocese of Venice, Florida 
* Peace and Justice Office, Diocese of Venice, Florida 
* Episcopal Diocese of Southwest Florida 
* Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
* National Farm Worker Ministry 
* National Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice 
* Ohio Council of Churches 
* First Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Findlay, OH  
* Florida Council of Churches Commission on Social Justice 
* Apostolic Catholic Church (SW Florida) 
* Sarasota/Manatee Farm Worker Supporters 
* The Session of Lakeview Presbyterian Church, Florida 
* North Carolina Council of Churches Farmworker Ministry Committee 
* Florida United Church of Christ Women 
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* Florida Church Women United 
* Church Women United of Illinois 
* South Florida Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice 
* Tampa Farm Worker Supporters 
* Interfaith Action of Southwest Florida 
* Unitarian Universalist Migrant Ministry 
* Religious Society of Friends, Ft. Myers Meeting 
* Florida Council of Churches Commission on Social Justice 
* Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary 
* Orange County (CA) Interfaith Committee to Aid Farm Workers 
Community/other 
* National Family Farm Coalition 
* Family Farm Defenders 
* Community Farm Alliance of Kentucky and Indiana 
* National Lawyers Guild 
* American Anti-Slavery Group 
* School of Americas Watch (SOA Watch) 
* Florida AIM (American Indian Movement) 
* ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) 
* Florida Green Party 
* LUS (Latinos Unidos Siempre), youth organization, Oregon 
* Florida Coalition of Peace and Justice 
* Long Beach, CA, Green Party 
* The Simple Way 
* Zapatista Solidarity Coalition - Sacramento, CA 
* Bay Area (San Francisco) Radical Women 
* Green Party of Brevard County, FL 
* The Blue-Green Alliance of the Green Party of Florida 
* San Francisco Day Laborers 
* Marin (CA) Interfaith Task Force on Latin America 
* Liberate Orange County (CA) 
* Coastal Convergence Society (Huntington Beach, CA) 
 
